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Abstract 
This thesis investigates several issues relating to corporate governance. These issues 
include the relationships between corporate governance and each of: strategy, failure, 
and financial performance. 
We find that major reductions in the level of diversity of companies are preceded by 
changes in the identity of the major shareholder. Also, companies which had a 
majority of outside (non-executive) directors on their board, and did not have a 
divisional structure, were more likely to fail. With regards corporate governance and 
financial performance, we find that board structure is not a consistent determinant of 
performance. 
The studies herein also provide insights into board structure, corporate control and 
interlocks in New Zealand public companies. Board size has declined by 
approximately one director since the mid-1980s, as has the number of outside 
directors. We find no support for any "managerial revolution" in New Zealand; on 
the contrary our public listed companies have increasingly become subject to the 
control of major shareholders. In particular control by both foreign and institutional 
investors has increased over the last ten years. There has also been a reduction in the 
level of interlocks between New Zealand public companies. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is concerned with a number of important, and hitherto somewhat 
neglected, issues relating to corporate governance, corporate strategy, and the 
relationship between these. Foremost among these research questions are: What 
effect does corporate governance have on corporate strategy and on the survival of 
large New Zealand corporations? What influences the structure of boards of 
directors? What impact does board structure have on corporate financial 
performance? 
The research undertaken uses readily identifiable aspects of board structure to 
investigate some of the issues outlined above. These qualities include: whether or 
not the chief executive officer is also board chair (CEO duality), the number of 
directors, and the number and proportion of non-executive (outside) directors. This 
approach is taken for two reasons: First, to ensure consistency with previous 
research. Second, for the sake of convenience, and possible replication (such data 
can easily be obtained from secondary data sources, such as annual reports). 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE THESIS 
We will use the term corporate strategy to refer to those decisions which determine 
the range of industries in which a firm is active at any point in time.1 In other words, 
the scope for strategic choice are the entry (diversification) and exit (divestment) 
decisions which determine the set of industries in which a firm is operating at any 
point in time. 
During the period 1975 to 1985, New Zealand listed companies with a related 
diversified strategy outperformed companies having other corporate strategies, in 
terms of return on assets, return on equity and growth in sales (Hamilton and 
Shergill, 1992, 1993a, 1993b). Given the demonstrated superiority of this strategy 
1 Refer Appendix 1 for a description of the measurement of corporate strategy used in this thesis. 
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we would expect companies not already having this strategy to adopted it in the 
subsequent period, 1985 to 1990. However, if we examine the corporate strategies of 
listed companies present in both 1985 and 1990 (refer Table 1.1), we observe that 
this is not the case. There was no such move to related diversification. On the 
contrary, three of the six companies which had this strategy in 1985 adopted another 
strategy by 1990. Furthermore, we note that in 1990, surviving companies tended to 
lie at the two extremes in terms of strategy (23 of our 54 companies retained very low 
diversity over 1985-90 and 15 retained very high diversity as their strategy over this 
same period). In contrast, there was a more even spread of corporate strategies 
among companies listed in 1985, which did not survive to 1990 (refer Table 1.2). Of 
particular interest in Table 1.2, we note that firms having a related diversification 
strategy in 1985 did not appear to reduce the risks of failure (ie., disappearance) 
through to 1990. 
From the foregoing we observe that, contrary to our expectations there was in fact a 
move away from what we anticipated, from previous research, to be the corporate 
strategy associated with both the highest growth rate and company profitability. 
TABLE 1.1 
Corporate strategy of New Zealand 
listed companies, 1985-90 
No. of companies 
Stable corporate strategy 
VLD 23 
RD 3 
UD 6 
VHD 15 
Change in corporate 
strategy 
RD to VLD 1 
RD to VHD 2 
UDto VLD 1 
UDto VHD 1 
VLDtoUD 2 
Total 54 
Note: VLD=very low diversity; RD=related diversified; 
UD=unrelated diversified; VHD=very high diversity. 
TABLE 1.2 
Corporate strategy in 1985 
of New Zealand listed companies, 
listed from 1980A 85, 
but not surviving to 1990 
Corporate strategy No. % 
VLD 26 27.7 
RD 26 27.7 
UD 20 21.3 
VHD 22 23.4 
Totals 94 100.0 
Note: VLD=very low diversity; RD=related diversified; 
UD=unrelated diversified; VHD=very high diversity. 
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One possibility that may explain our findings in this regard is that, contrary to our 
expectations - from Hamilton and Shergill (1992, 1993a, 1993b) - companies having 
a related diversification strategy during 1985-90 did not outperform companies with 
other corporate strategies during this period. Given that only three of the 54 
companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE) from 1985 to 1990 
were observed to have retained a related diversified strategy over that same period 
(refer Table 1.3), no statistical comparison can be made of the relative performance 
. merits of this strategy compared to other corporate strategies. However, if we 
examine the performance impact of other corporate strategies (very low diversity, 
unrelated diversification and very high diversity) we find that none of these strategies 
appears to have any significant impact on corporate performance (refer Table 1.3). 
Table 1.3 shows regressions of corporate strategy and two control variables (firm size 
and leverage) on three performance variables. The companies included for analysis 
are those 47 which retained the same corporate strategy over the 1985-90 period, ie. 
the 54 firms listed between 1985 and 1990 less the 7 firms which changed their 
corporate strategy during that period. 
Our constant term includes those three companies having the related diversified 
strategy for 1985-90. The null findings of this regression (note that the F-statistics 
are not significant) indicate that, primajacie, corporate strategy does not appear to be 
driving the financial performance of New Zealand listed companies. Also of interest 
is the lack of significance during 1985-90 of the two control variables, firm size and 
leverage, which Hamilton and Shergill (1992, 1993a, 1993b) had previously found to 
be significantly associated with financial performance. Hence, none of the traditional 
determinants of corporate performance appear to be important during the period 
18 
investigated. This is not intended as a criticism of previous research in this area. 
Rather these findings are reported to stress the importance of context in any study of 
corporate behaviour and performance, and to justify our study of other explanations 
of the patterns of corporate strategies adopted by New Zealand companies. 
TABLE 1.3 
Regression analysis of company performance, 1985e 90 
Peiformance variables 
Independent variables ROA ROE G_SALES 
Constant term 23.91 -10.70 -26.81 
(t-values) (2.41) (-0.28) ( -0.39) 
Very low diversity -8.39 -17.05 34.09 
(-1.47) (-0.76) (0.86) 
Unrelated diversification 1.10 -7.12 12.39 
(0.17) (-0.28) (0.27) 
Very high diversity -0.93 -2.89 11.71 
( -0.15) ( -0.12) (0.28) 
Firm size* -0.71 2.71 3.98 
(-0.87) (0.85) (0.71) 
Leverage** -3.65 -14.16 -3.01 
(-0.48) (0.48) (-0.06) 
Adjusted R2 0.04 -0.02 -0.08 
No. of observations 47 47 47 
F-statistic 1.36 0.81 0.27 
(5,41) (5,41) (5,41) 
Notes: ROA=Return on assets; ROE=Return on equity; G_SALES=Growth in sales 
(all are averages for 1985 to 1990 inclusive). 
* Firm size was measured as the natural logarithm of total tangible assets, 
averaged over 1985-90. 
** Leverage was measured as (current liabilities+long-term liabilities+minority 
interests)/total tangible assets, multiplied by 100, and averaged over 1985-
1990. 
The question facing us then is: what does drive the strategy of New Zealand 
companies? One general explanation lies in the economic environment during 1985 
to 1990, which was a time of economic liberalisation, in stark contrast to the pre-
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1985 period which was characterised by wide-spread government intervention. It has 
been observed that post-1985, New Zealand moved from one of the "most regulated 
societies in the free world, to the world's freest market economy" (Passow, 1992, 
p.5). Furthermore, during this period unemployment rose rapidly and, with the 
depressed domestic economy, retrenchment and divestment strategies were more 
commonly pursued by New Zealand companies (Hamilton and Chow, 1993). It is 
possible that the turbulent economic environment during 1985-90 led to a situation 
where a strategy of related diversification was no longer best in terms of these 
performance outcomes. In this respect it has been observed that the strategy-
performance relationship only holds in "growth" environments (Reger, Duhaime and 
Stimpert, 1992; Chenhall, 1984) which offer more scope for diversification. The 
turbulent economic environment may have led to a situation where goals of increased 
profitability and growth were replaced by the need merely to survive. 
Another possible explanation of the corporate strategies adopted by these of New 
Zealand companies lies in corporate governance structures of these companies. For 
example, the New Zealand Institute of Directors comment: 
... the directors constitute the link between shareholders and management. 
While the ultimate control of the company rests with shareholders ... the 
responsibility for the strategic direction of the company, the determination 
of business objectives and the achievement of those objectives rests with 
the board (Institute of Directors, 1991). 
The emphasis added to the above quote gives one view of how governance can 
influence strategy. In particular we note that the role of the directors is that of 
determining a company's corporate strategy and ensuring that it is achieved. 
Generally, we can view corporate governance as power and influence over what a 
company does, ie., corporate strategy. Such influence on strategy may be direct, for 
example in the case where the major shareholder is also CEO and has selected the 
other board members, or indirect - for example where there is a major shareholder 
who is not represented on the board of directors, but can influence the board through 
the power held in terms of being able to select directors. 
A decision was made early in this project to seek breadth coverage rather than a 
single narrow focus. This was done for two reasons. First, the broad-ranging nature 
of the issues under investigation, particularly governance. Second, the likely 
difficulty of sourcing original New Zealand data on anyone front. A consequence of 
this is that this thesis seeks in the main to test the extension of overseas findings to 
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the New Zealand context. Hence, we provide a useful extension of overseas studies, 
but at the same time have the shortcomings of such studies. These shortcomings 
occur because we resort to the use of proxy measures of corporate governance. 
Because corporate governance is about intangibles such as power and influence, 
proxy measures of governance may fail to adequately capture the richness of the 
variables they seek to explain. We will now turn our attention to those individuals 
and groups which are considered to be powerful or influential in terms of corporate 
governance: 
1.3 KEY "ACTORS" IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
There are several key "actors" in corporate governance. These actors and the 
relationships between them are shown in Table 1.4. The board itself is seen to be 
responsible to shareholders, who can through their shareholding stake have a say in 
who represents their interests (i.e., who sits on the board). Directors as a group have 
a leader (using the term loosely), namely the board chairperson. This person may 
also be the chief executive officer (CEO) of the company, in which case CEO duality 
(i.e., the holding of the dual role of chairperson and CEO) is said to occur. In the 
event that the CEO or another executive is board chairperson, we refer to this person 
as executive chairperson. Another possibility is that the board chairperson is a non-
executive director, in which case we refer to them as non-executive chairperson. The 
board of directors, viewed as a group, is seen to comprise both insiders, who are 
serving executives of a company, and outsiders, who are not serving executives. 
Boards may also have common members, thus creating what are termed interlocks 
between companies. 
TABLE 1.4 
Corporate governance famework 
I SHAREHOLDERS I ¢¢ 
BOARD CHAIRPERSON 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
(INSIDERS, OUTSIDERS) 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 
(CEO) 
MANAGEMENT 
BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS 
SHAREHOLDERS 
There are several central issues in corporate governance. These are as follows: 
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.. should the same person function in the dual role of CEO and chairperson? what 
are the implications of this for performance? 
.. what influences the size of a board of directors and does this matter in terms of 
performance? 
.. what determines the composition of a board (outsiders and insiders) and how 
does this affect performance? 
.. when managers are also major shareholders, do we observe differences in 
company strategy and performance? 
Previous corporate governance research has tended to focus on two central elements 
of corporate governance. First, the ownership of corporations (Firth, 1992), and 
second the structure of boards of directors (Chandler and Henshall, 1982; Dalton and 
Kesner, 1987). Typically researchers have sought to relate these governance 
components with corporate financial performance. It appears likely that the plethora 
of studies in these areas has been in part prompted by the relative ease with which the 
necessary data can be collected. 
However, more recently researchers have begun to explore the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate strategy (Fox and Hamilton, 1994; Markides, 
1992; Goodstein and Boeker, 1991). This line of inquiry is intuitively more 
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appealing than the governance-performance literature in several respects. Foremost 
among these is that corporate strategy has been demonstrated to be associated with 
corporate financial performance. In the event that corporate governance does 
influence corporate performance it is likely to do so through the decisions which 
boards make with regards the strategic direction of their companies. Hence 
examining this relationship directly (rather than assuming its existence from 
performance outcomes) is more sensible. 
Furthermore, the relationship between corporate governance and corporate failure has 
received little research attention. This is hardly surprising given the focus of the 
corporate failure literature on the creation of financial models, which exclude the 
roles decision makers play in determining the success of their companies. While 
some attention has been paid to the role of managers (in particular chief executive 
officers and top management teams) in avoiding corporate failure, little attention has 
been paid to the board of directors. Needless to say, this is somewhat surprising 
given that directors are often deemed to be ultimately responsible for the strategic 
direction of the companies on whose boards they serve. In contrast, managers are 
typically charged with the execution or implementation of the corporate strategy. 
Given all of this, a focus on corporate governance per se is relevant when examining 
corporate failure. It may well be the case that some governance structures are 
deficient in that they contribute to decisions being made which in turn lead to failure. 
In this respect the holding of the board chair position by the chief executive officer 
and having a board dominated by executive directors are often seen to lead to the 
pursuit of ends which are not in the interests of all shareholders (Daily and Dalton, 
1993; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). 
The determinants and performance consequences of board composition form other 
streams of literature in corporate governance. The latter is of particular interest given 
calls for governance reform which typically suggest that it is harmful for chief 
executive officers to hold the position of board chair and for boards to be dominated 
by executive directors. Given the importance of this issue and some lack of 
consensus in the literature, we conducted a meta-analysis of the board structure-
performance literature. We also review the literature relating to the determinants of 
board composition in light of the possible effect that the selection of directors may 
have on corporate financial performance. 
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In addition to the aforementioned governance issues, there is a basic lack of data in 
New Zealand regarding corporate control. By corporate control we mean the 
ability/power through ownership to determine the strategic direction of a company. 
In the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, institutional investors have 
played an increasingly active role in monitoring their investments in public 
companies and, more and more, in influencing the direction of these same 
companies. It is possible that the increasing prominence and active role played by 
institutional investors globally has also occurred in New Zealand. 
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The remainder of this thesis comprises eleven chapters, grouped into three main 
sections: 
Section One 
In Chapter 2 we examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate strategy, in particular focusing on major divestment decisions. Chapter 3 
then investigates the role that corporate governance plays in determining the survival 
or failure of companies. 
Section Two 
In Chapter 4 we examine the board structure of New Zealand listed companies, and 
changes in this over time. Then, in Chapter 5 we compare the board structure of 
New Zealand companies with those in other countries. Chapters 6 and 7 investigate 
the performance consequences and determinants of board composition, respectively. 
Section Three 
Chapter 8 examines changes in corporate control and relates these to financial 
performance. Chapter 9 investigates interlocks between boards. In Chapter 10 we 
investigate changes in foreign control and the implications of these changes. And in 
Chapter 11 we focus on institutional investment. 
Finally, Chapter 12 summarises this thesis and provides some directions for future 
corporate governance research. 
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Section One 
Chapter 2 
FROM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
TO CORPORATE STRATEGY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
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In the introduction to this thesis we posited a direct causal connection from corporate 
governance through to corporate strategy. In this chapter we seek to confirm links 
between corporate governance and corporate strategy by studying changes in 
governance and subsequent strategic moves in the form of major divestments. These 
divestment moves had to be sufficient to cause a change in diversity. Such a 
divestment move would, for example, occur if a firm which was unrelated 
diversified, divested units to such an extent that it then was of very low diversity. 
In the previous chapter we proposed that corporate failure was an unambiguous 
measure of corporate performance; likewise major divestment moves can be seen as 
unambiguous strategic moves, thereby giving us the opportunity to investigate 
corporate governance and corporate strategy in a meaningful way. 
With but a few exceptions, noted below, strategy research has proceeded from the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) downward and concentrated on the outcomes of the 
strategy process, e.g., strategic choice, organisational structure, and financial 
performance. The emphasis here is on the inputs to the strategy decision-making 
process which occur at a level above that of the CEO. It is found that changes in 
corporate governance are indeed closely linked to divestment behaviour. 
2.2 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
While there has been much research on aspects of governance and performance 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Hunt, 1986), relatively little attention (Goodstein and 
Boeker, 1991; Boeker, 1989; Carroll, 1984) has been paid to the links between 
governance and corporate strategy, especially the divestment aspect of strategic 
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change.2 Divestment is commonly viewed as a means of discarding unprofitable 
business units (Hamilton and Chow, 1993; Singh, 1993; Montgomery and Thomas, 
1988; Duhaime and Grant, 1984; Vignola, 1974; Lovejoy, 1971). Another, but less 
researched, view of divestment is that it is undertaken in order to enable the divestor 
firm to focus on its core business (Hamilton and Chow, 1993; Markides, 1992). In 
this general regard, an aspect of corporate governance that has been examined is the 
effect of different ratios of insider to outsider (non-executive) directors on company 
boards. Zahra and Stanton (1988) in their study of 100 Fortune 500 companies 
found that outsider dominated boards were associated with divestment decisions and 
board size was negatively correlated with divestments. Also, both the proportion of 
outside directors and the proportion of minorities on the board were positively 
correlated with divestments. In contrast, Goodstein and Boeker (1991) found that 
there was no association between increases in outsider representation on boards and 
divestment behaviour. Changes in the insider/outsider mix on a board of directors do 
not require any change in ownership or in the identity of the CEO. Bhagat, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1990) and Goodstein and Boeker (1991) do conclude that it is changes 
in ownership which are influential for divestment. Bhagat et aI's (1990) study 
examined divestitures over the three year period following hostile takeover of 62 
companies and concluded that: 
In only 20 cases out of the 62 were there no quantifiable selloffs, and even 
in some of these cases ... there were selloffs, but we could not find the price 
... It is absolutely clear from these data that selling off divisions is one of 
the most pervasive consequences of hostile takeovers (Bhagat et aI, 1990, 
p.35). 
Singh (1993) in his recent review of the divestment literature writes that there is "an 
indication of high levels of discretion available to corporate managers" (p .165). One 
means through which such discretion may be curtailed or removed follows changes 
in major shareholders. A new shareholder may bring in a new CEO and top 
management team, or monitor the performance of incumbent managers such as to 
reduce their discretion. Support for this occurring is provided by the management 
succession literature, which indicates that changes in CEOs and other top managers 
are more likely to occur if there has been a change in the identity of the major 
shareholder (refer Kesner and Sebora, 1994, for a review in this regard). 
2 Numerous studies have examined the relationship between corporate governance structure and 
diversification, e.g., Amihud and Lev (1981), Lloyd, Hand and Modani (1987), Fox and Hamilton 
(1994). 
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Furthermore, there are a number of other reasons as to why ownership changes may 
be important in the divestment decision process. Perhaps one of the most compelling 
possibilities is that new owners, not having being involved in the original investment 
decisions are more ready to accept the poor performance of such investments, and 
then discard them. In contrast the previous owners appeared all too ready to continue 
involvement in the poorly performing divested activities. This can be viewed as a 
form of escalation of commitment, with the past owners hoping, against strong 
evidence to the contrary, that continued involvement and further investment would in 
itself lead to improved performance. 
The literature outlined indicates that several governance variables may well play an 
important role in determining divestment behaviour. It is to this area which we now 
turn our attention in the context of New Zealand companies making divestment 
decisions. 
2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
2.3.1 Sample size 
Resort to using a small sample was influenced by the need, following Boeker (1989, 
p.511), to obtain information on the detailed timing of the strategic decisions of 
interest (i.e., major divestments) in order to test theories about the prior events 
expected to be linked to divestment decisions. We believe that the use of a small 
sample will allow more detailed information to be gathered, albeit on a limited 
sample of companies. 
Theory building was done using the five New Zealand listed companies that made a 
variety of major divestment decisions between 1980 and 1985, such that they reduced 
their diversity measure (refer below). These companies were contrasted with another 
(control) group of five companies that did not divest during the same period. Theory 
testing was done on a separate group of four companies, two of which divested 
during 1985-1990 and two which did not. That there were substantially fewer 
companies in the theory testing group is largely attributable to the comparatively 
lower number of companies surviving as listed companies between 1985-90 as 
compared to 1980-85. 
A detailed diary of events was created for each of these 14 companies comprising: 
the key governance variables suggested by the literature (viz., ownership; board 
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composition; CEO identity); financial performance at each balance date; and the 
nature, timing, and declared rationale for any divestments. Theory building then 
involved a detailed comparison of divesting and non-divesting companies across the 
governance variables. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 give some summary information on the 
companies used for theory building and theory testing, respectively. Detailed 
information on the industry involvements of these companies, and - where relevant -
changes in these, appear in Appendix 2. 
It must be noted that our small sample approach is, in part, attributable to the 
difficulty of obtaining governance data generally, and ownership data in particular, 
for a large number of companies. Ownership is particularly difficult to determine 
because of the use of nominee companies to acquire and hold shares. 
TABLE 2.1 
Sample of companies, 1980-85 (theory building) 
Divestors Total Corporate 
tangible strategy, 
assets 1980 and 1985 
($ millions 
in 1980) 
ABACUS 2.6 VHDto UD 
Angus 10.8 VHDtoUD 
Atlas 27.0 VHDtoRD 
Hutton's 8.9 UDtoVLD 
Tolley 29.7 RDto VLD 
Control companies Total Corporate 
tangible strategy, 
assets 1980-85 
($ millions 
in 1980) 
Dingwall and 7.6 RD 
Paulger 
Firestone 32.6 VLD 
Golden Bay Cement 50.8 UD 
John Webster 5.3 RD 
PDL Holdings 16.8 VHD 
Note: VLD=very low diversity; RD=related diversified; 
UD=unrelated diversified; VHD=very high diversity. 
TABLE 2.2 
Sample of companies, 1985-90 (theory testing) 
Divestors Total Corporate 
tangible strategy, 
assets 1985 and 1990 
($ millions 
in 1985) 
Parapine 4.3 RDto VLD 
Waste Management 11.2 UDto VLD 
Control companies Total Corporate 
tangible strategy, 
assets 1985-90 
($ millions 
in 1985) 
Colonial Motor 79.5 UD 
Sanford 47.3 UD 
Note: VLD=very low diversity; RD=related diversified; 
UD=unrelated diversified; VHD=very high diversity. 
2.3.2 Data sources 
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Any detailed research on aspects of, or changes in, corporate governance presents 
. major data problems particularly with regard to changes in ownership - changes in 
board composition3 and CEO are, of course, more conspicuous. There are no 
available data sources for New Zealand company ownership prior to 1980. For the 
1975-80 period, the researcher had to source the necessary information from Stock 
Exchange announcements; business and daily newspaper reports; and, in some cases, 
by direct contact with individuals who were company directors during this period. 
Matters improve for 1980 onwards where the Directory of Shareholders: New 
Zealand Public Companies was used along with company annual reports. The timing 
of changes in the identity of a major shareholder; board composition; and divestment 
moves were confirmed through detailed scrutiny of Stock Exchange announcements, 
supplemented as necessary by cross-reference to business and daily newspaper 
articles. Motives for divesting and multiple measures of financial performance 
(return on sales; real growth in sales; real return on assets; and growth in assets) were 
extracted from publicly-available sources, mainly company annual reports. Product 
range information was also taken from company reports, supplemented by trade and 
3 By changes in board composition we simply mean changes in the identity of who sits on a board. 
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business directories. In a number of cases where these secondary sources were 
insufficient, the company was contacted directly to ascertain its range of activities. 
These companies were willing to supply the information we sought. 
2.4 THEORY BUILDING 
2.4.1 Measuring corporate strategy 
The strategic variable of interest was the degree of diversity of major New Zealand 
companies, measured using the product-count procedure developed by Varadarajan 
and Ramanujam (1987), an approach validated for New Zealand companies by 
Hamilton and Shergill (1992, 1993).4 The study used companies listed on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange in either or both of two time periods (1980-85 and 1985-
90). At the beginning and end of each period, companies were classified as having 
one of four levels of diversity: very low; related; unrelated; or very high. Companies 
that moved between these categories by reducing the level of diversity in their 
corporate strategy were identified for in-depth study. There were five such firms in 
1985-90 and two in 1985-90. In addition, companies which made no change to the 
level of diversity in these periods were identified and used to form a control group 
for the study of divestors. Members of this control group were also required to be 
. active in more than one four-digit industry to ensure that they indeed had the scope to 
reduce their diversity. 
We originally hoped that a matched pair research design would be possible; whereby 
we could select control companies that would be similar to divesting companies at 
the start of each period of interest (1980 or 1985) in terms of both extent of diversity 
and firm size. However, because of the small number of companies which met our 
requirements that they have no change in their level of diversity and be involved in 
more than a single industry, we were not able to use a matched pair design. 
2.4.2 Motives for divestment 
We proceed from the premise suggested by previous research (Porter, 1987; 
Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987) that managers do not enjoy the connotations of 
failure associated with divesting. This is particularly likely to be so if the self-same 
managers had been involved in the original decision to invest in the assets in question 
(Staw and Ross, 1986; Staw, 1976). This suggests that whenever possible managers 
4 Refer Appendix 1 for an overview of this classification scheme. 
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will seek to control the timing of a divestment to enable them to deflect the blame on 
to other individuals or events that are beyond their direct control. 
To illustrate how this process works in a real situation, consider the 1984 divestment 
of its cable manufacturing division by Tolley Ltd, then a medium-sized listed 
company. Consider the following extracts of the period: 
The [divested division] had been more often than not a drain on the group 
profits, even in good years when it has not performed as well as the 
sizeable investment there suggests it should have done (Headliner, 
September 1984). 
The decision to sell ... follows [the major shareholder's] own decision to 
move out of Tolley's .... It was through this shareholding that it dominated 
the business of [the divested Division] being the major force in the 
subsidiary (Headliner, September 1984). 
It is clear that this Division had been under performing for several years, long enough 
for its performance to be observed over at least one business cycle. Nothing was 
done to improve performance but the exit of a strategic shareholder presented an 
opportunity to divest the Division while deflecting attention away from the years of 
under performance which, on their own, proved insufficient to provoke divestment. 
As a second demonstration of this process at work, consider the 1983 divestment of 
retailing operations by Abacus Group Ltd. The company's 1983 Annual Report 
offers the following basis for divestment: 
There was a significant administrative overhead attached to the number of 
separate businesses the Group was operating in which could be 
substantially reduced by a consolidation of Group activities (Annual 
Report, 1983, p.4). 
However, the divestment decision was made with reference in the same Annual 
Report to the fact that "the growth potential in retailing was limited in the present 
economic climate" (p.4). Managers created a situation of excessive overhead which 
was only dealt with in the context of an adverse economic climate (not their fault) 
forcing them to divest. In other words, given a more favourable economic climate, 
the consolidation may not have been undertaken to the same extent, if at all. 
Atlas Majestic divested its poultry operations around 1980. Poor performance of 
these operations had been mentioned in Annual reports for several years prior to the 
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divestiture. For example, the 1979 Chairman's Review stated that: "[the poultry 
operation] was marginally profitable in the year" (p.6). However, two external 
factors, namely difficult trading conditions and an "act of god" were given as the 
reasons for divestiture: 
Difficult trading conditions adversely affected (poultry) operations a 
disastrous fire gutted the processing plant. Not only was the plant out of 
action for several months, but the effects on the other integrated operations 
at Clinton Park - the breeding farm and hatchery were serious. After much 
careful deliberation, a decision was made to sell the land, buildings and 
plant (Director's Review, 1980). 
Hutton's meat processing operations also had a long history of poor performance. 
For example, Hutton's 1978 Chairman's review comments that: 
The directors must report that the costs at the Petone plant created 
problems for the company and in fact meat processing created a loss which 
reduced the satisfactory profits in other divisions (p.3). 
Hutton's made such losses that it felt it was "forced"5 to sell the meat processing 
operations, the alternative being liquidation. This is illustrated in the following 
report of the sale of the freezing works in the 1980 annual report: 
The action of The Hawkes Bay Farmers' Meat Company Limited in buying 
Gear Meat Processing Limited saved the Company from substantial 
potential costs of closure and possibly a forced liquidation ... [they] have, 
by their action, saved Gear Meat Company from being extinguished (1980 
Chairman's Review). 
The divested operations of Angus also exhibited poor performance over a number of 
years. Take, for example the following comment: 
Gross profit, down by nearly 15% was eroded by the loss of sales, increased 
competition for a diminished market, cost increases we could not pass on 
and, in comparison with last year, a lack of inventory profit (albeit illusory) 
resulting from price increases (Managing Director's Review, 1983, p.4) 
Angus' gives factors associated with the environment as the reason for its major 
divestment, namely Scott Commercial: 
5 "Last year we wrote off our investment in Gear against the background of the substantial losses 
which had been incuned and the forced sale of the Petone freezing works" (Annual Report of one 
of the joint major shareholders, 1981). 
... as a wholesaler of products manufactured largely by its competitors it 
frequently lost clients who sought direct access as a means of holding costs. 
Coupled with this, the cyclical nature of the broad sector and its lack of 
future growth prospects pointed to the need for rationalisation as a means 
of maintaining profitability. 
As Scott Group is a relatively small operator in the field and perceived little 
advantage in attempting to vertically integrate back into the areas that it got 
its supplies from, it was decided in the long-term benefits of the Group 
would be best served by re-establishing in another area where there was 
growth and where some degree of influence could be achieved (Managing 
Director's Review, 1983). 
From the above we generated the following propositions: 
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Proposition 1: Divested activities will have a history of poor performance over a 
number of years. 
Proposition 2: Divestments will be explained as occurring due to individuals or 
events beyond the control of incumbent managers. 
2.4.3 Ownership 
The findings of Bhagat et al (1990) and Goodstein and Boeker (1991) suggest that 
divestments are typically preceded by a change in the identity of the major 
shareholder. This is supported by the detailed case evidence drawn on here with such 
a change being observed in all the divesting companies but in none of the non-
divesting control group. The details of the ownership changes for the divesting 
companies are presented in Appendix 4. 
Only one company (Tolley) pointed to change in ownership as a direct reason for 
divesting, citing the loss of technical support from the previous major shareholder. 
Elsewhere the nature and extent of ownership changes are rather more difficult to 
observe. In the case of the Abacus Group, there were three changes in ownership 
with the first and second only six months apart. Divestments followed the second 
and third ownership changes. For Hutton's, there was in fact no major shareholder 
prior to 1979, at which point restrictive voting provisions were removed. This 
changed the balance of ownership as the two companies jointly holding the majority 
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of the shares were thus enabled to exercise voting rights in proportion to their 
shareholding. In the case of Angus a hostile takeover occurred with Tatra industries 
gaining 51 per cent of voting capital in June 1983. Shortly thereafter the decision 
was made to divest Angus' largest subsidiary, Scott Commercial. A further three 
divestments were made by April 1984. 
The case of Atlas illustrates the difficulty in identifying changes in ownership and 
relating these same changes to divestment moves. Between January and October 
1980, interests associated with Messrs Bidwill and Gibbs obtained as much as 30 per 
cent of issued voting capital (Headliner, 1981, p.3). Prior to this period the major 
shareholder was an insurance company which had no board representation. An 
indication of likely shareholding influence of Messrs Bidwill and Gibbs is given in 
April 1980 when the CEO of Atlas was replaced by a management board, consisting 
of Gibbs, Bidwill and the incumbent board chair. Subsequent to this management 
board taking control several major divestments occurred (refer Appendix 4). 
In contrast to the changes in ownership we observed among divesting companies we 
find that none of the control group of companies had a change in the identity of their 
major shareholder (refer Table 2.3). 
TABLE 2.3 
Percentage of shares held by major shareholders 
in non-divesting companies 
Company 1975 1980 1985 
% % % 
Dingwall & Paulger N/A 38.2 50.5 
Firestone 83.3 83.3 83.3 
Golden Bay Cement 45.8 45.9 75.2 
John Webster N/A 27.1 33.9 
PDL Holdings 70.0 60.7 56.9 
Notes: There was no change in the identity of the major 
shareholder of any of these companies over the period in 
question. Dingwall and Paulger was not listed in 1975; at this 
time the major shareholders were the same as those in 1980 
and 1985 . 
. N/A=Not available 
From the above analyses we propose that: 
Proposition 3: The proportion of companies divesting under new owners will be 
higher than under continuing ownership. 
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2.4.4 Changes in Board composition 
We find that divesting companies tend to have changes in board composition 
following ownership changes, but before divestment moves (refer Appendix 4). This 
is what we would expect from the earlier findings of Goodstein and Booker (1991). 
In the case of Tolley it was clear that the removal of directors following a change in 
ownership was sufficient to prompt a decision to divest. The directors that left 
represented the outgoing major shareholder, leaving Tolley without valuable 
technical support. 
In all but the case of Tolley, the new major shareholder, if not already a member of 
the board of directors, was appointed a director shortly after taking voting control. In 
two of the seven changes in ownership observed in total, the new major shareholder 
was already on the board of directors and held the position of Managing Director. 
Given the foregoing case analysis we propose that: 
Proposition 4: Changes in the ownership of divesting compames will lead to 
changes in board composition of these companies. 
2.4.5 CEO changes 
If we examine changes in CEO between the time of a change in ownership and 
divestments being made, it is evident that there is no pattern in terms of new major 
shareholders assuming management control. This is consistent with Markides' 
(1992) finding that a change in CEO has "no effect on the decisiori to refocus" (p.96). 
In the case of Tolley, a holding company, there was no overall CEO, and as 
mentioned above the new major shareholder did not elect to gain board 
representation. In another case, Angus, the incumbent CEO was retained. 
In the case of ABACUS where there were three changes in ownership, two of these 
changes involved the sale of shares to the Managing Director, who then continued in 
this role. In the third instance, the new majority shareholder seconded one of their 
executives to succeed the incumbent managing director. An indication of active 
involvement in the strategy determination of the company by one of these new major 
shareholders is given by the following quote: 
In many respects it has been a significant period in the deVelopment of 
British Office Supplies. The founders of the company ... disposed of their 
shareholding during the year and subsequently retired from the board. A 
major new shareholder ... has become actively involved in the direction of 
[the company] (Director's Report, 1982). 
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In the case of Atlas an unusual situation developed with the incumbent CEO been 
ousted by a management committee consisting of the Chairman and the two 
individuals who were the new joint major shareholders. The role of this committee 
in restructuring Atlas is illustrated by the following quote: 
... a Board of Management was established to give executive direction to 
the operations of the Company and to deal with the most serious problems 
of reduced demand, over-production and liquidity ... The Board of 
Management has determined the likely effects of changes in the economy, 
industry structure, imports, exports, inflation and technical developments 
may have on the company. Taking these factors into account, they are well 
advanced in an appraisal of the future earnings capacity of the Company's 
assets and where a reasonable return cannot be achieved in the foreseeable 
future, assets concerned will be realised (Directors' Review, 1980). 
In the case of Hutton's one of the joint major shareholders assumed management 
control following the forced sale of the company's major asset. 
Table 2.4 shows the changes in CEOs that occurred for non-divesting firms. We can 
see from this that the stability in ownership structure of these firms is not reflected in 
stability in the top executive office. 
From the foregoing analysis we derived the following proposition: 
Proposition 5: There is no association between changes in CEO and divestment 
decisions. 
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TABLE 2.4 
CEO changes in control group* 
Company Time Nature of chanRe 
Dingwall & Paulger 1978-80 New MD, internal appointment 
1982 New GM, internal appointment 
1982-3 New CEO; retired M.D. comes 
out of retirement 
Firestone 1979-80 New Executive Chairman 
appointed from the company of 
the new major shareholder 
1986-87 New Executive Chairman, an 
internal appointment 
J. Webster 1980-81 New CEO, an internal 
appointment. Succeeds Executive 
Chairman who remains Chairman 
PDL 1982-83 New MD, an internal 
appointment 
One company Golden Bay Cement retamed the same CEO between 1975 and 1985 
2.5 THEORY TESTING 
From the theory building undertaken above we propose that companies which make 
divestment decisions of such magnitude to alter our measure of their corporate 
strategy will follow the pattern illustrated in Table 2.5. 
In addition to summarising the results of our theory building, Table 2.3 also shows 
the general results of our theory testing. This theory testing forms the basis of the 
following sections of this thesis. We are seeking to test the validity of propositions 
made in the previous section with reference to the two companies that refocus sed 
between 1985 and 1990 (Genestock and Waste Management), which are contrasted 
with two companies that had no change in their product diversity over this period 
(Colonial Motor and Sanford). 
TABLE2.S 
The divestment process 
1980-85 1985-90 i 
Proposition Proposition Divestors Control Divestors Control 
suggests ... (5 companies) companies (5 companies) companies 
(5 companies) (5 companies) ! 
PI History of poor Y N/A Y N/A 
performance 
P2 Not managers Y N/A Y N/A 
fault 
P3 Ownership Y N Y N 
change 
P4 Change in board Y N N N 
composition 
... ----
Note: Y=yes; N=no; N/A=not applicable. 
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2.5.1 Performance 
A history of poor performance of Genestock's divested operations is clearly evident, 
with the company as a whole making large, and unexpected, losses in its initial years 
of operation: 
... operating returns in the first year of development were inadequate 
because of the sudden and dramatic downturn in the beef industry and a 
longer than planned development of pastures for the dairy operation. 
Considerable discussion was made with partners before a decision was 
made to terminate the investment ... The New Zealand dairy farm ... was 
closely related to the development of the United States farming strategy, 
and became uneconomic once the investment in America was terminated. 
The sale of the farm came at a time when the market was depressed and 
likely to remain so in the foreseeable future (Chairman's Report, 1986) . 
... early in January 1987, independent sales of goats dropped dramatically 
in price and orders for technical services began to evaporate. 
The directors recognised that reorganisation of capital and general 
operations were immediately necessary. The main administrative office 
was closed in April this year and resources combined at the laboratory. The 
technical services division was sold in May ... While this operation has 
shown the wisdom of a planned breeding programme to produce high 
genetic quality stock, the values in the market have continued to decline ... 
The holding costs of this operation outweigh the medium and long term 
benefits so directors have accepted a management recommendation to 
dispose of this major asset [goat farming]. 
Poor performance over a number of years is also evident for the major divestment 
made by Waste Management, as is illustrated by the following quotes: 
Like many New Zealand companies the high US$INZ$ exchange rate has 
made it very difficult to achieve satisfactory profits on export orders 
(Managing Director's Review, 1986) 
Carbonic Industries ... once again had a disappointing year (CEOs 
comment, Press, January 1987) 
The above quotes clearly support proposition 1, which held that divested activities 
would have a history of poor performance. We also note from the above quotes 
relating to Parapine and Waste Management that events beyond the control of 
management are portrayed as being important, thereby supporting proposition 2. 
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2.5.2 Ownership 
As expected from the theory-building discussion, the refocus sing companies did 
indeed have changes in the identity of the major shareholder prior to divestment 
decisions being made (refer Appendix 4). 
The role that changes in ownership played in influencing refocus sing within each 
company is illustrated by the following quotes: 
The directors advise that [three individuals] jointly hold 50% of the issued 
shares in the company. [One of these individuals] has been appointed to 
the Board and discussions will be held this week between the directors as to 
the companies future plans (Waste Management, Stock Exchange 
Announcement, 1 April 1986). 
For [the new major shareholder] the aim is to help restructure the company 
so that it has a wider base. [The CEO of the new major shareholder] said 
that as a shareholder [they had] a number of ideas as to how this can be 
achieved but the company will not be involved in the day-to-day running of 
Genestock (National Business Review, March 28 1986). 
The directors advised at this time that this undermined the security 
provided to secured creditors. The company sought the assistance of 
merchant bankers, Fay Richwhite, at the time 30% shareholder, to provide 
financial advice to the company and assist with reorganisation. 
One of the non-divesting companies, Colonial Motor, had no change in the identity 
of the major shareholder from 1980 to 1990. The other, Sanford, had no change in 
the identity of the major shareholder between late 1983 and 1990. Thus proposition 
3 is supported, indicating that a change in ownership is an important precursor to 
major divestment moves, and stable ownership is associated with a similarly stable 
corporate strategy. 
2.5.3 Board representation 
In the case of Waste Management the changes in ownership resulted in changes in 
board composition, with representatives of the new major shareholders being 
appointed to the board (refer Appendix 4). Furthermore following the first change in 
major shareholder, one of the new joint major shareholders was appointed Managing 
Director. 
In the other refocus sing firm, Genestock, the new major shareholder did not gain 
board representation. However, major changes in board representation did occur; 
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Genestock had one director resign between 1985-86 and two directors resign between 
1987-88. These last mentioned resignations took place following the final 
divestment moves made by Genestock. The latter two resigned as "the duties of 
directors reduced with the sale of the company rural assets" (1988 Annual Report). 
Thus we have an unexpected scenario where a new owner played a role in 
restructuring the company, leading to involvement in fewer areas, and consequently 
less need for some directors expertise. This is contrary to our expectations that major 
changes in board composition would occur prior to divestment moves being made. 
Therefore, proposition 4 is refuted, leading us to conclude that changes in board 
composition are not a necessary to major divestments. 
2.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, Singh (1993) has commented on what he 
sees as high levels of discretion available to corporate managers. From the 
companies examined in the present study, ownership changes appear to be the 
necessary driving force behind divestment decisions. In particular, a change in the 
identity of a major shareholder seems to be a necessary prerequisite to the divestiture 
of poorly-performing activities. One of the reasons for that ownership changes may 
be important is that new owners, not having being involved in the original investment 
decisions are more ready to accept the poor performance of such investments, and 
then discard them. In contrast the previous owners appeared all to ready to continue 
involvement in the poorly performing divested activities. This can be viewed as a 
form of escalation of commitment, with the past owners hoping, against strong 
evidence to the contrary, that continued involvement and further investment would in 
itself lead to improved performance. It should however be noted that our results 
should be treated as indicative only. The sample size is necessarily small, and some 
information with regards the control companies was not readily available. A 
shortcoming of the present study in this regard is that we do not know if the control 
group had units that would be divested given a change of ownership. 
Our findings are consistent with previous evidence from large sample quantitative 
research, notably Bhagat et al (1990) and Goodstein and Boeker (1991), but give a 
more coherent and richer picture of the whole divestment process, whereby both 
performance and ownership play key roles in determining what action, if any, will be 
taken in terms of the corporate strategy pursued by companies. 
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Possibly our most interesting finding was that proposition 4 was not supported, i.e., 
changes in board composition were not a necessary prerequisite to major 
divestments. It appears, therefore, that major shareholders can wield considerable 
influence, if they so desire, without gaining board representation. One possible 
reason for this is that major shareholders typically have the ability to dismiss 
incumbent directors. The threat, or possibility, of such action may lead to a new 
major shareholder having a more-of-less compliant board, through which they can 
exert their influence with regards the company's strategic direction. Needless to say, 
associations between ownership, board representation and corporate strategy provide 
an interesting avenue for future research. 
Chapter 3 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND CORPORATE FAILURE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
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Numerous studies have explored the relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate financial performance (refer Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In contrast, only a 
few studies have looked at corporate governance and corporate failure (Daily and 
Dalton, 1994a, 1994b; Gales and Kesner, 1994; Sheppard, 1994b; Hambrick and 
D'Aveni, 1992; Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985). It is surprising that more 
studies have not examined the governance-failure relationship, especially when we 
consider the often equivocal results of the governance-performance literature. Such 
equivocal findings may be attributable to problems in the definition and measurement 
of performance. In this regard, corporate failure can be seen to provide a more 
precise measure of a company's ultimate performance. 
By looking at companies at two extremes - those that survive and those that fail - we 
may gain greater insights into which, if any, governance variables are important in 
avoiding corporate failure. Increasing our understanding of the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate failure is the purpose of this chapter. 
In the next section we review, first the literature relating to corporate governance and 
corporate failure and, then, the literature relating to other causes of corporate failure. 
In section three we discuss the sample used to test various hypotheses generated in 
the literature review. We then proceed, in section four, to present the 
operationalisation of the variables of interest. Section five presents the results of our 
analysis and a discussion thereof. Finally, section six concludes this chapter. 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The role of corporate governance in corporate failure has been largely neglected, with 
previous studies of corporate failure invariably seeking to create financial models 
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using financial ratios of liquidity, leverage and profitability among others (Ohlson, 
1980; Moyer, 1977; Altman, 1973). Several authors have highlighted the 
shortcoming of these financial models. Take, for example, the following comments: 
Going bust is a financial phenomenon - plainly so, painfully so - but failure 
does not start this way, it only becomes financial as it moves to the 
penultimate phase (Argenti, 1986a, p.1S7). 
Despite the accuracy that can be achieved with these models, the financial 
approach has been criticised for its inability to predict failure in sufficient 
time to prevent bankruptcy ... In essence, this approach begs the issue of 
how the firm got into financial trouble in the first place (Daily, 1994, 
p.270). 
Deficiencies in the governance of corporations may well provide one possible 
explanation for corporate failure. In fact, previous research lends some support to 
there being a corporate governance-failure relationship (refer Table 3.1). 
In the following sections of this chapter we examine various governance variables 
and role they may play in determining corporate failure. We then turn our attention 
to several other factors that may contribute to corporate failure. 
3.2.1 Corporate governance and corporate failure 
In this section we examine the major corporate governance variables that may 
contribute to corporate failure. These factors include, board size, representation by 
non-executive (outsider) directors on boards, CEO duality and ownership. 
3.2.1.1 Board size 
Two explanations have been given to explain why board size may be related to 
corporate performance. The first explanation takes a resource dependence view, 
whereby directors are seen to link the company with resources from its environment. 
This role is seen to be particularly important in times of corporate decline, when the 
necessity for corporations to co-opt resources from their environments is inevitably 
heightened. Companies with smaller boards are seen as being more likely to fail; a 
small number of board members is believed to indicate an inability - or lessened 
ability - by the firm to co-opt resources from its environment that are necessary for 
survival. 
TABLE 3.1 
Previous studies of corporate governance and corporate failure 
Study Sample Board CEO i_OUT P_OUT P_AFFIL M_OUT Dual x Dual x 
size Duality # OUT % OUT 
Chaganti, Mahajan and 21 matched pairs of failed - none none none 
Sharma (1985) and not failed retailing firms 
Hambrick and D'A veni 57 matched pairs of Dun and -
(1992) Bradstreet companies in three 
industry sectors 
(manufacturing, retailing and 
transportation) 
Gales and Kesner (1994) 127 matched pairs of - none none 
bankrupt and nonbankrupt 
firms 
Sheppard (1994b) Matched pairs of 23 failed none 
and 23 surviving firms for 
each of the five years 
preceeding bankruptcy 
Daily and Dalton (1994a) 50 publicly held firms that none none none none + 
filed for bankruptcy during 
1990 and 50 matching 
nonbrankrupt firms 
Daily and Dalton (l994b) As for Hambrick and D'Aveni + + + 
(1992) 
--
Note: + denotes possitively associated with failure; - denotes negatively associated with failure; none denotes not associated with failure. 
N_OUT=number of outsiders; P _OUT=Percentage, or proportion of outsiders; M_OUT=majority of outsiders on board; Dual x OUT=interaction effect of CEO duality 
and number of outsiders on board; Dual x P _OUT = interaction effect of proption of outsiders and CEO duality; P _AFFIL=proportion of affiliated directors 
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The second explanation for a board size-corporate performance relationship concerns 
centralisation of control. Here, an important factor is the extent to which the CEO 
can influence the board. In this regard, it has been proposed that "larger boards are 
not as susceptible to managerial domination as their smaller counterparts" (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989, p.309) and, in particular, that CEOs are more likely to dominate 
smaller boards (Chaganti et aI, 1985). Hence, we expect that a company with a 
smaller board is more likely than one with a larger board to fail. This is because the 
CEO and/or other executives may have more scope to pursue strategic decisions 
which go unchecked by directors having some degree of impartiality. The strategic 
decisions adopted by dominating, or autocratic, CEOs have been shown to - in some 
instances - lead to corporate failure (Miller, 1990). The reason for this is typically 
viewed to lie in the personality of such dominating CEOs. For example, Kets de 
Vries and Miller (1985) talk about narcissistic CEOs who pursue corporate strategies 
in an effort to satisfy their own egos, but at the expense of the companies they 
manage. 
Each of the above theories points to the following hypothesis: 
Hi: Companies with smaller boards will be more likely to fail than will companies 
with larger boards. 
Board size is a proxy for intangible variables such as CEO influence and resource 
dependence. As such, it is possible that board size may not adequately capture the 
richness of these intangible variables it seeks to represent. However, it is hoped that 
the use of this proxy variable - and the others discussed below - will give some 
indication of the variables of interest. 
3.2.1.2 CEO Duality 
CEO duality is usually deemed to occur when the board chair of a company is also its 
chief executive officer. Those arguing in favour of CEO duality adopt the argument 
that duality leads to increased effectiveness, which will be reflected in improved 
company performance. CEO duality is seen to result in a situation where there is a 
clear leader of the organisation and where there is no room for doubt as to who has 
authority or responsibility over a particular matter (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 
Anderson and Anthony, 1986). Given this, it has been proposed that separation of 
board chair and CEO roles "is guaranteed to produce chaos both within the 
organization and in relationships with the board" (Anderson and Anthony, 1986, 
p.54). In the event that such "chaos" does ensue, it would be likely that this would 
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have a detrimental effect upon the formulation of corporate strategy and the 
responsiveness of the company to changes in the external environment. Both of these 
factors could potentially contribute to corporate failure. 
In comparison to arguments in favour of CEO duality, more compelling and 
numerous arguments have been proposed against this stmcture. In particular, those 
arguing against CEO duality typically propose that it leads to a situation where the 
governance role of the board of directors is compromised. The argument against 
CEO duality is aptly put in the following quote: 
In a company where the chairman is also the CEO ... power concentrated in 
one individual and possibilities for checking and balancing powers of the 
CEO ... are virtually eliminated. In such a corporation, the board may not 
be able to function as an independent body - independent from the 
influences of top management (Chaganti et al, 1985, p.407). 
As we mentioned above - in relation to CEO dominance - board independence may 
be critical in ensuring that a CEO does not follow strategies which are detrimental to 
corporate survival. 
Aside from the above argument it is also proposed that the separation of CEO and 
board chair roles is necessary because one person cannot perform both roles 
effectively. Stewart (1994) in her study of the relationships between board chairs and 
CEOs comments that "both the chairman and general manger have a distinctive 
domain" (p.523). 
A further argument for separating the roles of chairperson and CEO concerns the 
relative role expectations on each. In contrast to the CEO, who is involved in the 
day-to-day management of the company, the board chair "is often involved in special 
planning assignments, in policy review and formulation and in public and 
stockholder relations" (Chaganti et al, p.408). It is likely that, given his or her day to 
day executive commitments, the CEO will not be able to effectively perform the 
additional roles of chairperson. This is likely to be particularly so during times of 
crisis. Furthermore, some of the benefits which the CEO can obtain from having a 
chairperson will. inevitably be absent when the roles are combined. For example 
Stewart (1991, p.522) has highlighted several roles of chairpersons, including 
mentoring (acting as a coach and counsellor positively seeking to influence the 
[CEOs] behaviours), and consultant (giving advice to the CEO and other directors). 
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Hambrick and D'Aveni's (1992) study, although it does not directly examine CEO 
duality and failure, also indicates that CEO duality may be undesirable in ensuring 
corporate survival. These authors comment that: 
Possibly the most widely observed characteristic of failing top management 
teams is the presence of dominant CEOs, or autocrats. Argenti (1976), 
Miller and Friesen (1977) and Ross and Kami (1973) all found evidence of 
strong-willed, dominating, often egomaniacal chief executives at the helms 
of unsuccessful firms. Such leaders may be wedded to the wisdom of their 
own views, may greatly discount or stunt the potential contributions of 
subordinate team members, and drive subordinates away in frustration 
(Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1992, pp.1450-1451). 
Hambrick and D'Aveni's (1992) study of 57 bankrupt firms and 57 matched survivors 
found that CEO dominance - operationalised as the ratio of the CEO's cash 
compensation to the average compensation of other members of the top management 
team - was a significant predictor of bankruptcy. Hambrick and D'Aveni's (1992) 
sample was also used by Daily and Dalton (1994b), which found that CEO duality -
which can be seen as another measure of chief executive dominance - was a 
significant predictor of bankruptcy. CEO duality can be seen as one means by which 
chief executive officers can wield greater control over the direction of companies 
and, in particular, over those persons also charged with determining the future 
direction of the company (other directors) and achieving the objectives of the 
company (other executives). It is therefore not surprising that Hambrick (1991) sees 
CEO duality as a means of power hoarding, which has in turn been linked to inferior 
corporate performance (Miller and Friesen, 1977). 
One argument proposed for the separation of CEO and chairperson roles is that - in 
the case of a poorly performing company - "it is not immediately clear what process 
would be relied on to remove CEOlboard" (Daily and Dalton, 1994a, p.645). This is 
because the CEO who is also board chair is assumed to have a board which largely 
defers to him or her. Interestingly, research by Harrison, Torres and Kukalis (1988) 
indicates that it is more difficult to replace either the CEO or board chair when these 
roles are separated, than when the two roles are held by one individual. 
Taking an agency theory perspective, Daily and Dalton (1994a) propose that 
separating the roles of CEO and chairperson "reduces the opportunity for the CEO 
and inside directors to exercise behaviours which are self-serving and costly to the 
firm's owners" (p.645). 
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Another argument against CEO duality is that it lessens organisations ability to adapt 
to change (Daily and Dalton, 1994a). In this regard, Argenti (1986b) gives autocratic 
leadership and CEO duality among the management defects which can contribute to 
eventual failure: 
An autocratically run company that also has not responded to change is 
plainly in jeopardy, for it means that the autocrat himself has almost 
certainly failed to notice how the world has changed. He is the company: if 
he has not understood some new trend in the business environment then the 
company is doomed. It might not happen for years, or it might be 
tomorrow. It only needs some stroke of bad luck to expose the fatal flaw 
that his company has been allowed to develop (Argenti, 1986, p.101). 
Lorsh and MacIver (1989) also propose that separating the roles of CEO and 
chairperson has compelling benefits, including increasing a board's ability to prevent 
crisis and enhancing the ability of the board to act quickly during times of crisis. 
The above arguments tends to support the following hypothesis: 
H2: Failed companies will be more likely to have CEO duality compared to 
. . . 
survlvmg compames. 
As with board size, CEO duality is a proxy measure for intangible variables such as 
CEO power or dominance, role expectations and the ability to respond to crises. The 
intangible nature of these variables may lead to CEO duality being an imprecise 
proxy, but in the absence of better developed measures - and given the convenience 
of CEO duality in terms of data collection - we adopt its use in this study. 
3.2.1.3 Outside directors 
As with the CEO duality debate it is often proposed that inside directors cannot be 
relied on to impartially monitor their own performance. In contrast, outsiders are 
seen to be independent, and therefore impartial, as well as benefiting a company by 
representing alternative perspectives and enhancing the expertise of directors in 
general (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Sheppard (1994b) proposes that outside directors "provide an indicator of the board's 
orientation toward its external environment ... and thus its ability to respond to 
change" (p.80l). The inability to respond to change is one of the major causes of 
corporate decline (Miller, 1990). It therefore appears reasonable to propose that 
corporations having fewer outside directors will be less able to perceive and respond 
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to change in the external environment, and therefore be more likely to fail. As 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) note, increased environmental pressure means that 
organisations will require more support from outside constituencies. One means by 
which such support can be gained is through outside directors and their network of 
contacts (Borch and Huse, 1993). 
The turnaround literature indicates that replacement of top management is a major 
prerequisite for major strategic change. In the New Zealand context, Addison and 
Hamilton (1988) found that the top ranked turnaround strategy was to change top 
managers (used in 77 per cent of turnarounds). Also, Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan 
(1990) found that 85 per cent of their "sharpbenders" - which were defined as 
"companies, of different sizes, that have been in relative decline with regard to their 
industry and have managed a sharp and sustained recovery" (p.116) - instituted major 
changes in management. 
One of the advantages of outside directors is that, in contrast to inside directors, they 
are more able and willing to support changes in top management. In this regard 
Boeker (1992) found that boards with a higher proportion of outsiders were more 
likely to dismiss CEOs of poorly performing companies. As Daily (1994) comments 
"outside director do not operate under the same constraints as inside directors. This 
may be especially true in crisis situations where outside directors may be more able 
to exercise control in organisations" (p.284). We therefore expect that having more 
outside directors on a board is advantageous in that it increases the likelihood that 
poor performing managers will be removed during crises; thereby, possibly avoiding 
failure. 
Those arguing in favour of having a board dominated by outside directors propose 
that the independence of inside directors is open to question. One role of the board is 
to monitor and evaluate top management. In this respect, insiders directors are seen 
to be in a position to serve their own best interests. 
Studies of corporate governance and failure have tended to use the proportion of 
outside (or inside) directors as the independent variable. Daily and Dalton (1994a) -
while accepting the value of this measure when corporate control is being evaluated -
propose that it is more appropriate to use the number of outside directors in 
evaluating resource dependence theory. These authors note that: 
It seems that - especially in crisis - the firm needs as many outside 
representatives on its board as it can garner to provide access to as many 
valued resources and as much information as possible (Daily and Dalton, 
1994a, p.646). 
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There is evidence that boards with higher proportions of outside directors are more 
involved in strategic decision making (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992) and are more likely 
to be involved in strategic restructuring (Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 1993). These 
findings indicate that outsider representation on boards will be associated with efforts 
to prevent corporate decline (Daily and Dalton, 1994b, p.1606). 
As we can see from the preceding arguments there are rather compelling arguments 
in favour of outside directors. However, some arguments have been made against 
representation by outsiders on boards. In this regard, it has been suggested that 
outsiders do not have the time and expertise to perform effectively (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989, p.315). In addition outsiders may find it difficult to "understand the 
complexities of the company and to monitor its operations and, hence, to be fully 
responsible or effective" (Chaganti et al, 1985, p.407). These two arguments would 
lead us to expect that having more insiders on boards is conducive to corporate 
survival as these directors can be expected to have more time, expertise and 
knowledge to bring to bear, which will help avoid corporate collapse. 
On balance, the above arguments - for and against outsider representation on boards -
. are supportive of the above hypothesis: 
H3: Failed companies will have a lower proportion of outside directors on their 
boards compared to surviving companies. 
H4: Failed companies will have fewer outside directors on their boards compared to 
. . . 
survIvmg compames. 
H5: Failed companies will be less likely than surviving companies to have a 
majority of outside directors. 
Once again, outsider representation is a proxy for intangible variables; such as the 
influence of outsiders on corporate strategy and responsiveness to the environment. 
As a proxy variable outsider representation is subject to the same concerns outlined 
above in relation to the board size and CEO duality proxy variables. 
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3.2.1.4 Interaction effects of governance variables 
Two recent studies (Daily and Dalton, 1994a, 1994b) have investigated the 
relationship between the interaction of governance variables and corporate failure. In 
the first of these studies, Daily and Dalton (1994a) examined the interaction effect of 
CEO duality and both the number and proportion of outside directors, proposing that: 
... it should be acknowledged that firms with CEO/board chair structures 
and few independent directors would constitute the limit of centralized top 
management governance. At the other extreme would be separate 
CEO/board chair positions and relatively more independent directors (Daily 
and Dalton, 1994a, p.646). 
Whether or not it is the interaction between the number of outsiders or the proportion 
of outsiders, and CEO duality, or both, that may lead to corporate failure is unclear, 
hence the following hypotheses: 
H6: Failed firms will be more likely than survivors to have CEO duality and a 
lower proportion of outside directors. 
H7: Failed firms will be more likely than survivors to have CEO duality and have 
fewer outside directors. 
3.2.1.5 Ownership 
Following Berle and Means (1932), it is often argued that in the modern corporation 
ownership is so widely spread that managers have the scope to pursue their own 
interests largely unchecked by shareholders. As Glasberg and Schwartz (1983), 
comment, this "managerial theory" of the firm: 
... is premised on the observation that most companies are no longer subject 
to the dictates of individual owners holding dominant blocks of stock 
(Glasberg and Schwartz, 1983, p.320) 
However, there appears little basis for this statement in the New Zealand context. As 
we demonstrate in Chapter 7 the vast majority of New Zealand listed companies are 
controlled by individuals or companies holding large blocks of stock combined with 
board and, often, management representation. 
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It has been proposed that one of the ways managers can pursue their own interests is 
through conglomerate building. The general proposition here is that as share 
ownership becomes more diffuse - and, as a result, managers discretion increases -
the firms they manage will be observed to diversify in ways which are likely to be 
contrary to owners' primary concern for profitability. Through diversity comes a 
reduction in managers perceived "employment risk" (Amihud and Lev, 1981) and an 
increase in company size and hence managers compensation (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and 
Hinkin, 1987). Fox and Hamilton (1994) found no evidence to support this corporate 
control-diversification relationship in their study of 96 New Zealand listed listed 
companies for the year 1985. 
Furthermore, the evidence on corporate control and corporate financial performance 
does not lend support to the managerial theory of the firm. Hence Glasberg and 
Schwartz's comment that: 
Though there have been some discrepant results, the body of evidence 
disconfirms the managerial hypothesis. Owner- and manager-controlled 
companies exhibit little or no difference, in either profit margin or rate of 
return to stockholders (Glasberg and Schwartz, 1983, p.320). 
Given the above, there appears to be no sound basis for supporting the managerial 
theory of the firm in the context of corporate failure. If there is no association 
between ownership and corporate financial performance, it appears most unlikely that 
there would be any such association between ownership and failure. Hence: 
H8: Failed companies and surviving companies will not be distinguishable by their 
concentration of ownership. 
Note this statement asserts an essentially linear relationship between the share of the 
largest owner and degree of influence or control that can be exerted over the 
company. It is accepted that this relationship my have been better represented by a 
binary (step function) relationship (control/no control). However, any step function 
representation would have involved some loss of information and the imposition of a 
critical level of ownership at which the step should take place. In other words, both 
formulations involve assertion and we have proceeded here with the continuous 
linear version on the grounds that its performance would be (a) less sensitive to the 
assertion underlying its use, and (b) provide the more severe test of the relationship 
in question. 
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3.2.2 Other factors that may lead to corporate failure 
In addition to the governance variables examined above, there are a number of other 
factors which have been proposed to contribute to corporate failure. It is to these 
factors which we will now turn our attention: 
3.2.2.1 Company size (the liability of smallness) 
There is extensive evidence that there is a "liability of smallness" (Aldrich and 
Auster, 1986), ie. that smaller firms are more likely than larger firms to fail. For 
example, Peel, Peel and Pope (1986) found failed companies were significantly 
smaller (as measured by the logarithm of total assets) than their non-failed 
counterparts. Bates and Nucci (1989) found firm size, as measured by the logarithm 
of sales revenue, to be inversely related to discontinuance. In a review of the firm 
size-failure literature Singh and Lumsden comment that "with few exceptions, there 
seems to be strong empirical support for the liability of smallness" (1990, p.176). 
One explanation for increased rates of failure among smaller firms is that, in contrast 
to larger firms, smaller companies tend to be less diversified and therefore more 
subject to industry fluctuations (Sheppard, 1994a). Also, in corporations which 
operate in a single industry, there may be significant advantages associated with size 
which reduce the likelihood of failure. For example, in the context of banking, Boyd 
and Runkle (1991) propose that larger bank size is associated with a larger customer 
base and in turn to less risk in the lending portfolio, leading to a lower chance of 
bankruptcy. 
Aldrich and Auster (1986) propose several other reasons for the liability of 
smallness, the first of which relates to Hannan and Freeman's (1984) notion of 
structural inertia: 
According to Hannan and Freeman, since selection processes in modern 
societies are such that they favor organizations with greater structural 
inertia (ie. inert organizations have lower mortality rates) larger 
organizations must have lower mortality rates (Aldrich and Auster, 1986, 
p.17l). 
Smaller organizations have several disadvantages, compared with large 
organizations. Tax laws, in particular the favorable tax treatment of capital 
gains, create incentives for small-firm owners to sell out to large firms, 
whose borrowed funds for acquisition purposes have tax-deductible 
interest. Governmental regulations have more impact on small 
organizations as they attempt to deal with city, country, state, and federal 
levels of government. Finally, in competing with large organizations for 
labor input, small organizations are at a major disadvantage, since they 
cannot offer the long-term stability and internal labor markets that large 
organizations are thought to have (Singh and Lumsden, 1990, p.176). 
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One of the most commonly used arguments for the liability of smallness concerns the 
association between firm size and firm age. With regards firm age there is seen to be 
a "liability of newness" (Stinchcombe, 1965). Javanovic (1982) proposes that firms 
learn about their efficiency through operating in their industry. As firms become 
more experienced in their industry the likelihood of failure is reduced, or as 
Javanovic states "efficient firms grow and survive: the inefficient decline and fail" 
(1982, p.650). Stinchcombe's (1965) first referred to the concept of liability of 
newness. This concept incorporates Javanovic's (1982) proposition in arguing that 
younger firms are more likely than older firms to fail. The reasons for this are: 
First, new organizations depend on new roles and tasks that have to be 
learned at some costs. Second, sometimes new roles have to be invented, 
and this may conflict with constraints on capital or creativity. Third, social 
interactions in a new organization resembles those between strangers, and a 
common normative basis or informal information structure may be lacking. 
Finally, stable links with to clients, supporters of customers are not yet 
established when an organization begins (Bruderl and Schussler, 1990, 
p.530). 
The arguments outlined above along with previous research on the liability of 
smallness lead us to propose that: 
H9: Smaller companies will be more likely to fail than larger companies. 
3.2.2.2 Industry 
Several studies have found that industry effects impact on company performance 
(Grant, Jammine and Thomas, 1988; Scherer, 1980; Vernon, 1972). As Vesper 
(1980) notes in an early review on success and failure factors of entrepreneurial start-
ups: 
Probably the most important variable affecting the survival and success of a 
new venture ... is the choice of product or service to be offered (Vesper, 
1980, p.29). 
There is compelling evidence that failure rates differ significantly between industries. 
For example, Preisendorfer and Voss found that "survival times of manufacturing 
firms are longer than those of trading firms" (1990, p.117). Platt (1989) found failure 
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rates of American companies differed significantly among 16 industry groups during 
each of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. 
One explanation for the relationship between industry and corporate failure concerns 
industry contagion (Lang and Stulz, 1992; Aharony and Swary, 1983): 
Contagion may manifest itself in the form of creditor and customer 
withdrawal within an industry as a result of one firm's bankruptcy. This 
withdrawal weakens other firms as a consequence. Alternatively, one 
firm's banlauptcy may signal to the market that the industry is weak. This 
is consistent with the view that survival is determined by environmental 
carrying capacity, defined as the ability of the environment to support a 
population of firms (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). A strong environment, 
however, may enable a resource-deficient firm to delay or even avoid 
bankruptcy ... (Daily, 1994, pp.274-5). 
Given the evidence for an industry-failure relationship we propose that: 
HlO: The industry in which a company operates will influence its likelihood of 
failure. 
3.2.2.3 Protection 
In New Zealand, the second half of the 1980s were characterised by a wide-ranging 
process of economic liberalisation (Campbell-Hunt, Harper and Hamilton, 1993; 
Savage and Bollard, 1990). This process of economic liberalisation is of particular 
interest in that it was beyond that attempted by any comparable country (Hamilton 
and Shergill, 1993b, p.103) and took New Zealand from being one of the most 
regulated economies in the industrialised world to one of the least regulated (Passow, 
1992). 
Major reforms to impact on manufacturers included the removal of import licenses, 
and their replacement with tariffs which were destined to fall over time (refer Baird 
et al, 1990, pp.13-15). Non-manufacturers were hit by the removal of entry 
restrictions (Hamilton, 1992a). 
In terms of the effects of the aforementioned economic policy on New Zealand 
companies, there are two previous studies of interest. In the first study, Hamilton and 
Shergill (1993a) looked at 44 manufacturing companies that were listed on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange between 1975 and 1985. They found that industry 
concentration and effective protection rates were significantly related to return on 
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equity, and industry concentration was significantly related to growth in sales. 
Another study (Galt, 1986) surveyed 30 manufacturing firms and found that the most 
common responses to economic liberalisation were dropping product lines 
(mentioned by 11 firms) and reducing staff numbers (mentioned by 12 firms). 
Given the obvious effects of industry protection on corporate performance, it is 
somewhat surprising that this factor has been neglected in previous studies of 
corporate failure. In the New Zealand context, we expect companies that had higher 
levels of protection prior to deregulation to be more likely to fail during a period of 
economic liberalisation. This is because economic liberalisation will inevitably have 
the most severe impact on the performance of these companies. In particular 
companies that are only profitable because they operate in a protected environment 
may not be able to adapt to their changing environment in order to become profitable 
and survive. 
Hii,' Companies having higher levels of industry protection will be more likely to 
fail during a period of economic liberalisation than will companies with lower 
or no industry protection. 
3.2.2.4 Strategy 
Numerous studies have examined the relationship between corporate strategy and 
corporate financial performance (Datta, Rajagopalan and Rasheed, 1991; Ramanujam 
and Varadarajan, 1989). A recent review of these studies states that: 
... the performance effects of firm diversification remain unclear despite a 
large body or prior research that has yielded mixed results due to differing 
performance measures, diversification measures, samples and time periods 
(Lloyd and Jahera, 1994, p.259). 
In the New Zealand context there is evidence that some corporate strategies lead to 
higher financial performance. Hamilton and Shergill (1993) in their study of 79 
companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange between 1975 and 1985 found 
that companies with a related diversified strategy outperformed companies with any 
other strategy in terms of ROA, ROE and growth in sales. 
With the exception of Sheppard (1994b), who found no relationship between the 
level of diversification and bankruptcy, previous studies of corporate failure have 
neglected to control for corporate diversification. Instead, these studies have 
controlled for industry effects by matching failed and surviving companies in the 
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same major industry. Sheppard (1994a) argues that this is inappropriate given that 
diversified firms activities are often so widely spread that no comparable match can 
be made on the basis of major industry. Hence the need to control for corporate 
diversification in failure studies. Sheppard (1994b) outlines the argument for a 
diversification-failure relationship thus: 
Through diversification an organization can reduce its reliance on anyone 
domain of activity and thus reduce the chance that a market downturn in 
anyone market will greatly impact the firm's chance for survival 
(Sheppard, 1994b, p.798). 
From the foregoing discussion we expect that: 
H12: Failed firms will be less diversified than survivors. 
3.2.2.5 Structure 
Previous research has supported the M-form hypothesis, namely that companies with 
a multidivisonal structure will perform better than companies with other structures 
(Hoskisson, 1987). The reason for the purported superiority of the M-form structure, 
as originally stated by Williamson, is that: 
... the organisation and operation of the large enterprise along the lines of 
the M -form favours goal pursuits and least -cost behaVIor more nearly 
associated with the neo-classical profit maximising hypothesis 
(Williamson, 1975, p.150). 
More recently Hamilton and Shergill (1989) in commenting on the influence of 
adoption of the M -form structure on corporate performance state that: 
... the alleged superiority of this structure in terms of company profitability 
stems from its ability to avoid the problems of control loss and strategic 
myopia, problems which would otherwise lead to impaired profitability 
(Hamilton and Shergill, 1989, pp.89-90). 
Williamson (1970) proposed that compared to companies with an M-form structure, 
large companies with a functional structure would be less internally efficient and 
have less direction as a result of less strategic control (Hoskisson, Harrison, and 
Dubofsky, 1991). Williamson (1970) also highlights the problem of replacing poorly 
performing top managers, which is said to be more difficult in companies with a 
functional structure. As we mentioned earlier, the replacement of poorly performing 
top managers is particularly important in turnaround situations (Addison and 
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Hamilton, 1988). Thence the inability to replace such managers due to structural 
constraints may well be an important factor associated with corporate decline. 
Another structure which has come under criticism by Williamson (1985) is the H-
form (holding company) structure. It has been proposed that this structure "does not 
provide adequate controls necessary for efficient capital allocation" (Hoskisson et aI, 
1991, p.272). 
An interesting question arises with regards the association between the various 
structures we have examined and corporate failure. It appears clear that divisional 
(M-form) structures are much less likely to be associated with corporate failure than 
functional structures. Furthermore, it is apparent that the holding company structure 
is something of a transitory structure, falling between the functional and divisional 
structures. In the New Zealand context, Hamilton and Shergill (1989) found 
structure to be associated with financial performance (growth and profitability). 
Companies with divisional structures were the most profitable, followed by 
companies with holding company structures and functional structures. It therefore 
appears likely that: 
Hi3: Companies with a functional structure will be more likely to fail than 
companies with either a holding company structure or a divisional structure. 
3.2.2.6 Strategy-structure fit 
Several studies have indicated that some combinations of strategy and structure are 
associated with higher performance than are others (Hamilton and Shergill, 1992; 
Donaldson, 1987; Donaldson, 1984). For example, Hamilton and Shergill (1992) 
found that New Zealand listed companies having a related diversified strategy and a 
divisional structure outperformed companies having any other combination of 
strategy and structure. Given the relationship between strategy-structure fit and 
corporate financial performance, we expect that: 
Hi4: Failed companies will be more likely than survivors to have no fit between 
strategy and structure. 
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3.3 SAMPLE 
According to Sheppard (1994b), one of the major problems with the organisational 
decline literature is that: 
... most studies involve organizations which may be subject to substantial 
liability of newness or smallness ... The conclusions of these studies may 
thus be inappropriate for the managers of larger, on-going business 
concerns. Yet, the research in the area is desired [sic]. Strategic managers 
- those managers responsible for the well being of the entire organization -
list the survival of their organization as their principal concern ... 
(Sheppard, 1994b, p.796). 
Taking note of Sheppard's comments, we elected to use a group of established 
companies as the basis for our study, thereby hoping to gain a greater understanding 
of the factors contributing to organisational decline. The sample was selected from 
those 129 companies that were listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE) 
from 1980 to 1985.6 Next, we classified those companies that then remained listed 
through to 1990 as survivors (31 companies).? 
Our next task was to determine which of those companies that did not remain listed 
through to 1990 were failures. To do this we used a previous study of corporate 
distress in New Zealand (Addison and Hamilton, 1988) and determined the Z-values 
of all companies that did not survive (remain listed) to 1990. For each of these non-
survivors, Z-values were based on financial information contained in the most 
recently available annual report prior to delisting. If the company had a Z-value that 
signified distress and did not survive until 1990 we classified it as failed. 8 In doing 
so we excluded from our sample companies that were delisted for reasons ostensibly 
not associated with poor financial performance. A total of sixteen companies were 
classed asfailures (out of 35 companies). 
6 Finance and mining companies were excluded from analysis because of their unusual balance sheet 
characteristics. 
7 Four companies (Mount Cook, Radio Otago, Nuhaka and Taylor's) were excluded from anlaysis 
due to insufficient data. 
8 Following Addison and Hamilton (1988) the Z-values were determined as follows: 
Z = 0.56 + 12.52 Xl - 3.82 X2 
Where: 
Xl = EBITlTotal Assets 
X2 = Current LiabilitieslTotal Assets 
A Z-value of less than +0.15 signifies distress, whereas a Z-value of greater than +0.15 signifies 
that a company can be regarded as non-distressed. 
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3.4 THE VARIABLES 
The dependent variable of interest was company failure, a binary variable assigned 
the value of 1 if the company was a failure and 0 if it was a survivor. The 
independent governance variables of interest are given in Table 3.2: 
TABLE 3.2 
Governance variables and their measurement 
. Governance variable Measured as: 
Board size Total number of directors 
Number of outsiders Total number of outsider (currently non-
executive) directors 
Percentage of outsiders Ratio of total number of outsiders to board 
size 
Majority outsiders A binary variable assigned the value 1 if more 
than half of the board members are outsiders; 
otherwise coded as 0 
Executive Chair A binary variable assigned the value 1 if the 
board chair is also an executive; otherwise 
coded as 0 
Ownership The percentage of all issued voting capital 
held by the major (ie. largest) shareholder or 
shareholding group 
Interaction A Interaction effect of executive chairperson 
and number of outsiders 
Interaction B Interaction effect of executive chairperson 
and proportion of outsiders 
In addition to the governance variables several other independent variables were 
examined. These are discussed in turn below: 
Corporate Strategy 
The strategic variable of interest is the extent of diversification of New Zealand listed 
companies. Previous studies in New Zealand have used the product-count approach 
developed by Varadarajan and Ramanujam (1987) to measure diversification strategy 
(refer: Fox and Hamilton, 1994; Hamilton and Shergill, 1993a; Hamilton and 
Shergill, 1992b). Using this approach, both failed and surviving companies were 
classified as having one of the following four levels of diversity in 1985: very low 
diversity; related diversified; unrelated diversified; and very high diversity. 
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The primary reason for the adoption of this measure of diversification strategy 
derives from the lack of publicly available sales data, on a product line basis, for 
New Zealand companies. The measurement system was also adopted for this thesis 
in the interests of local continuity and replication. 
Structure 
Following previous studies of company structure in New Zealand (Hamilton and 
Shergill, 1989; Hamilton and Shergill, 1992b) we classified companies as having one 
of the following three types of structure: functional, holding company, divisional: 
In the functional structure, the organisation is broken down into a series of 
specialised hierarchical functions, each controlled by a specialist 
(functional) manager, all of whom report directly to the chief executive ... 
In the divisional structure, each division - whether based on product or 
geography - is likely to be headed by its own general manager, and have the 
resources and authority to operate as an autonomous unit ... The holding 
company structure is one comprised of independent companies 
(subsidiaries) which are majority owned and controlled by the separate 
holding company (Hamilton and Shergill, 1993, p.37). 
Strategy-Structure fit 
Following Hamilton and Shergill (1992) strategy-structure fit was recorded as a 
binary variable, with companies having a strategy structure fit assigned the value 1, 
and companies without such a fit assigned the value O. The following table shows 
the possible combinations of strategy and structure and whether or not there is a fit: 
TABLE 3.3 
'Fit' and 'non-fit' combinations of strategy and structure 
Very low 
diversity 
Functional + 
Holding Company -
Divisional -
Source: HamIlton and ShergIlI (1992) 
Note: + = 'fit', - = 'non-fit' 
Co~orate strategL 
Related Unrelated Very high 
divers~fied diversified diversity 
- - -
- + -
+ + + 
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Other independent variables of interest are given in the following table: 
TABLE 3.4 
Other independent variables 
Variable Measurement 
Protection The measure of protection for each company was based on its 
primary industry. Data for rates of protection were taken from 
Wong and Brooks (1986) and relate to 1985-86. It must be 
noted that the protection variable will be less appropriate for 
diversified firms, i.e., where a firm does not have a dominant 
primary industry. 
Industry Each company was assigned the concentration ratio (based on 
Concentration persons engaged) of its primary industry during 1984-85 
Firm size The natural logarithm of total tangible assets 
3.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Descriptive statistics and correlations appear in Table 3.5. We observe that several 
variables are indeed correlated with corporate failure. In particular companies having 
very low diversity, a majority of outside directors or a higher proportion of outsiders 
were correlated with failure. In addition companies having very high diversity were 
negatively correlated with failure. 
The failing propensity that appears to be associated with outside directors is counter 
to our expectations. One possible explanation for our finding is the measure of 
outside directors used, i.e., non-executive directors. For example, our measure of 
outside directors will include former executives of a company which remain on a 
board following retirement from their positions as executives. Hence, our measure of 
outsiders may not have been sufficiently robust to provide an accurate picture of 
director independence from management, or of resource dependence; and our 
findings in this regard should be treated with some caution. 
The apparent failure-avoidance characteristics of very high diversity companies 
should be put in context. The data relates to 1985-90, i.e., a period in which there 
was large-scale deregulation and a recession following the post -1987 sharemarket 
crash. It is plausible that companies involved in many industries were less 
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susceptible to failure for reasons that do not deny the limits of managerial 
competence in the multi-business enterprise. 
Our findings that very high diversity companies may be more likely to avoid failure 
and that very low diversity companies may be more likely to fail - may indicate that 
having an involvement in many industries protects a company from failing. In this 
regard the comments of Sheppard (1994b) may be supported by our findings, i.e., 
diversification may reduce reliance on anyone industry and - in the event of a market 
downturn in anyone market - increase the chances of survival. 
TABLE3.5a 
Correlation matrix - control variables 
VLD 
RD -0.3149b 
UD -0.3149b -0.1750 
VflD -0.5408c -0.3005b -0.3005b 
Fnl 0.643I c -0.1010 0.0207 -0.5918c 
fllg -0.2675a -0.1251 -0.1251 0.4592c -0.5094c 
Dvl -0.4204c 0.2264 -0.3005 0.1824 -0.5640c 0.4592c 
Fit 0.3198b -0.0392 -0.0392 -0.2653 0.2030 -0.6870c 0.4455c 
Size -0.2709a -0.1057 -0.7093 0.4138 -0.3292b 0.3822c -0.0202 -0.2614a 
IC 0.0264 0.0133 0.1246 -0.1304 0.2066 -0.1416 -0.0816 -0.0244 0.1919 
Prom 0.0324 0.0138 -0.0391 -0.0138 0.1436 -0.1648 0.0070 (>.0809 -0.2087 -0.0109 
Fail 0.3002b 0.0778 -0.0483 -O.3266b 0.2317 -0.0427 -0.2029 0.OIl8 -0.2185 0.0518 
VLD RD UD VflD Fnl fllJ.? Dvl Fit Size IC 
. -- -
Note: VLD=very low diversity; RD=related diversified; UD=unrelated diversified; Fnl-functional structure; 
Hlg=holding company structure; Dvl=divisional structure; Fit=strategy-structure fit; Size=firm size; IC=industry concentration; 
Protn=brotection; Fail=failure. 
ap<.I; p<.05; cp<.OOJ 
0.1521 I 
__ Erotn I 
TABLE3.5b 
Correlation matrix - governance variables 
EC 
BdSize -0.1457 
N OUT -0.3648° 0.6517c 
POUT -0.385Jc -0.0530 0.6883c 
M OUT -0.3551° -0.0545 0.4707c 0.6837c 
IlIlA 0.2314 0.6250c 0.7732c 0.4528c 0.2952° 
1mB 0.4088° -0.1520 0.3261° 0.6115c 0.4675c 0.6515c 
OWl! 0.0710 -0.1448 0.1377 0.2740a 0.4704c 0.2268 0.3972c 
Fail -0.2059 -0.2177 0.1218 0.3104° 0.3496° 0.0236 0.1429 0.3459b I 
EC BdSize N OUT POUT M OUT IntA 1mB Own I 
Note: EC=executive chairperson; BdSize=board size; N_OUT=number of outsiders; P _OUT=percentage 
of outsiders; M_OUT=majority of outsiders; IntA=interaction of EC and number of outsiders; IntB=interaction 
of EC ami proportion of outsidcrs; Own=owl1crship; rail==failurc. 
ap<.I; bp<.05; (;p<.OO I 
TABLE3.Sc 
Correlation matrix - other variables 
EC 0.0125 -0.0304 -0.1895 0.1525 -0.0270 0.3528b -0.31OI b -0.3420b 0.2170 
BdSize 0.3303b 0.1627 0.1538 0.0971 -0.2426a 0.1224 0.1379 -0.0343 0.6131c 
N OUT 0.0851 0.1171 0.0721 -0.0558 -0.0948 -0.0215 0.1204 0.0973 0.1789 
POUT 0.3323b 0.0066 -0.0972 -0.2689a 0.2180 -0.2075 -0.0304 0.2800a -0.3441 b 
M OUT 0.1413 0.0517 0.0517 -0.2209 0.0703 -0.3035b 0.2172 0.2840a -0.2073 
IntA 0.0067 0.1370 -0.0427 -0.0776 -0.0244 0.0876 -0.0583 -0.0329 0.2856a 
IIltB 0.3655b 0.0243 -0.2168 -0.2260 0.2631 a -0.0229 0.2551 a 0.0648 -0.1681 
Own 0.1420 0.0397 -0.1035 0.0960 -0.0847 0.0263 0.0639 0.0258 -0.1518 
VLD RD UD VfID Fill fIt!; Dvl Fit Size 
Note: VLD=very low diversity; RD=related diversified; UD=unrelated diversified; Fnl-functional structure; Hlg=holding 
company structure; Dvl=divisional structure; Fit=strategy-structure fit; Size=firm size; IC=industry concentration; 
ap<.l; bp<.05; cp<.OOI 
0.1981 
-0.0660 
-0.1096 
-0.0836 
0.0725 
0.1567 
0.2300 
-0.1898 
IC 
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We next proceeded to conduct a logistic regession. This statistical technique is 
common in terms of the corporate failure literature, where the independent variable is 
dichotomous (failure versus survival) as opposed to continuous. The results of the 
logistic regression are presented in Table 3.6. 
TABLE 3.6 
Results of logistic regression analysis 
Coefficients s.e. log-likelihood 
Baseline N/A N/A 60.28 
M_OUT -4.62 16.33 
DVL 0.73 0.39 47.65 
Predictive accuracy 
Predicted Percent 
correct 
0 1 
Actual 0 20 11 64.52 
1 3 13 81.25 
Overall: 70.21 % 
Note: 0 = survivor; 1 = failure 
Model Improvement 
Chi-square in chi-square 
8.55 8.55 
12.63 4.08 
Sig. Hit 
rate 
.003 65.96% 
.002 70.21% 
From the logistic regression, only two independent variables were found to be 
significant predictors of failure. First, we found that companies having a majority of 
outside directors in 1985 were significantly more likely to fail before 1990 than were 
companies that did not have a majority of outside directors. We also found that 
companies which did not have a divisional structure in 1985 were more likely than 
companies that did have such a structure to fail before 1990. In the next two sections 
we will discuss these findings. We will then proceed to examine the null-findings of 
this research in light of previous research. 
3.5.2 Majority of outside directors 
With regards our majority of outsiders-failure finding, it is interesting to note that in 
1985 all of the companies which subsequently failed had a majority of outsiders on 
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their boards. In contrast 22 out of 31 (71 per cent) of those companies that survived 
through to 1990 had a majority of outside directors in 1985. The issue of causality 
needs to be addressed with regards the observed majority of outsiders-failure 
relationship, ie. did having a majority of outside directors lead to corporate failure, or 
did the failing companies recruit more outside directors to their boards as their 
performance deteriorated. Insight into this issue is readily derived from the board 
composition data which was collected for Chapter 4 of this thesis. If we compare the 
boards of failed and non-failed in the earlier year of 1980 we find that the companies 
that were subsequently to fail during 1985-90 also all had outsider controlled boards 
in 1980. In contrast 24 of the 31 (77.4 per cent) of companies which survived 
through to 1990 had outsider controlled boards in 1980. 
All of this points to the companies that failed having a majority of outsiders on their 
boards for a considerable length of time prior to their eventual demise. That the 
majority of outsiders should be a significant predictor of failure is particularly 
interesting given that the proportion of outsiders was not found to be a predictor of 
failure. This indicates that the resource dependence arguments - which propose that 
outside directors will be particularly beneficial in linking firms with their 
environments thereby reducing the risk of failure - are not supported by our data. On 
the contrary, having a majority of outsiders appears to be detrimental to a firms 
chances of survival. 
Thus it is desirable that the balance of power on boards should not rest with 
outsiders. There are several reasons why this may be the case. As was mentioned 
previously, outsiders as a whole may lack the insight into the activities of a firm and 
its environment that those involved in the company on a day-to~day basis possess. 
These attributes may be particularly pertinent in ensuring corporate survival. 
Our finding that companies having a majority of outsiders were more likely to fail is 
not wholly consistent with the only previous study to examine this relationship. 
Chaganti et al (1985) found no significant differences between failed and non-failed 
companies in terms of the majority of outsiders on their boards. However, they did 
observe that "in each of the three years prior to failure, a larger number of non-failed 
firms had outsiders in the majority than did failed firms" (p.412). However, as we 
earlier mentioned our measure of outsiders is somewhat restrictive and may not 
adequately capture the notions of director independence or resource dependence. 
Hence, our findings with regards outside directors should be regarded as indicative 
only. 
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3.5.3 Not having a divisional structure 
The other major finding of our logistical analysis was that firms not having a 
divisional structure, ie with either functional or holding company structures, are more 
likely to fail. This finding is particularly interesting given the lack of attention to 
structure as a variable in previous failure studies. As was mentioned earlier there are 
several reasons why companies with a holding company or functional structure may 
be more likely to fail, than companies with a divisional structure. 
We now turn our attention to the variables which were not found to be significant 
predictors of corporate failure: 
3.5.4 CEO duality 
Our finding that there is no relationship between CEO duality and failure is 
consistent with two previous studies (Chaganti et aI, 1985; Daily and Dalton, 1994a), 
but inconsistent with Daily and Dalton (l994b). In the first of these studies Chaganti 
et al (1985) found no difference in the incidence of CEO duality - in each of the 5 
years preceding failure - for failed as compared to non-failed retailing companies. 
More recently, Daily and Dalton (1994a) found that CEO duality was not a 
significant predictor of bankruptcy at either 3 or 5 years prior to firms filing for 
bankruptcy. However, another recent study by Daily and Dalton (1994b) found that 
bankrupt firms were more likely than their matched non-bankrupt controls to have 
dual CEOs. 
Therefore, one the whole, the empirical evidence to date supports the proposition that 
CEO duality is not detrimental to a firms chances of survival. This is rather 
surprising given the strong arguments that both the proponents and detractors of the 
CEO duality structure have proposed. 
3.5.5 Board size 
The two previous studies which have examined board size and bankruptcy have 
found a negative association, ie. bankrupt firms tend to have fewer directors than 
their non-bankrupt counterparts. The first of these studies (Chaganti et aI, 1985) 
compared board size between 21 matched pairs of failed and non-failed retail firms. 
For each of the five years prior to failure, failed firms were found to have 
significantly fewer directors (at the 95 per cent level of confidence) than their non-
failed counterparts. Failed companies had, in each of the five years prior to failure an 
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average board size of between 9 and 10 members. This is in contrast to non-failed 
companies which had an average board size of between 11 and 12 members. 
More recently Gales and Kesner (1994) also support a board size-failure relationship. 
These authors found that at the time of filing for bankruptcy, firms had significantly 
smaller boards (an average of 7.04 members) than their non-failed matched pairs 
(which had on average 7.69 members). Gales and Kesner also found that firms 
eventually filing for bankruptcy experienced a significant decline in board size. 
However, Gales and Kesner made no comparison with the control group for this two 
year period. If is possible, therefore, that the control group also experienced a 
significant decline in board size, for reasons unassociated with poor performance. 
Unlike the previous studies we have just mentioned, we found that board size was 
not a significant predictor of corporate failure. As with our finding concerning the 
majority of outside directors and failure, this finding indicates that the resource 
dependence view of boards is not supported by our sample. 
3.5.6 Proportion and number of outsiders 
Five previous studies have, either directly or indirectly, examined the relationship 
between the proportion of outside directors on boards and corporate failure. 
Chaganti et al (1985) found no difference in the percentage of outside directors on 
boards of failed companies as compared to non-failed matched pairs for each of the 
five years prior to failure. Sheppard (1994b) who also compared failed and non-
failed matched pairs in each of the five years prior to failure (using 23 matched pairs 
in total), also found no significant difference in the percentage of outsiders on the 
boards of these companies. Gales and Kesner (1994) found no significant difference 
in the percentage of outside directors for 127 matched pairs of bankrupt and non-
bankrupt companies, at the time of bankruptcy and two years prior to filing for 
bankruptcy. Daily and Dalton (1994a) found no significant difference in the 
proportion of independent directors in 50 matched pairs of failed and non-failed 
firms at either 3 or 5 years prior to filing for bankruptcy. However, another recent 
study by Daily and Dalton (1994b) found that failed companies have a higher 
proportion of affiliated directors than their non-failed counterparts. In summary, 
previous studies have, with the exception of Daily and Dalton (1994b) found no 
association between the proportion of outsiders on boards and corporate failure. 
Three studies have examined the number of outside directors and corporate failure. 
In the first of these studies Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) found, for each of the four 
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years immediately preceding bankruptcy, that failed companies had significantly 
fewer outside directors than their matched-pairs of surviving companies. Daily and 
Dalton (1994a) found for their matched pairs no significant difference in the number 
of independent directors at either three of five years preceding bankruptcy. Gales and 
Kesner (1994) found that at the time of bankruptcy and two years preceding 
bankruptcy, there was no significant difference in the number of outsiders on the 
boards of failed versus non-failed companies. They did, however, find that in the 
two years preceding bankruptcy, failing firms lost a significant number of outside 
directors. 
As previously mentioned, four out of five previous studies found no relationship 
between the proportion of outsiders and failure. These studies are supported by our 
research. Also two out of three previous studies found no relationship between the 
number of outsiders and failure. These finding are also supported by our research. 
3.5.7 Interaction effects 
The interaction effects of CEO duality and either the number or proportion of 
outsiders were not found to be associated with subsequent corporate failure. This is 
in contrast to Daily and Dalton (l994a), where the interaction effect of CEO duality 
and the proportion of outside directors was found to be the only significant 
governance variable that predicted failure at both 3 and 5 years prior to firms filing 
for bankruptcy. Daily and Dalton (l994b) also found this interaction effect to be a 
significant predictor of bankruptcy (they did not test the interaction effect of the 
number of outsiders and CEO duality in their second study). 
One possible reason for the lack of a finding in this area relates to the, 
aforementioned, lower incidence of CEO duality among New Zealand, as compared 
to U.S. companies, thereby ensuring that relatively few New Zealand companies will 
exhibit the interaction effect under investigation. 
3.5.8 Ownership 
That ownership does not appear to be a significant predictor of failure indicates that 
management-controlled firms may not be any more likely to be led by self-serving 
individuals who may engage in acts which jeopardise the very survival of their 
companies. This finding would appear to lend further support to proponents of 
stewardship theory, who argue that far from being self-serving individuals managers 
do act in ways that are in the best interests of shareholders. 
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3.5.9 Protection 
The level of protection afforded companies in 1985 does not appear to be related to 
their chances of survival in the subsequent five year period. This indicates that 
companies did not have such difficulty in dealing with deregulation that their survival 
was jeopardised. This is counter to our expectations; we expected that deregulation 
would have had a detrimental effect on the survival of New Zealand firms. However, 
our finding in this regard must be treated with caution - it may simply be that our 
measure of protection was not sufficiently robust to capture the effects of 
deregulation on the firms under investigation. One possibility is that the protection 
variable did not adequately capture the effects of deregulation on diversified firms, as 
the value assigned this variable was based on the notional primary industry for each 
firm. 
3.5.10 Strategy 
Consistent with Sheppard (1994b), no relationship was observed between corporate 
strategy and failure. Thus, while there is considerable evidence that corporate 
strategy influences financial performance, the relationship between corporate strategy 
and failure appears non-existent. It appears that despite some corporate strategies 
being associated with poorer financial performance, this does not mean that 
companies having such strategies are over represented in terms of corporate failure. 
This is somewhat puzzling as we, naturally enough, expect failure to be influenced by 
financial performance. 
3.5.11 Other variables 
No relationship was observed between company size and failure. This is perhaps not 
surprising given that our samples of failed and surviving companies comprised 
companies which had been established for at least five years. As was earlier stated 
this finding was anticipated and can be seen to give our findings more relevance to 
managers of larger established companies. 
Also, we found no relationship between industry concentration and failure. In part, 
this may be due to the level of measurement, namely at the two-digit SIC code level. 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This study indicates that several factors, some of which have not been previously 
identified, distinguish companies that fail from those that survive. In particular 
having a majority of outside directors may be detrimental to a firm's chances of 
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survival; so too may be having either a functional of holding company structure. A 
caveat to our findings should be made with regard sample size. This study has a 
smaller sample size than some other analyses. This was inevitable given the 
restricted population size, ie., the small number of New Zealand listed companies. 
However, it is possible that our null findings might simply be an artifact of a limited 
sample size. Also, it is plausible that the failure of prior studies - and the present one 
- to explain corporate governance and failure may have something to do with the 
weakness of the data used; in particular, the use of the proxy corporate governance 
variables such as those adopted here may be inadequate. 
Our findings lend further credence to stewardship theory, a framework which 
presumes that managers are seeking to maximise organisational performance 
(Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Managements representation on 
boards, far from being undesirable, appears to enhance a firms likelihood of survival, 
if executives, and not outside directors, dominate the board. The implication from 
this is the dominant influence of managers at board level may well be necessary 
because these individuals may well posses knowledge and expertise which outside 
directors do not, by virtue of their more detached involvement in the activities of the 
company. It appears that boards dominated by outsiders may, in effect, hamstring 
executives from the pursuit and implementation of those strategies which best ensure 
the very survival of their company. 
The finding that not having a divisional structure appears to increase a firms 
likelihood of failure is interesting in light of the lack of previous research on 
corporate structure and failure. As with corporate governance in general, structure 
appears to be an area on which failure researchers should turn their attention. 
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Chapter 4 
BOARD STRUCTURE OF 
NEW ZEALAND LISTED COMPANIES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Remarkably little is known about the boards of directors of New Zealand companies. 
The most recent research in this area was conducted by Turner (1985) who examined 
CEO duality among listed companies for 1984, and Chandler and Henshall (1982) 
who examined board size, incidence of executive chairmanship and the proportion of 
outsiders on the boards of listed companies. We seek to expand on these earlier 
studies and, in particular, identify what changes in board structure have since 
occurred. This analysis should give us a sense of the responsiveness of New 
Zealand companies to pressures to reform corporate governance and the current state 
of corporate governance with respect to board structure variables. In the terminology 
of Boyd, Carroll and Howard (1996), this analysis is micro and descriptive in nature. 
Micro, because we examines board variables, and descriptive because we are 
focusing on a single country, New Zealand. 
4.2 CHANGES IN BOARD STRUCTURE IN NEW ZEALAND, 1962 TO 1993 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Past studies of board composition in New Zealand have typically focused on just 
board size (Laurent, 1971; Fogelberg and Laurent, 1974; Firth, 1987, Chandler and 
Henshall, 1982; Turner, 1985). Two previous studies have looked at CEO duality 
(Chandler and Henshall, 1982; Turner, 1985) with one of these studies (Chandler and 
Henshall, 1982) also looking at the proportion of outsiders on corporate boards. 
We add to the existing data in two ways. First, we look at more board structure 
variables than previous local studies (refer Table 4.1 for a summary of the board 
structure variables of interest). Second, we update our knowledge of board structure 
variables, and changes in board structure, by including data for the years 1980, 1985, 
1987, 1990 and 1993. Data for 1980 represents 53 per cent of all listed companies in 
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that year and 66 per cent of all listed companies are in the 1985 sample. The data for 
1987, 1990 and 1993 represent all listed companies in each of those years. 
Previous studies of board structure in countries with large numbers of listed 
companies have usually examined the largest listed companies (e.g., the Fortune 500 
or the Times 1000). Given the association between company size and some board 
composition variables, such studies will not provide an accurate portrayal of 
corporate governance in the countries of interest. Take, for example, board size 
which has found to be correlated with two measures of firm size, namely sales 
(Pfeffer, 1972) and total assets (Dalton and Kesner, 1987). Given these correlations 
we would expect any sample of companies drawn from a group of very large 
companies to have a larger mean board size than would a randomly chosen sample of 
all, for example, listed companies. Therefore, samples of very large companies will 
not accurately represent the average board size for all listed companies. 
TABLE 4.1 
Board structure variables 
Variable Definition Illustrative studies 
CEO duality CEO duality occurs when an Turner (1985) 
individual is both CEO and board 
chair 
Executive board Binary variable. Coded as "1" if the Donaldson & Davis 
chair board chair is also CEO or another (1991) 
executive; "0" otherwise 
Board size Total number of directors (excluding Pfeffer (1972) 
alternative or deputy directors) Barnhardt, Marr and 
Rosenstein (1994) 
Number of Outsiders The number of directors who are Dalton & Kesner (1987) 
current executives of the company 
Percentage of Number of outsiderslBoard Size, Dalton & Kesner (1987) 
Outsiders multiplied by 100 
Majority of Binary variable. Coded as "1" if Kesner, Victor & 
Outsiders greater than 50 per cent of directors Lamont (1986) 
are outsiders; "0" otherwise 
Table 4.2 summarises the findings of past studies in New Zealand along with those 
findings for the years we have added. We will now proceed to identify and examine 
any changes which have occurred in the board structure of New Zealand listed 
companies since 1962. 
TABLE 4.2 
Summary of New Zealand board structure studies 
Year 1962a 1970a 1972b 1980 1981c 1984d 1984b 1985 1987 1990 
Board size 7.21 6.96 6.66 7.24 6.95 7.12 7.45 6.14 5.70 
% Dual - - 17.83 - 11.14 - 10.81 17.81 15.38 
%EC - - 20.16 20.30 - 14.19 18.49 17.48 
N OUT - - 5.45 - - 5.60 4.48 4.15 
% OUT - - 74.98 71.50 - 75.83 72.60 72.67 
M OUT - - 86.82 - - 87.16 81.16 82.52 
No. of 58 160 247 129 208 184 221 148 292 143 
companies 
Rep'n* 100 53 100 66 100 100 
Sources: aLaurent (1971) and Fogelberg and Laurent (1974); DFirth (1987); cChandler and Henshall (1982); GTurner (1985). 
Note: % Dual=percentage of companies in sample with CEO duality; % EC=percentage of companies with executive chairpersons; 
N_OUT=mean number of outsiders on boards; %_OUT=mean percentage of outsiders on boards; M_OUT=percentage of boards with 
a majority of outsiders. 
*Tbe percentage of listed companies represented. 
1993 
6.07 
14.29 
16.54 
4.57 
74.18 
82.71 
133 
100 
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4.2.2 Board size 
There has been a significant change in board size between 1962 and 1993. There is 
little apparent change in board size over the most recent period from 1987 to 1993. 
But there does appear to have been a reduction in board size (from seven to six 
directors) between the period up to 1985 and the later period, 1987 though 1990. To 
test the significance of this change the available data on board size were subjected to 
an analysis of variance. 
Full information was available for board data for all years except 1962 and 1981 (in 
these years only the mean board size was available). Conducting an analysis of 
variance on the available data we found an F ratio of 14.62 (p<0.01). An 
examination of the means and standard deviations of the data for the years analysed 
indicates that board size is, generally speaking, higher in the earlier years and lower 
in more recent years (refer Table 4.3). A Scheffe test reveals significant differences 
between several years of data. To confirm the direction and level of significance of 
these differences, t-tests were then conducted for the pairs of years identified as 
having significant differences by the Scheffe test (refer Table 4.4). As expected these 
t-tests indicate that, compared to earlier years, board size is significantly smaller in 
more recent years . 
. On the whole our analysis points to a reduction in the board size of New Zealand 
listed companies. In 1970 the mean board size was around 7 members, whereas in 
1993 the mean board size was around 6 members. Board size was significantly 
smaller in each of the years 1987 and 1990 compared to 1970; and in 1990 compared 
to 1972. Board size was also significantly smaller in each of the years 1987, 1990 
and 1993 compared to each of 1980, 1984 and 1985. 
There are two possible explanations for the reduction in board size in more recent 
years. First, the lowest mean board size of 5.69 in 1990 perhaps reflects the levels of 
insolvency, bankruptcy, resignations and the loss of legitimacy of some directors as a 
consequence of the 1987 stock market "crash". Second, the rapid deregulation of the 
New Zealand economy and the stock market crash led companies to "give primary 
emphasis to their own survival" (Hamilton and Shergill, 1993, p.104). Companies in 
survival mode do not have the luxury of excess and unproductive directors, and are 
likely to alter their board structure accordingly. 
TABLE 4.3 
Sample characteristics for board size 
Year N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
1970 160 6.96 1.99 
1972 247 6.66 1.98 
1980 129 7.24 1.91 
1984 221 7.12 2.21 
1985 148 7.45 2.11 
1987 292 6.14 2.17 
1990 143 5.69 2.27 
1993 133 6.07 2.20 
TABLE 4.4 
t-tests for board size * 
Year 1987 1990 1993 
1970 4.063 5.153 
1972 4.268 
1980 5.222 6.109 4.670 
1984 5.023 5.935 4.422 
1985 6.070 6.821 5.409 
>i< .. All slgmflcant at 1 % level; blank cells denote 
no significant difference between years 
4.2.3 Number of outside directors 
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The mean number of outside directors in five years is shown in Table 4.5. There has 
been a significant change in the number of outsiders on New Zealand boards. An 
ANOVA for the years of data available found a significant F ratio of 14.33 (p<O.Ol). 
A Scheffe test found that there were significant differences in the number of outside 
directors between each of the years 1980 and 1985 and each of the more recent years 
1987, 1990 and 1993. T-tests show that the number of outside directors was 
significantly lower for each of these more recent years compared to the earlier years 
(refer Table 4.6). 
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TABLE 4.5 
Number of outside directors 
Year Mean Standard 
Deviation 
1980 5.45 2.05 
1985 5.60 1.94 
1987 4.48 2.09 
1990 4.15 2.12 
1993 4.57 2.13 
TABLE 4.6 
t-tests for number of outsiders* 
Year 1987 1990 1993 
1980 4.444 5.135 3.408 
1985 5.572 6.081 3.226 
.. 
All t-tests are sIgmfIcant at 1 % level 
4.2.4 Proportion of outside directors 
An analysis of variance on the available data (ie, 1980, 1985, 1987, 1990, and 1993) 
revealed no significant change occurred in the percentage of outsiders on New 
Zealand boards (F=0.88; not significant). The mean proportion of outsiders remained 
within the range 0.73 to 0.76 over the 1980 to 1993 period (refer Table 4.7). That no 
significant change occurred can be explained by the changes we observed in the two 
variables which determine the proportion of outside directors, namely the number of 
outsiders and board size. These variables declined together, having no significant 
impact on the proportion of directors which were outsiders. 
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TABLE 4.7 
Proportion of outside directors 
Year Mean Standard 
Deviation 
1980 0.75 0.19 
1985 0.76 0.18 
1987 0.73 0.22 
1990 0.73 0.22 
1993 0.74 0.19 
4.2.5 Outsider Dominance 
Between 1980 and 1993, outsider dominance of boards of directors was very high 
with over 80 per cent of New Zealand boards being dominated by outside directors. 
Table 4.8 shows the results for tests of difference in proportions between the various 
years for which data were available. From this analysis we observe that for no two 
years was there was there a significant difference in the proportion of companies 
being controlled by a majority of outside directors. 
TABLE 4.8 
Test of difference in proportions (p-values) 
1980 
1985 -.084 
1987 1.421 1.589 
1990 .981 1.106 -.342 
1993 .926 1.046 -.381 -.041 
Year 1980 1985 1987 1990 
4.2.6 CEO Duality/Executive board chairs 
Between 1980 and 1985 the proportion of companies having CEO duality declined 
significantly (from 17.8 to 10.8 per cent). However from each of the years 1984 and 
1985 to 1987 there was a significant increase in the incidence of CEO duality. 
In contrast to the changes observed in CEO duality, statistical analysis reveals no 
significant difference in the proportion of companies having executive board chairs 
between any of the years for which data was available. 
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TABLE 4.9 
Duality: test of difference in proportions (p-values)* 
1980 
1985 1.675a 
1984 1.608 0.173 
1987 0.005 -1.886a -1.918a 
1990 0.542 -1.054 -1.158 0.632 
1993 0.782 -1.316 -0.881 0.903 0.256 
Year 1980 1984 1985 1987 1990 
>c- .. 
All p-values are sIgmficant at 10% level 
TABLE 4.10 
Executive board chair: test of difference in proportions (p-values) 
1980 
1981 -0.029 
1985 1.320 1.359 
1987 0.401 0.440 -1.314 
1990 0.564 0.598 -0.770 0.257 
1993 0.756 0.791 -0.547 0.487 0.208 
Year 1980 1981 1985 1987 1990 
4.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The analysis undertaken indicates several key changes in board structure. First, 
board size has declined from around 7 members between 1962 and 1985 and 6 
members more recently (1987 to 1993). As mentioned previously this reduction may 
have occurred due to the stock market crash and the pressures of economic 
deregulation. 
Interestingly, the number of outside directors declined from around 5.5 per board in 
1980 and 1985 to around 4.5 per board in the more recent period of 1987 through 
1990. Thus, it would appear that the reduction that has taken place in board size is 
due to fewer outsiders being represented on boards. Following the previously 
outlined argument, this may indicate that such directors were more likely to 
constitute "dead wood" than were insiders, and are more likely than insiders to have 
suffered legitimacy problems following the sharemarket "crash", 
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With regards representation by non-executive directors, New Zealand boards were 
found to typically be dominated by outsiders. The Cadbury Report (1992) in the 
United Kingdom prescriped a "Code of Best Practice". Among the features of boards 
seen as desirable in this Code was that, " .. the representation of non-executive [i.e., 
outsider] directors on the board should be sufficient in number to carry weight in the 
board's deliberations ... ". 
In this respect New Zealand boards appear well equipped to perform their governance 
role effectively, with over 80 per cent of our boards having a majority of outside 
directors. Furthermore, by 1993, approximately three-quarters of the members on the 
average board were outside directors. 
The Cadbury Report (1992) also recommends that, " ... there should be a clear 
division of responsibilities at the top of any large company between the chairman and 
the chief executive officer ... ". Only a small proportion (around 14 per cent) of listed 
companies had chief executives who were also board chairperson, indicating that 
such companies, primajacie, have an effective board leadership structure. 
In conclusion, it appears that New Zealand boards are, primajacie, well structured in 
terms of what the Cadbury Report (1992) refers to as "best practice". In the next 
chapter we compare the board structure of New Zealand listed companies with those 
in the United States, United Kingdom, Japan and Australia. This investigation 
should give us a sense of the extent to which New Zealand boards are (dis)similar to 
those of our major trading partners. 
Chapter 5 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
OF BOARD STRUCTURE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
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In the previous chapter we have taken a largely descriptive approach, examining 
board structure within the New Zealand context. This approach is not dissimilar to 
much previous corporate governance research. As Boyd et al state, "much prior work 
has taken a descriptive rather than a comparative or explanatory focus" (1996, p.16). 
In fact, international comparative research on board structure is a neglected area, with 
Boyd et al (1996) commenting that: 
... international research on corporate governance appears surprisingly 
scarce (p.3) 
... much remains to be done to understand the function and effectiveness of 
international boards, and to provide comparisons across nations (p.16) 
That international corporate governance research is so scarce it is somewhat 
surprising, especially when several studies indicate that there are in fact marked 
differences in board structure between some countries (Dalton, Kesner and Rechner, 
1988; Dalton and Kesner, 1987). As Chapters 2 and 6 of this thesis demonstrate, 
these differences in board structure may have important implications for the 
performance and ultimately the survival of corporations. 
5.2 PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 
Only two previous papers have made any attempt to integrate the literature 
concerning board structure in different countries (Dalton, Kesner and Rechner, 1988; 
Dalton and Kesner, 1987). Each of these papers neglects much of the relevant 
research. For example, the research on determinants of board structure (e.g., Pearce 
and Zahra, 1992) and performance consequence of board structure (e.g., Rechner and 
Dalton, 1986; Mallette and Fowler, 1992) contain a wealth of data on board structure 
that, to date, has not being brought together. 
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Dalton and Kesner's (1987) is the only attempt that has been made to compare board 
structure variables between countries at a given time. This study compared board 
composition variables for 50 large companies in each of the United Kingdom., 
United States and Japan. Dalton and Kesner concluded that there were differences in 
CEO duality between the these three countries and that Japanese companies had a 
lower proportion of outside directors than either their U.S. or U.K. counterparts. 
Given the lack of integration of previous research on board structure in different 
countries, and our interest in board structure in New Zealand, we decided to seek 
answers to the following research questions: 
Ql: Does board structure in New Zealand differ from that in the United States, 
United Kingdom, Japan and Australia? 
Q2: What factors account for any differences in board structure between New 
Zealand, the United States, United Kingdom, Japan and Australia? 
5.3 DATA AND METHOD 
One of the major difficulties in conducting international comparative research in the 
area of corporate governance is that: 
Interational governance is not a research stream per se, but rather a loosely 
integrated set of studies. Consequently, there is little consistency in the 
choice of theoretical perspectives, or countries and variables being studied. 
Because these papers are also written from a broad array of disciplines, they 
can be difficult to identify through an article search. This difficulty in 
identifying and locating international governance studies likely serves as a 
disencentive for other researchers to enter this area (Boyd et aI, 1996, p.3) 
Having decided to conduct an international comparative study, there were two 
approaches we could take. First, we could elect to collect relevant board structure 
data from other countries, which we could then compare to our New Zealand data. 
Alternatively, we could draw upon existing studies of board structure and make 
comparisons to New Zealand from these. The first option, collecting the data 
ourselves, was eliminated because of the inherent difficulties and time-consuming 
nature of collecting detailed board structure data in any country. We chose the 
second method, namely a literature review of existing data, because no 
comprehensive comparative literature review has previously been undertaken in this 
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area. We therefore hoped that some interesting insights would be gained from an 
investigation of this literature. 
For comparative purposes we collected published board structure data for the United 
States, United Kingdom, Australia and Japan. The United Kingdom and the United 
States were selected for comparison because we believed more studies touching on 
board structure would be available for these countries than anywhere else. Australia 
was chosen because of its close ties with New Zealand and, in particular, its status as 
our largest trading partner. Japan was chosen because of companies from this 
country are believed to have vastly different governance structures than those 
apparent in western countries (Dalton and Kesner, 1987). It is also important to note 
that the four countries selected for comparison with New Zealand are our major 
trading partners. 
The data on overseas board structure was obtained primarily from studies relating to 
board composition alone, board composition and corporate performance, and 
company interlocks. In an attempt to obtain as many studies as possible we searched 
abstracting databases (ABI-Inform, Econlit, Social Sciences Index). In addition the 
references in each paper we obtained were examined to identify any further papers 
that may be of use; literature review papers were especially useful in this regard. 
We will now proceed to compare the board structure of New Zealand listed 
companies with those of Australia, Japan, the United States and United Kingdom. In 
making these comparisons it is important to be mindful of the relationships observed 
between firm size and board structure which may - by virtue of sampling biases 
(towards larger companies) - lead to otherwise erroneous comparisons being made. 
For example, if we find larger boards in American compared to New Zealand 
companies - then this may be a function of the data sources used (we would expect, 
say, Fortune 500 companies to be very much larger than New Zealand Stock 
Exchange listed companies). Given this concern, we are only attempting to obtain a 
prima facie understanding of international board structures. 
5.4 COUNTRY COMPARISONS 
5.4.1 Comparisons with Australia 
Table 5.1 shows board size for Australian Companies and comparisons with New 
Zealand companies. The Australian data is not strictly comparable to that for New 
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Zealand because of their bias towards larger Australian companies. Nevertheless, 
examination of the available data highlights some differences. New Zealand listed 
companies appear to have lower mean board sizes than large Australian companies. 
Around 1980 this difference was about one director. However, by around 1990, the 
Australian companies have approximately two more directors than do New Zealand 
companies. This situation appears to have arisen because the mean board size of 
New Zealand listed companies has declined between 1980 and 1990 (from 7.24 to 
5.70), whereas the mean board size for larger Australain companies has remained 
relatively stable over a similar period (8.33 in 1979 and 8.37 in 1991). 
TABLES.1 
Board size of Australian versus New Zealand companies 
Australian companies New Zealand 
Companies 
Year Sample Basis for Average Year Average 
selection board size board size 
1959a Top 250 Assets 6.60 
1979a Top 251 Assets 8.33 1980 7.24 
1986b Top 250 Assets 8.62 1987 6.14 
1991b Top 250 Revenue 8.37 1990 5.70 
.a .b Sources. Stelling and Wan (1984), Alexander and Murray (1992). 
The only other board structure variable that has been given research attention for 
Australian companies is CEO duality. Kiel and Blannerhasett (1984) in their study of 
the top 50 Australian listed companies and found that 8 companies (16 per cent) had 
a board chair that was also CEO. Unfortunately, the authors do not give the year 
they their obtained data for, making a comparison with New Zealand data impossible. 
5.4.2 Comparisons with the United Kingdom 
As with Australia, most of the available board composition data for the United 
Kingdom relates to board size (refer Table 5.2). Hiner (1967) found that the mean 
board size of 345 randomly selected British listed companies was 5.9 directors in 
1962. This compares to 7.21 directors in Laurent's (1971) study of 58 large New 
Zeland listed companies in the same year. 
More recently, Dalton and Kesner (1987) in their sample of 50 large u.K. companies 
for the year 1986 found an average board size of 11.44 directors. This compares with 
a mean board size of only 7.45 directors for our 1985 sample of New Zealand listed 
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companies. However, this difference may be attributable to the size bias in Dalton 
and Kesner's (1987) sample. 
TABLE 5.2 
Board size and duality in United Kingdom companies 
Study Year No. Mean Duality 
board 
size 
Hiner (1967) 1955 510 8.31 33.92 
Hiner (1967) 1960 704 8.07 36.80 
Hiner (1967) 1962 345 5.90 
Dalton and Kesner (1987) 1986 50 11.44 30.0 
Both Dalton and Kesner (1987) and Li (1994) examined the proportion of outsiders 
on the boards ofU.K. companies. Dalton and Kesner (1987) found this statistic to be 
0.64 for 50 large companies in 1986, wheras more recently Li (1994) found it to be 
0.36 for 60 U.K. based multinationals in 1987. On the face of it these two statistics 
appear incompatable. In any event it appears that New Zealand companies have a 
higher proportion of outsiders on their boards at this time (0.76 in 1985 and 0.73 in 
1987). 
5.4.3 Comparisons with the United States 
More studies have touched on various aspects on board structure in the United States 
than anywhere else. However, these studies have typically focussed on very large 
companies (Boyd et aI, 1996). 
Board size 
Large U.S. companies appear to have a mean board size of around 12 directors (refer 
Table 5.3). Only one study (Schellenger, Wood and Tashakori, 1989) examines a 
random sample of U.S. listed companies. That study found a mean board size of 6.58 
directors for 1986. This compares to 7.45 directors in 1985 and 6.14 directors in 
1987 for New Zealand listed companies. It appears that, around 1986 anyhow, New 
Zealand and the U.S. listed companies had similar board sizes. 
90 
TABLE 5.3 
Board size in United States companies 
Study Sample Year(s) Mean 
board 
size 
Gordon (1945) 155 largest U.S. corporations 1935 13.5 
Kaplan (1994) 146 companies with the 1980 14.88 
highest sales on Fortune's list 
of the largest industrials in 
1980 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) 324 U.S. listed companies 1981-85 12.2 
who appointed an outside 
director 
Kesner (1987) 250 randomly selected 1983 12.48 
Fortune 500 companies 
Lee et al (1992) 58 MBOs, 1983 to 1989 U.S. 1983-89 11.45 
listed companies 
Bric1dey et al (1994) 247 firms listed on the NYSE 1984-86 11.96 
between 1984 and 1986 that 
Dalton and Kesner (1987) 50 large U.S. corporations 1986 12.96 
Schellenger et al (1989) 526 randomly selected U.S. 1986 6.58 
listed companies 
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TABLE 5.4 
Percentage of outside directors in United States companies 
Study Sample Year(s) Percent 
Outsiders 
Kesner and Dalton (1985) 266 compames listed III 1970 46 
Forbes from 1970 to 1980 
Kesner and Dalton (1985) 266 companies listed III 1980 57 
Forbes from 1970 to 1980 
Rechner and Dalton (1986) 30 companies from the Top 1980 68 
100 Fortune 500 
Kesner et al (1986) Average for 1980-84 of 1980-84 70 
proportion of outsiders on 
384 companies listed in the 
Fortune 500. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt 324 U.S. listed companies 1981-85 65.6% 
(1990) who appointed an outside 
director 
Kesner (1987) 250 randomly selected 1983 63.70 
Fortune 500 companies 1983 
Lee et al (1992) 58 MBOs, 1983 to 1989 U.S. 1983-89 59.39% 
listed companies 
Brickley et al (1994) 247 firms listed on the NYSE 1984-86 68.8% 
between 1984 and 1986 that 
Dalton and Kesner (1987) 50 large U.S. corporations 1986 69.7 
Schellenger et al (1989) 526 randomly selected U.S. 1986 64.7 
listed companies 
Li (1994) 192 U.S. firms taken from the 1987 74 
Directory of Multinationals 
Baysinger, Kosnik & Turk 176 Fortune 500 companies not given 40.5% 
(1991) but appears insiders 
to be early 
1980s 
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TABLES.S 
Number of outside directors in United States companies 
Study Sample Year(s) Number of 
Outsiders 
Kaplan (1994) 146 companies with the 1980 9.57 
highest sales on Fortune's list 
of the largest industrials in 
1980 
Rosenstein and Wyatt 324 U.S. listed companies 1981-85 8.0 
(1990) who appointed an outside 
director 
Lee et al (1992) 58 MBOs, 1983 to 1989 U.S. 1983-89 7.50 
listed companies 
Dalton and Kesner (1987) 50 large U.S. Corporations 1986 9.02 
Proportion of outside directors 
There is no indication that the percentage of outside directors on boards is associated 
with company size. This was shown in Dalton and Kesner's (1987) study of 50 large 
companies in each of the U.K., U.S. and Japan. Given this results relating to 
differences in the percentage of outside directors between countries should be 
informative. 
Results of studies on the proportion of outsiders on U.S. boards do not show any 
trend (refer Table 5.4). However, it appears that between 1980 and 1990 mean board 
size of large U.S. companies was between 60 and 70 per cent. This is somewhat 
lower than in New Zealand companies where the average percentage of outside 
directors over the same period was between 73 and 76 per cent (refer Table 4.2 of 
Chapter 4). 
Number of outside directors 
The only studies which have looked at the number of outside directors on the boards 
of American companies have examined large corporations (refer Table 5.5). Hence, 
no meaningful comparison can be made between New Zealand and United States 
companies with regards the number of outside directors. These studies found that 
large U.S. corporations had on average about 8 outside directors (refer Table 5.5). 
CEO Duality 
In contrast to New Zealand companies, American companies appear to have a 
significantly higher incidence of CEO duality (refer Table 5.6). Estimates of CEO 
93 
duality for U.S. companies vary widely, from 46 per cent in 1980 (Boyd, 1994) to 89 
per cent for 1980 to 1984 (Kesner et aI, 1986). The most recent study indicates that 
76 per cent of American companies had a dual CEO structure in 1987. This 
compares to only 10.81 per cent for 1985 and 17.81 per cent for 1987 among New 
Zealand listed companies. It therefore appears in any event that New Zealand listed 
companies have an extremely low incidence of CEO duality compared to American 
companies. 
TABLE 5.6 
CEO duality in United States companies 
Study Sample Year(s) % with 
CEO 
Duality 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) 141 companies listed in the 1978-83 78.7 
Fortune 500 between 1978 
and 1983, with stable 
governance structures 
Boyd (1994) 192 U.S. corporations 1980 46 
Dalton and Kesner (1987) 50 large U.S. corporations 1986 82.0 
Donaldson and Davis 321 U.S. corporations 1987 76 
(1991) 
Kesner, Victor & Lamont 384 Fortune 500 companies 1980-84 89 
(1986) listed between 1980 and 1984 
5.4.4 Comparisons with Japan 
Each of the studies examining board size in Japanese companies has used very large 
companies (Kaplan, 1994; Dalton and Kesner, 1987), so once again any comparisons 
with New Zealand are of dubious value. It is however interesting to note that the two 
studies just mentioned found board sizes of 22.5 and 21.0 members respectively, 
which are extremely large by any standards (refer Table 5.7). The large size of 
Japanese boards has not been explained by previous researchers. 
TABLES.7 
Board structure in Japan 
Study Sample Year Mean #of Percentage CEO 
Board outsiders outsiders Duality 
size 
Kaplan (1994) * 119 Japanese 1980 22.49 0.86 
companies included in 
the 1980 list of Fortune 
500 largest foreign 
industrials 
Dalton and Kesner 50 large Japanese 1986 21.04 10.17 0.51 10.9% 
(1987) companIes 
The same sample was used for Kaplan and Minton's (1994) paper. 
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The only study to examine CEO duality in Japanese companies is that of Dalton and 
Kesner (1987) who found that only 10.9 per cent of their sample of large Japanese 
companies had this board characteristic in 1986. This compares with a similar figure 
of 10.8 per cent for New Zealand companies in 1985, but a considerably higher figure 
for New Zealand companies of 17.8 per cent in 1987. The difference that is indicated 
for this later year may be due to the adoption of a board leadership structure by New 
Zealand boards leading up to the 1987 stock market "crash". 
The findings of previous studies with regards the number of outsiders on Japanese 
boards are confusing (refer Table 5.7). Kaplan (1994) found that only 0.86 outsiders 
were represented on the average board during 1980. In contrast, Dalton and Kesner 
(1987) found that 10.2 outsiders were represented on the average Japanese board in 
1986. There is no sound explanation for a massive increase in outsider 
representation over the 1980-85 period, leading us to conclude that the difference 
may be attributable to sampling bias. Given this possibility we elected not to 
compare Japanese and New Zealand boards on this variable, as we felt that any 
differences observed would in alllikilehood be dubious. 
Only one study has investigated the proportion of outsiders on Japanese boards is that 
of Dalton and Kesner (1987) who found this statistic to be 51 per cent for 1986. This 
compares to somewhere around 75 per cent at the same time for New Zealand listed 
companies. It therefore appears that New Zealand companies have a higher 
proportion of outsiders on their boards than Japanese companies. Insight into why 
this may be the case is provided by Dalton, Kesner and Rechner (1988): 
In Japan ... the role of the director appears to be less the steward of the 
stockholder than would be expected in either the United Kingdom or the 
United States. The "watchdog" model of outside directorship, then, may be 
largely unnececessary for the typical Japanese corporation ... (Dalton, 
Kesner and Rechner, 1988, p.101). 
5.5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Our findings are indicative of some differences in board structure between New 
Zealand and each of Japan, Australia, the UK. and the U.S. Ideally, future research 
in this area should take care to study representative samples of companies in different 
countries, rather than just very large companies, thereby giving researchers the 
opportunity to make more generalis able observations about differences in board 
structure between countries. 
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Some explanations as to why governance structures in the U.K., U.S. and Japan may 
be different have been provided by previous research. The corporate structure of 
Japanese companies in particular is seen to differentiate such companies markedly 
from those of most western countries. In particular it has been noted that, " ... the 
typical Japanese firm is comprised of very few owners whose financing comes from 
large financial instituions who work very closely with top management" (Dalton, 
Kesner and Rechner, 1988, pp.lOO-1). In a similar vein Prevezer and Ricketts (1994) 
note that, in comparison to U.K. companies (and presumably U.S. companies too): 
... [shareholders] are largely insiders, having some kind of commercial 
contact with the company. Thus, although the structure of shareholding ... 
the nature of instituional shareholding is very different ... The institutions 
are not independent pension funds and insurance companies with their own 
interests and obligations ... They are instead institutions such as banks who 
may have provided loan finance; supplying companies who may have a 
long-running association; or other companies linked by cross-
shareholdings. 
The second important feature of Japanese shareholding is that trade ability 
of rights is more constrained than in the U.K. It is estimated that nearly 
two-thirds of equity is held in the form of stable shareholding-antei 
kabunushi-which is distinct from interlocking shareholding-kabushiki 
mochiai (Prevezer and Ricketts, 1994, pp.245-6). 
In addition to shareholding differences in Japanese, as compared to western 
companies, it has been observed that corporate boards in Japan are more "consensus 
orientated and less CEO-dominated" than their U.S. counterparts (Kaplan, 1994, 
p.520). This may also help account for the apparently low incidence of CEO duality 
among Japanese companies and the apparently large boards 6f Japanese boards 
(presumably consensus decision-making involves the participation of many relevant 
parties, which may be represented on the board) 
The discussion just outlined indicates that Japanese companies may have different 
board structures than those of their western counterparts by virtue of differences in 
the nature of corporate ownership and decision-making. It is less clear why 
differences in board structure of western countries occur. It would be instructive for 
future international comparative studies to track board structure in different countries 
on an historical basis. Hence, any differences in board structure which may be 
present between countries today could be attributed to, say, how industry and 
corporate control has evolved in different countries. Take for example the following: 
... the British tradition of corporate accountability has been traced to the 
philosophical writings of Bentham. Bentham applied utilitarian principles 
to management, with the idea that there is a concept of accountability for 
management actions which should result in beneficial consequences (Boyd 
et al, 1996, p.7). 
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However, despite the calls made for international comparative research on corporate 
governance, one must remain somewhat sceptical of its value. It is inevitable that the 
variables of interest to academics (such as those we have used) provide only vague 
indicators of whether or not a board is in fact effective. Academic research on boards 
of directors has largely been driven by convenience of data collection, with variables 
such as board size, outsider representation and CEO duality being readily observable 
and, typically, easily obtainable from secondary data sources, hence their use, and the 
theories revolving around these variables. 
It would be more productive for researchers to focus on what makes some boards 
more effective that others. For example, to say that a larger board is likely to be 
more effective that a smaller board is somewhat simplistic. The quality and the 
diversity of the directors on the board is what one is more likely to be really talking 
about, and board size may only provide a rough indicator of these factors. Some 
research on the effectiveness of boards has been conducted. for example Bradshaw, 
Murray and Wolpin (1992), Cook and Brown (1990) and Kovner (1985). However, 
research in this area has typically focused on organisations in the health care sector. 
More general observations on effectiveness have been made by some (Leighton and 
Thain, 1993; Thain and Leighton, 1988; Weidenbaum, 1986), but empirical research 
appears more-or-less non-existent. This appears the most promising area for 
international governance research. 
Chapter 6 
BOARD COMPOSITION 
AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
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Conventional wisdom has it that boards of directors influence company performance. 
Such influence may be direct, e.g., through boards monitoring management, or 
indirect, through the actions of a CEO selected by the board. Various structural 
characteristics of the board are often argued to influence - either positively or 
negatively - corporate performance. These structural characteristics include the 
leadership of the board, i.e., whether the CEO or another executive is board chair; 
board size i.e., the number of directors on the board; and representation by outside 
directors. Much of the research on board structural characteristics is open to 
alternative interpretation. Given the cross-sectional nature of much of this research 
causality could be argued to be in the other direction i.e., performance may well 
influence board composition. In fact, several longitudinal studies support this 
proposition (Boeker and Goodstein, 1991; Boyd, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1988). 
This chapter and the chapter that follows, overcome some of the methodological 
problems of previous research and gives some new insights into the determinants of 
boards structural characteristics and their performance consequences. 
6.2 BOARD LEADERSHIP, BOARD COMPOSITION, FIRM SIZE AND 
PERFORMANCE 
Previous empirical literature has typically examined the influence of three 
characteristics of boards on corporate performance. These are CEO duality, the 
proportion, or percentage, of outside directors on the board, and board size. The 
literature relating to these threee areas was reviewed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. In 
the present chapter we this literature with the assistance of meta-analysis: 
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6.2.1 CEO Duality 
In the most recent study of CEO duality Boyd (1995) conducted a meta-analysis of 
previous studies and concluded that these showed that CEO duality has a weak 
negative relationship with firm performance. However, Boyd missed at least two 
studies in his meta-analysis (Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1993) and mistakenly included 
two other studies (Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993; Mallette and Fowler, 1992).9 A 
revised meta-analysis of CEO duality-corporate financial performance is shown in 
Table 6.1, as are previous studies and two recent studies by Boyd (1994, 1995). We 
observe from these past studies that the combined mean effect size is -0.07. This 
figure, although modest, is statistically significant, and indicates that, there is a weak 
negative relationship between CEO duality and corporate financial performance. 
One major concern in interpreting these studies is the method of analysis: some of 
these studies are cross-sectional. The authors of these studies are all to willing to see 
their findings as either supporting a CEO duality-performance relationship, the 
inference being that CEO duality either influences performance or it does no such 
thing. This may be the case, however an alternative interpretation could be placed 
upon some research findings in this area, namely that past performance causes CEO 
duality. 
Where a positive CEO duality-performance relationship was found it could be argued 
that CEO duality has come about because the company has performed well under the 
stewardship of the CEO. Here the CEO may be rewarded for improved performance 
with the additional role of board chair. Alternatively, strong performance may permit 
CEOs to wield more power in terms of board influence, thereby ensuring their 
election to the additional role of board chair. 
Whilst CEO duality has been argued to either positively or negatively influence 
corporate financial performance, the reverse could also be argued. For example, poor 
financial performance may lead to CEO duality. In such cases the role of board chair 
is likely to be both undesirable and onerous, leading to the incumbent board chair to 
be more willing to vacate this position. Therefore any CEO who wishes to 
consolidate their position of power with an organisation will have an easier job either 
deposing the current board chair, and convincing other directors that such a change is 
necessary. This scenario has some support in the literature with Mallette and Fowler 
9 In determined prior to the year in which CEO duality was observed. Therefore these 
studies could only be used to test the proposition that corporate financial peformance 
leads to CEO duality. 
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(1992) finding that ROE averaged over the previous three years was negatively 
correlated with CEO duality. 
6.2.2 Outside directors 
Outside directors, in the most narrowly defined sense are simply directors who do not 
currently serve in an executive capacity for the company on whose boards they sit. 
However, a number of broader definitions have been adopted (refer Table 6.2). 
Most studies on the debate relating to insider versus outsider directors have used the 
proportion of outside directors as the independent variable. However, some studies 
have use the proportion of inside directors on the board or even the proportion of 
insiders to outsiders. Table 6.2 shows a meta-analytic review of previous studies. 
One methodological concern in interpreting previous board composition-financial 
performance studies, as was mentioned earlier, and relates to the different definitions 
of an "outside" director. Thus while some studies take the approach that outsider 
directors are directors who are currently non-executives, others define outsiders as 
directors who are neither current or past executives. Bearing in mind these 
differences, the data in Table 6.2 could collectively be seen to provide a conservative 
view of the effect that outside directors, defined in their broadest sense, have on 
corporate financial performance. The meta-analysis of proportion of outside 
directors and financial performance shows an average effect size of .06, which is 
statistically significant. Thus, it appears that having a higher proportion of outsiders 
on corporate boards is associated with increased financial performance. This 
relationship, although not strong, is significant. That a positive, rather than a 
negative, relationship is observed when aggregating the findings of previous studies, 
is of particular interest. This is because, as we have seen, the arguments relating to 
inside versus outside directors, tend to favour representation by outside directors. 
TABLE 6.1 
CEO duality and financial performance 
Study Sample CEO duality Peiformance Sample Effect size 
definition measurers) size 
Berg and Smith (1978) Fortune 200 firms CEO is also board Growth in stock price 159 -0.49 
chair ROI 194 -0.04 
ROE 193 -0.18 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) 337 Standard & CEO or another ROE 329 0.13 
Poor's companies executive is board Stock returns 321 0.06 
chair 
Rechner and Dalton (1989) Fortune 500 CEO is also board Stock returns 141 0.05 
companies chair 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) 141 Fortune 500 As above ROE 141 -0.2200 
companies having, or ROI -0.2700 
not having, CEO Profit margin -0.2200 
duality between 1978 
and 1983 
Daily and Dalton (1992) 100 firms listed in As above ROA 100 0.0541 
Inc. magazine's ROE 0.0100 
annual railing of the PIE ratio 0.0281 
fastest-growing small 
publicly held 
companies in the U.S. 
Daily and Dalton (1993) 186 Standard & As above ROA 186 -0.1500 
Poors companies ROE -0.1100 
PIE ratio -0.0400 
Boyd (1994) 193 publicly held As above ROE 193 -0.0470 
companIes 
headquartered in the 
U.S. in 1980 
Boyd (1995) As above As above ROI 193 -0.0300 
Combined effect size -0.0709 
.J1.VU 
TABLE 6.2 
Meta-analysis of proportion of outsider directors and financial performance 
Study Sample Definition of Peiformance Analysis N Eff~ct i 
"outsider" measurers) Slze , 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) 266 Forbes Public directors, ROE (current) correlation 266 0.0900 ' 
corporations professional directors, ROE (future) 0.1200 
private investors and 
independent decision 
makers 
Cochran, Wood and Jones 406 Fortune 500 firms Insiders: current- ROS correlation 406 0.1100 
(1985) for the year 1980 employee directors ROE 0.1100 
ROA 0.1800 
Excess value 0.2000 
Cochran, Wood and Jones As above Insiders = current, past ROS correlation 406 0.1600 
(1985) and affiliate ROE 0.0700 
employee-directors ROA 0.1500 
Excess value 0.1400 
Rechner and Dalton (1986) 30 randomly selected Not defined Month-end stock correlation 30 0.0200 
companies from the top returns -0.0040 
100 companies on the Month-end stock 
Fortune 500 returns (controlling 
for firm size) 
.Jl..V""ll: 
Kesner (1987) 250 of the 1983 Not defined (used Profit margin correlation 250 -0.1700 
Fortune 500 firms insiders) ROE -0.1100 
ROA -0.1600 
EPS -0.1100 
Stock price 0.1200 
Return to investors 0.1000 
(all for 1983) 
Kesner (1987) 221 of the 1983 As above Profit margin correlation 221 -0.0800 
Fortune 500 firms for ROE 0.0000 
which performance data ROA -0.1000 
was available for 1984- EPS -0.0600 
85 Stock price -0.1000 
Return to investors -0.1200 
(for 1984-5) 
Hill and Snell (1988) 94 Fortune 500 firms Examined ratio of ROA correlation 94 -0.8800 
for the year 1980, in inside to outside ROA regressIOn 0.2030 
research intensive directors, obtained 
industries from Dun and 
Bradsheet's Reference 
Book of Corporate 
Management for 1980 
Zahra and Stanton (1988) Random sample of Not defined ROE correlation 100 -0.2000 
1980 Fortune 500 Profit margin -0.1500 
companies Net sales to equity -0.1200 
EPS -0.1600 
DPS -0.4000 
Log profits -0.2000 
Schellenger, Wood and 526 firms, randomly Not stated (verify) ROE correlation 526 0.0599 
Tashakori (1989) selected from those ROA 0.1255 
firms listed on both the ROI 0.0827 
Compustat Industrial Risk adjusted ROI 0.1398 
tape and the Centre for Dividend payout 0.0831 
Research in Securities Average dividend 0.1041 
Prices 
Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan 58 going private Proportion of Cumulative abnormal regression 58 0.2608 
and Davidson (1992) transactions of NYSE independent and returns 
or AMEX companies affiliated outside regressIOn 0.2338 
between 1983 and 1989 directors on the board 
Proportion of 
independent outside 
directors 
Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan 74 unit management As above As above As above 74 0.1556 
and Davidson (1992) buyout transactions of 0.0594 
NYSEorAMEX 
companies between 
1983 and 1989. 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) III NSE or AMEX Directors with no Two day risk adjusted regression 111 0.1363 
listed firms making 128 affiliation with the returns 
acquisition bids during firm other than their Two day risk adjusted 
1980-87. directorship returns regression 111 0.1593 
Daily and Dalton (1992) 100 firms listed in Inc. Those not in the direct ROA canonical 100 0.1643 
magazine's annual employ of the ROE correlation 0.0755 
ranking of the fastest- organisation PIE ratio 0.3161 
growing small publicly 
held companies in the 
u.S. 
-lLVV 
Pearce and Zahra (1992) 119 Fortune 500 "Affiliated outsiders" - ROA correlation 119 0.2000 
compames taken from Corporate ROE 0.2100 
1000 EPS 0.1800 
Net profit margin 0.0900 
Pearce and Zahra (1992) As above "Non-affiliated ROA correlation 119 0.1800 
outsiders" - taken ROE 0.2200 
from Corporate 1000 EPS 0.3300 
Net profit margin 0.1600 
Daily and Dalton (1993) 186 Standard and Outsiders were classed ROA correlation 186 -0.0600 
Poors companies as those directors not ROE 0.0200 
currently in the direct PIE ratio 0.0700 
employ of the 
organisation 
Boyd (1994) 193 U.S. firms that Directors who are also ROE correlation 193 0.0490 
were publicly listed in serving executives 
1980 (insiders) 
Goodstein, Gautam and 334 Californian Board members who Operating margin correlation 334 0.0400 
Boeker (1994) hospitals were not hospital staff 
or physicians 
Barnhart, Marr and 369 Standard and Directors with no ties Market to book value correlation 369 -0.1590 
Rosenstein (1994) Poors 500 firms, for to the corporation of common equity 
1990. Excludes other than their board 
regulated utilities and seat 
financial services 
corporations 
Barnhart, Marr and As above As above Market to book value regressIOn 369 0.1029 
Rosenstein (1994) of common equity 
.LV, 
Brickley, Coles and Terry 247 NYSE and ASE Decision makers in Abnormal stock regression 247 0.1697 
(1994) firms adopting poison other firms that do not returns 
pills over 1984-86 have extensive 
business dealings with 
the firm as well as 
public directors, 
professional directors 
and private investors. 
Brickley, Coles and Terry As above Decision makers in As above As above 247 0.0756 
(1994) other firms without 
extensive business ties 
to the sample firm 
Combined effect size 0.0574 
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TABLE 6.3 
Summary of board size-financial performance studies 
Study Sample Performance Analysis Sample Effect 
measurers) size size 
Provan (1980) 46 non-profit Amount of intra- correlation 46 0.7700 
human service agency funding 
agencIes External funding 0.5200 
Bequests 0.1100 
Zahra and Stanton Random sample of ROE correlation 100 -0.3600 
(1988) 1980 Fortune 500 Profit margin 0.3400 
companies Net sales to equity 0.1600 
EPS 0.3800 
DPS -0.5500 
Log profits 0.6800 
Pearce and Zahra (1992) 119 Fortune 500 ROA correlation 119 0.2900 I 
companies ROE 0.2400 
EPS 0.3700 
Profit margin 0.1900 
Daily and Dalton (1993) 186 Standard and ROA correlation 186 -0.1000 
Poors companies ROE 0.1000 
PIE ratio 0.1200 
Barnhardt, Marr and 359 Standard and Market to book correlation 369 0.0360 I 
Rosenstein (1994) Poors 500 firms value 
Goodstein, Gautam and 334 Californian Operating margin correlation 335 0.1000 
Boeker (1994) hospitals as a percentage of 
net revenue 
Combined effect size 0.1326 
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6.2.3 Board size 
Table 6.3 shows a meta-analytic review of the board size-performance literature. In 
total 16 effect sizes were determined. Twelve of these were positive with significant 
p-values, four were non-significant and two were negative and significant. A 
significant positive effect size of 0.1326 is observable from all studies combined, 
indicating that having a larger board is indeed related to higher financial 
performance. 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has added to our understanding of the determinants and performance 
consequences of board structure in several ways. First, meta-analytic literature 
reviews indicate that board size and the proportion of outside directors on boards are 
positively associated with corporate financial performance, and that CEO duality is 
negatively associated with financial performance. These findings give some support 
to those arguing in favour of outsider representation on boards, but do not support 
those proposing that CEO duality is conducive to improved corporate performance. 
Chapter 7 
DETERMINANTS OF BOARD 
COMPOSITIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
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The author of a recent study on the determinants of board composition commented 
that: 
despite [the] wide recognition of the significant role played by board 
composition in company performance, very few empirical studies have 
been undertaken to explain its determinants (Li, 1994, p.360). 
We were able to identify thirteen studies which explored the determinants of board 
structure. 
It is instructive to ask why there has been comparatively little research in this area. 
The major reason, as proposed by Pearce and Zahra (1992), is that board composition 
is often seen to be determined by the preferences of CEOs. Recognition of this was 
made by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) who propose that CEO succession is a 
pivotal factor in determining board composition. These authors looked at board 
composition of 142 NYSE traded companies between 1971 and 1983, and found that 
inside directors tended to be appointed to boards prior to a change in CEO. These 
inside appointments were seen as part of a grooming process for would-be 
successors. Hermalin and Weisbach also found that following the appointment of a 
new CEO, iniders tended to resign from the board to be replaced by outsiders. 
The view that CEOs dominate boards is changing, due largely to reforms in corporate 
governance. Take for example the following remark from a recent edition of The 
Economist: 
[f]ormal nominations and performance evaluation, once reserved for lower 
rungs of the corporate hierarchy, are now applied to company directors too 
(The Economist, 8 October 1994, p.84). 
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Given the waning influence of the CEO in determining board composition, 
explanations that do not focus exclusively on the CEO, are increasingly pertinent in 
explaining determinants of board structure. 
7.2 PRIOR CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
Prior corporate performance provides one such possible explanation for board 
structure. In particular, poor past performance is seen to be positively associated 
with both board size and outside directors. Given that performance is often attributed 
to managers, in poor performing companies executive directors are seen to have been 
ineffective. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) found that poor performing companies 
tend to remove inside directors and add outside directors to their boards. The 
replacement of insiders with outsiders is thought to occur as "poor performance 
indicates a need for a fresh perspective or greater monitoring ... " (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1988, p.59l). Pearce and Zahra (1992) also support this view: in their 
study of 119 Fortune 500 companies they found effective past company performance 
was associated with lower representation by outsiders and larger boards. Kaplan and 
Minton (1994), in a longitudinal study of board appointments between 1980 and 
1988, found that directors representing banks and non-financial corporations were 
more likely to be appointed to boards following poor sharemarket performance. 
Poor corporate performance also appears to have implications for the ability of 
executives to gain directorships in other companies. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) 
found that managers of companies that significantly reduced their dividends between 
were significantly less likely to obtain other directorships than were managers of 
companies that had not reduced their dividends. 
Given all of these research findings we propose that: 
H6: Poor financial performance will be positively associated with the proportion of 
outsiders on a company's board. 
H7: Poor financial performance will be negatively associated with board size. 
7.3 FIRM SIZE 
Firm size has also been examined as a determinant of board structure. Taking a 
resource-dependence view, Pfeffer (1972) proposed that this will occur because 
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larger organisations are invariably more diversified, therefore requiring them to 
interact with more and varied constituencies in their environment. Pfeffer also 
proposed that because of their size large organisations will have a greater impact on 
society and the economy, and "thus there is again a greater need to have more 
members who can relate and legitimate the organization to its external environment" 
(1972, p.223). Pfeffer's (1972) research found a positive correlation between one 
measure of organisation size (sales) and board size. This finding is supported by 
Birnbaum (1980) and Boyd (1990) Li (1994) has also found that larger companies 
tended to have a larger proportion of outside directors. From these studies we 
propose that: 
H8: Firm size will be positively associated with board size. 
H9: Firm size will be positively associated with the number of outside directors. 
Hi 0: Firm size will be positively associated with the proportion of outside directors 
on the board. 
7.4 LEVERAGE 
Leverage has also been proposed to influence board structure. In this regard, Pfeffer 
(1972) found leverage to be positively correlated with board size. More recently, 
Pearce and Zahra (1992) found leverage to be positively associated with both board 
size and outsider representation on boards. 
The arguments for a leverage-board structure relationship also rely on resource-
dependence theory. Pearce and Zahra (1992) comment that: 
As a firm attempts to acquire outside finances, its board will be enlarged to 
co-opt influential decision-makers in pertinent financial institutions 
(Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). By so doing, a firm 
attempts to ensure flow of needed capital at favourable terms. 
Alternatively, financial institutions may insist on securing representation on 
a board to ensure sound fiscal policies by the borrowing company. Thus as 
a firm's long-term debt to equity rises, board size will be expanded by 
adding outside directors (Pearce and Zahra, 1992, p.421). 
Given this we propose that: 
Hii: There will be a positive association between leverage and board size. 
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Hi2: There will be a positive association between leverage and the number of 
outside directors on a board. 
Hi3: There will be a positive association between leverage and the proportion of 
outside directors on a board. 
7.5 OTHER FACTORS 
In addition to the three factors examined above (performance, firm size and 
leverage), several other determinants of board structure have been proposed. It is to 
these factors which we now turn our attention. Due to lack of available data relating 
to these factors will not be examined in light of our New Zealand data. However, it 
is important to note that the three factors we will examine appear to be those which 
are most prominent in the existing literature, hence it is envisaged that they will give 
the greatest insight into what determines board structure in New Zealand companies. 
Resource dependence theorists view board composition as being determined by an 
organisation's environment. This view is usually attributed to Pfeffer (1972) who 
views "the organization's use of the board of directors as a vehicle for dealing with 
problems of external interdependence and uncertainty, resulting from its exchange of 
resources with important external organizations" (p.219). Research with a resource 
dependence focus has typically viewed both board size and representation by outside 
directors as being attributable to the organisation's environment. 
Board size is seen to indicate an organisation's ability to co-opt resources from its 
environment. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) proposed that firms with a greater need to 
link with their environment should have larger boards. Pfeffer (1972) found board 
size to be positively related to both sales volume and leverage. Pfeffer (1973) found 
board size to be positively correlated with hospital budgets, proportion of funds 
received from private donations and the importance placed on community influence 
and fundraising as board selection criteria. Birnbaum (1984) in a longitudinal study 
of seven X-ray machine manufacturers found no causal relationship between 
competitive uncertainty and board size. This contrasts with the these findings of 
Boyd (1990) who, in a longitudinal study, found board size to be smaller under 
conditions of resource scarcity or competitive uncertainty. It appears that there is no 
clear empirical support for the proposition that environmental uncertainty influences 
board size. 
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This is also the case with regards outsider representation: Boeker and Goodstein 
(1991) found hospital boards changed representation by physicians, business 
executives and hospital executives in response to changing environmental 
contingencies. Birnbaum (1980) found increased competitive uncertainty led to 
fewer outsiders on boards. Pearce and Zahra (1992) found increased environmental 
uncertainty was positively associated with environmental uncertainty. In another 
study, Brinkley and James (1987) compared board composition in U.S. states where 
there was legislation restricting bank takeovers, with states where there was no such 
legislation. These authors found that both the number and proportion of outside 
directors was greater in states with no restrictive takeover legislation. Brinkley and 
James (1987) propose that this is the case because " ... the board of directors will bear 
greater responsibility for checking managerial discretion in corporations where the 
influence of the market for takeovers is weak" (p.162). 
Another determinant of board composition is thought to be strategy. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) found empirical support for the proposition that exiting from a 
market would lead to the executive director(s) in charge of that market leaving the 
board. Pearce and Zahra (1992) found significant positive associations between 
companies having an external growth strategy or being more diversified and board 
size and representation by outsiders. This finding with regards board size and 
diversification supports the proposition made by Pfeffer (1992). However, Li (1994) 
found mixed support for a diversification-board size relationship. Pearce and Zahra 
(1992) also found that several other strategy variables were associated with board 
composition. There was a negative association between concentration strategy and 
outsider representation. Retrenchment strategy was associated with smaller boards 
and increased outsider representation. 
Most recently, Li (1994) examined the role of ownership structure in determining the 
percentage of outside directors on boards. Li proposes that dimensions of ownership 
structure - ownership concentration, control by banks, and state control - influence 
outsider representation on boards. Where shareholdings in corporations are diffuse 
Li proposes a negative association with the percentage of outside directors. This is 
because owners in such cases are not seen to benefit individually by monitoring 
corporate performance. Shareholdings by banks in corporations were argued to be 
negatively associated with the percentage of outsiders on boards. As debtholders as 
well as equity holders banks will have daily access to information that is useful for 
monitoring purposes, thereby making board appointments less important in terms of 
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their monitoring benefits. In cases where the state has a shareholding in corporations 
it is argued that this will be positively associated with the percentage of outside 
directors because it is "especially important for the board of directors to be legitimate 
and accountable to the public" (Li, 1994, p.362). Li (1994) tested these propositions 
using a sample of 390 manufacturing companies, finding support for each. In 
contrast, Boeker and Goodstein (1991) found no support for the proposition that 
hospital ownership (a dichotomous variable: either for-profit or not-for-profit) was a 
determinant in changes in board representation by physicians, business executives or 
hospital executives. 
7.6 SAMPLEANDMETHOD 
The sample comprised all companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZSE) between 1987 and 1993. Financial institutions, mining companies and 
companies which merged over this period were excluded from analysis, as were 
companies where there was incomplete financial information, leaving 56 companies. 
Performance measures used were ROA and ROE. Board composition data (refer 
Table 7.1) was collected for the years 1987, 1990 and 1993. In addition company 
interlocks were determined in each of these years for each company. Company 
interlocks are the number of boards of other public listed companies (including those 
not in our sample) that any company has board representation on. 
TABLE 7.1 
Board structure variables 
Variable Definition 
CEO duality Operationalised as a binary variable. Coded 
as "I" if the board chair is also CEO 
Exec. Chair Operationalised as a binary variable. Coded 
as "I" if the board chair is also CEO or 
holds some other executive position 
Number of Outsiders The number of directors who are not 
executives 
Board size The total number of directors 
Proportion Outsiders Number of outsiderslBoard size 
Majority of Outsiders Operationalised as a binary variable. Coded 
as "1" if more than 50 per cent of the 
directors are outsiders 
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Our research design is a refinement upon that of Pearce and Zahra (1992), who 
collected board composition data for 1986 and performance data for each of the three 
preceding and three following years. In contrast, we collect board composition data 
for three years (1987, 1990, 1993). We then selected 1987 and 1990 as the years for 
which we would test the effects of board composition on subsequent performance. In 
line with this performance data (ROA and ROE) is collected for the three years 
following 1987 and 1990, i.e., 1988-90 and 1991-93. Board composition data for 
1990 and 1993 was used to test the determinants of board composition. 
Consequently performance data was collected for each of the preceding three year 
periods 1987-89 and 1990-92. In addition we collected data on firm size (measured 
as the natural logarithm of total tangible assets) and leverage for these periods. 
7.7 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
7.7.1 Cross-sectional analysis 
Given that much of the board structure studies have been cross-sectional in nature we 
decided that before looking at our longitudinal data we would examine the cross-
sectional data for all companies listed on the NZSE in 1987, 1990 and 1993 (refer 
Tables 7.2 to 7.4). 
From tables 7.2 and 7.3 we see that for the years 1987 and 1993 there was no 
correlation between either ROE or ROA and any of the board leadership or board 
composition variables. In contrast, in 1990 one board composition variable, board 
size, was positively correlated with ROE. 
Assets and both board size and number of outside directors were positively and 
significantly associated in each of the three cross-sections, as were assets and 
interlocks. No consistent associations were found between assets and other variables. 
Assets were positively correlated with having an executive board chair in 1987 and 
1990, but not in 1993. Assets and proportion of outsiders were negatively associated 
in both 1990 and 1993, but not in 1987. Assets and having a majority of outsiders 
was negatively associated in only one year, 1990. 
TABLE 7.2 
Correlation matrix, 1987 
B SIZE 
N OUT 0.732c 
POUT -0.061 0.600c 
M OUT 0.086 0.532c 0.763c 
DUAL -0.318° -0.393° -0.336° 0.321° 
EC -0.257a -0.475c -O.477c -0.399° 0.947c 
fLOCKS 0.576c 0.260a -0.216 -0.272 -0.187 -0.046 
LEV 0.018 -0.089 -0.132 -0.138 -0.055 -0.013 0.198 
SIZE 0.576c 0.303° -0.185 -0.080 -0.162 0.275° 0.447c 0.075 
ROE 0.187 0.069 -0.194 -0.118 0.096 0.100 0.063 -0.062 0.198 
ROA 0.121 -0.003 -0.194 -0.195 0.074 0.066 -0.035 -0.064 0.053 0.891 c I 
B_~IZE N OUT POUT M O![L ~LJAL -~-... ~ _I'LOc:~ _~EY SIZE . ROE --.- ..... -~ 
Note: B_SIZE=board size; N_OUT=number of outsiders; P _OUT=percentage of outsiders; M_OUT==majority of outsiders; 
DUAL=CEO duality; EC=executive chairperson; I'LOCKS=company interlocks; LEV=leverage; SIZE==firm size; ROE=Return 
on Equity; ROA=Return on Assets. 
TABLE 7.3 
Correlation matrix, 1990 
B SIZE 
N OUT 0.738 
POUT -0.074 0.599c 
M OUT -0.190 0.386b 0.763c 
DUAL 0.018 -0.210 -0.376b -0.238u 
EC 0.072 -0.216 -0.423c -0.338b 0.933c 
I'LOCKS 0.502 0.356b -0.017 -0.099 -0.154 -0.039 
LEV 0.118 0.118 0.024 -0.139 -0.025 0.031 0.295 b 
SIZE 0.610c 0.252u -0.295b -0.314b 0.167 0.276b 0.394b 0.076 
ROE 0.205 0.079 -0.084 -0.193 0.035 0.045 0.028 -0.224a 0.079 
ROA 0.326b 0.158 -0.123 -0.145 -0.012 0.028 0.136 0.020 0.197 0.502c J 
B SIZE N OUT POUT M OUT DUAL EC I'LOCKS LEV SIZE RQ]U 
Note: B_SIZE=bourd size; N_OUT=number of outsiders; P _OUT=percentage of outsiders; M_OUT=majority of outsiders; 
DUAL=CEO duality; EC=executive chairperson; I'LOCKS=compuny interlocks; LEV=leverage; SIZE=firm size; ROE=Return 
on Equity; ROA=Relurn on Assets. 
TABLE 7.4 
Correlation matrix, 1993 
B SIZE 
N OUT 0.818c 
POUT 0.050 0.582c 
M OUT -0.020 0.381 b 0.709c 
DUAL -0.203 -0.211 -0.115 -0.024 
EC -0.203 -0.211 -0.115 -0.024 1.000c 
I'LOCKS 0.563c 0.408b -0.033 -0.071 -0.175 -0.185 
LEV 0.215 0.239a 0.037 -0.045 -0.052 -0.052 0.170 
SIZE 0.651 c 0.362b -0.269b -0.203 -0.026 -0.026 0.514c 0.253a 
ROE 0.196 0.167 -0.050 -0.026 0.028 0.028 0.133 -0.238a 0.082 
ROA 0.175 0.099 -0.135 -0.137 -0.013 -0.0\3 0.063 -0.217 0.038 0.844c J 
B SIZE N OUT POUT M OUT DUAL EC I'LOCKS LEV SIZE ROE I --
Note: B_SIZE=board size; N_OUT=number of outsiders; P _OUT=percentage of outsiders; M_OUT=majority of outsiders; 
DUAL=CEO duality; EC=executive chairperson; l'LOCKS=company interlocks; LEV=leverage; SIZE=firm size; ROE=Return 
on Equity; ROA=Return on Assets. 
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Leverage was positively associated with was number of outside directors, and this 
association was only found for 1993. Also prior leverage was found to be associated 
with interlocks, but in 1990 only. 
Having examined the cross-sectional data, we next proceeded to conduct several 
longitudinal analyses of our New Zealand data. This analysis was conducted to 
investigate the performance consequences, and determinants, of board structure. It is 
to these issues which we now turn our attention: 
7.7.2 Longitudinal analysis 
7. 7.2.1 Board variables and financial peiformance 
Our findings indicate that, on the whole, board structure does not play an important 
role in determining the future financial performance of NZSE companies. 
Table 7.5 presents correlation matrices for board structure and subsequent financial 
performance. None of the board structure variables were associated with future 
ROE. Thus, our longitudinal findings indicate that the board size-ROE correlation 
that we observed for 1990 is not indicative of board size leading to improved 
financial performance. 
Only one board structure variable, namely board size, was found to be associated 
with subsequent performance. However, this finding held only for the earlier time 
period (1987 to 1990) and for one performance variable (ROA). Companies with a 
larger board size in 1987 tended to have higher ROA over the subsequent three years, 
1988-90, giving some support to hypothesis 5. 
The inconsistent findings relating to board size and ROA, lead us to question whether 
board size does in fact influence this performance variable. There are several 
possible explanations here. First, the differences observed may be due to differences 
in environmental circumstances between the two periods. The first period, 1987-90, 
was characterised by great environmental uncertainty and was a recessionary period. 
In contrast, the 1990 to 1993 period was more benevolent, with economic growth 
evident. Second, any difference we have observed may be spurious, and our findings 
are simply not robust. 
TABLE 7.5 
Board structure and financial performance, correlation matrices 
AVERAGES 
FOR 1988-90 
FOR: 
ROE 0.191 0.091 -0.109 -0.129 0.009 0.020 0.017 
ROA 0.282° 0.097 -0.184 -0.182 -0.123 -0.104 0.08e 
B SIZE N OUT POUT M OUT DUAL EC I'LOCKS 
GOVERNANCE VARIABLES, 1987 
AVERAGES 
FOR 1991-93 
FOR: 
ROE 0.074 0.162 0.154 0.077 -0.076 -0.061 0.064 
ROA 0.180 0.107 -0.044 -0.057 -0.109 -0.101 0.073 
B SIZE N OUT POUT M OUT DUAL EC I'LOCKS 
GOVERNANCE VARIABLES, 1990 
- -_ .... _-_._ .. _-- --_ .... _----- ---- --_ .. _---- -- ..... _- ... - -- - .. _-- --
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Those who argue that larger boards are better performing in more turbulent 
environments typically propose that this is because such boards, by virtue of their 
size, have a greater ability to co-opt valuable resources from the external 
environment. If this is the case we would expect companies interlocks to associated 
with subsequent financial performance. Interestingly we find no such correlation 
between company interlocks in either 1987 or 1990 and subsequent financial 
performance as measured by ROA and ROE (refer Table 7.5). This leads us to 
conclude that a resource dependence view of our differing results is unlikely to be 
founded. 
Given that environmental linkages do not appear to provide an explanation of the 
differing results, an alternative explanation relates to the size of the group per se. 
However, the findings run counter to what the literature would indicate - i.e., we find 
that larger boards performed better in the more turbulent environment. In contrast 
the literature indicated that small cohesive groups would be better suited to such 
environments. 
An interesting possibility is indicated by the high positive correlation between board 
size and interlocks. Company interlocks can be viewed as giving an indication of the 
experience of directors. Those companies with fewer interlocks could be viewed as 
having less experienced directors, whereas those with more interlocks are likely to 
have directors with more experience. This experience may be particularly useful 
during a time of turbulence, such as that surrounding the 1987 sharemarket "crash", 
hence our finding. 
7.7.2.2 Determinants of board composition 
We next look at the determinants of board composition. As with the preceding board 
composition-financial performance analysis correlation matrices were derived as a 
starting-point for our analysis (refer Table 7.6). No consistent correlation was 
observed between prior financial performance (ROE or ROA) and board structure or 
company interlocks. We did find that firms having higher levels of ROA over 1990-
92 were more likely to have larger boards in 1993, lending partial support to 
hypothesis 7. Furthermore ROE over 1990-92 was negatively associated with having 
CEO duality or an executive chairperson in 1993. 
Firm size revealed itself to be consistently positively associated with several board 
structure variables, namely board size and the number of outside directors, 
supporting hypotheses 8 and 9. It therefore appears that as companies increase in 
terms of size 
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Table 7.6 
Correlation matrix, determinants of board structure 
MEANS 
FOR 
1987-89 
LEV 0.128 0.043 -0.060 -0.203 -0.095 -0.023 0.296D 
SIZE 0.604c 0.281 b -0.242a -0.303b 0.161 0.283D 0.419c 
ROE 0.175 0.053 -0.155 -0.102 0.074 0.080 0.060 
ROA 0.174 0.012 -0.189 -0.145 0.073 0.074 -0.033 
B SIZE N OUT POUT M OUT DUAL EC fLOCKS 
BOARD STRUCTURE, 1990 
MEANS 
FOR 
1990-92 
LEV 0.223a 0.177 -0.085 -0.187 -0.055 -0.055 0.261a 
SIZE 0.640c 0.364b -0.250a -0.233a 0.049 0.049 0.482c 
ROE 0.075 0.057 -0.017 -0.037 -0.328b -0.328b 0.190 
ROA 0.301 b 0.194 -0.088 -0.029 -0.103 -0.103 0.048 
B SIZE N OUT POUT M OUT DUAL EC fLOCKS 
BOARD STRUCTURE, 1993 
they obtain more directors, and in particular more outside directors. This finding is 
consistent with the predictions we made from resource-dependence theory. 
Firm size was also consistently negatively associated with boards having a majority 
of outside directors and the proportion of outside directors. Thus larger boards were 
more likely to be dominated by insiders and have a higher proportion of insiders on 
their boards. It therefore appears that although, as firms increase in size, they obtain 
more outside directors, these outside directors do not tend come to dominate the 
board. In fact the contrary appears to be the case, with insiders being more likely to 
dominate the boards of companies as they grow. Previous firm size was also 
consistently and positively correlated with the number of company interlocks. 
Prior firm size was a significant positive predictor of having a board chair who was a 
serving executive for both 1990 and 1993. There was also a positive correlation 
between prior firm size and company interlocks in both 1990 and 1993. Leverage 
was also a significant positive predictor of interlocks for 1990 and 1993. 
Past leverage and both board size and number of outsiders were positively correlated, 
but only during 1990 to 1993, lending some support to hypotheses 11 and 12. It may 
be the case that during this later period firms relied more upon external sources of 
finance to pursue growth opportunities as the New Zealand economy expanded. 
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There was no support for hypothesis 13, which proposed that leverage would be 
positively associated with the proportion of outsider directors on boards. 
7.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Our findings in the New Zealand context indicate that board structure variables are, 
on the whole, irrelevant in determining future financial performance. The exception 
to this observation is board size, which was found to be a significant predictor of 
ROE in a time of environmental turbulence (1987-90). These findings indicate that 
any calls for corporate governance reform in New Zealand which propose that 
various board structure characteristics will lead to improved financial performance, 
are unfounded. 
Furthermore, firm size was found to be the only consistent predictor of board 
structure. However, in more recent years financial performance, as measured by 
ROA has become a determinant of both board size and board leadership. This 
relationship may only be apparent during the more recent time period, due to greater 
environmental stability, as opposed to the 1987-90 period, which could be seen as 
one of great environmental turbulence. 
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Section Three 
Chapter 8 
CORPORATE CONTROL 
AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
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To date, corporate control has received more research attention than any other aspect 
of corporate governance. Previous studies of corporate control have typically 
examined either changes in corporate control over time or attempted to relate 
corporate control to corporate performance. It is these two areas which are the focus 
of parts two and three of this chapter. In particular, we examine corporate control 
changes over time and the relationship between corporate control and performance 
among companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
8.2 CORPORATE CONTROL IN NEW ZEALAND 
It is often argued that, in the modern corporation, the ownership of shares is so 
widely spread that management can pursue their own interests unchecked by 
. shareholders. Symptoms of management's alleged pursuit of self-interest are 
believed to include conglomerate building and excessive salaries and perks 
(Dumaine, 1994; Amihud and Lev, 1981). This notion that managers may not act in 
the best interests of shareholders was first proposed by Adam Smith in the Wealth of 
Nations: 
The directors of Uoint stock] companies, however, being the managers of 
other people's money than their own, it cannot be expected, that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a 
private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a 
rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their 
master's honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from 
having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more 
or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company (Smith, 
1776),10 
In contrast to the, perhaps, rather cynical view of managerial behaviour set out above, 
a more charitable view of managerial behaviour is given by stewardship theory, 
10 Cited in Hunt (1986), page 85. 
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which proposes that " ... the executive manager, far from being an opportunistic 
shirker, essentially wants to do a good job, to be a good steward of the corporate 
assets" (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, p.51). 
In this section we address the issue of management versus owner control of New 
Zealand public listed companies. Specifically, we focus on the extent to which 
shareholders in New Zealand's public companies have the ability to influence the 
actions of management. 
Previous studies of corporate control in New Zealand have, with the exception of 
Firth (1992), classified companies according to the degree of control of those owning 
(voting) shares. Following Fogelberg (1980), companies were given one of four 
control classifications: majority, minority, joint, or management. Each of these four 
types of control is seen to represent different stages in the detachment of ownership 
from management control (refer Table 8.1). At one extreme, majority control 
represents a situation where there is a major shareholder (or group of shareholders) 
that holds an unassailable position in terms of control of a company. At the other 
extreme, management control represents a situation where shareholdings in a 
company are so widely dispersed as to ensure that no individual shareholder can 
exercise control in the direction of the company. 
Table 8.2 shows the results of previous studies of corporate control in New Zealand, 
along with new data which were collected for this thesis. These new data were for 
the years 1990 and 1993. In addition, Fox and Hamilton's (1994) data for the year 
1985 was updated with the inclusion of an additional 47 companies, to give a total 
sample of 143 companies for that year,ll 
Two previous studies (Fogelberg, 1980; Fox and Hamilton, 1994) have interpreted 
changes in ownership leading up to 1985. The first study, by Fogelberg (1980), 
examined the 43 largest surviving New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE) companies 
listed between 1962 and 1974. Of these companies, Fogelberg comments that: 
... by the early 1960s there had been a substantial movement towards 
management control. During the next 12 years this movement continued, 
13 firms moved either directly or more closely towards management 
control (Fogelberg, 1980, p.55). 
11 Fox and Hamilton's intial sample was based on those companies listed on the NZSE in 1985 that 
were also listed in 1975. The additional 47 companies represent those that were listed in 1985 and 
either 1980 or 1990. 
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TABLES.1 
Classification of control types* 
Classification Deemed to exist when: 
Majority Majority of capital (over 50%) held by one holder or a tightly-
knit group 
Minority An individual or small cohesive group of shareholders hold 
sufficient votes to be able to dominate the company through their 
interest 
Exists where there is an important minority interest or family 
group accounting for between 15 to 50% of the votes, where this 
minority interest is represented on the board 
Joint Minority interest strengthened by a close association with 
management, or management control enhanced by a sizeable 
minority interest 
One of two situations may apply. Either: 
.. owning a minority interest of 10-15 % coupled with board 
representation, or 
.. owning or controlling a minority interest of more than 5% 
with board representation and active management 
involvement 
Management Ownership is so widely distributed that no one individual or 
group has a minority interest which is large enough to allow them 
to exert dominance over the company's affairs 
'l', 
Denved from Fogelberg (1980, pp.61-64) 
TABLES.2 
Control types of New Zealand listed companies, 1962 to 1993* 
1962a 1974a 1981b 1985 
Control No. % No. % No. % No. % 
classification 
Majority 7 16.3 3 7.0 45 22.1 54 37.8 
Minority 14 32.6 13 30.2 78 38.2 69 48.3 
Joint 5 11.6 6 14.0 19 9.3 10 7.0 
Management 17 39.5 21 48.8 62 30.4 10 7.0 
Totals 43 43 204 143 
Sources: apogelberg (1980); DChandler and Henshall (1982) 
* Our 1985, 1990 and 1993 samples comprise 66, 94 and 89 per cent respectively of all listed companies 
in each of these years. 
1990 
No. 
73 
52 
4 
5 
134 
1993 
% No. % 
54.5 58 50.0 
38.8 48 41.4 
3.0 7 6.0 
3.7 3 2.6 
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If we conduct a Chi-square test on all the available data (as given in Table 8.2) we do 
find some significant differences in control classifications by year (refer Table 8.3). 
Interestingly, and in contrast to what we expect from Fogelberg's comments, no 
statistically significant change in the proportion of companies having various control 
classifications took place between 1962 and 1974. 
TABLE 8.3 
Chimsquare statistics for differences in distribution of 
control categories between adjacent years 
1962-74 1974-81 1981-85 1985-90 
Majority 2.29 66.51 15.99 9.92 
Minority 0.07 4.32 3.75 2.48 
Joint 0.20 3.15 0.83 3.08 
Management 0.94 14.21 25.76 2.04 
Chi-square 3.50 88.19* 46.33* 17.51 * 
statistic (3 dof) 
*slgnificant at .001 level 
1990-93 
0.43 
0.20 
3.61 
0.41 
4.65 
In contrast to what we expect from Fogelberg's comments, the first major changes in 
corporate control occurred between 1974 and 1981. Between these two years we 
found a significant difference in the proportion of majority and management 
controlled companies, with there being a higher proportion of majority controlled 
companies in 1981 and a lower proportion of management controlled companies in 
the same year. 
The 1981-85 period saw further major changes in the distribution of companies 
among different control categories. Compared to 1981, in 1985 there was a greater 
proportion of listed companies in the majority and minority categories. Furthermore 
there were significantly fewer companies in the management controlled category in 
1985 as compared to 1981. 
The changes highlighted above are consistent with Fox and Hamilton's (1994) 
comment that: 
... by 1981 there had been a big rise in the proportion of majority controlled 
companies and a roughly equivalent fall in the proportion of management 
controlled companies (as well as consistent if less marked shifts in the 
minority and joint categories). These changes continued on through to 
1985 (Fox and Hamilton, 1994, p.74). 
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The 1985-90 period also saw a difference in the proportion of companies having 
majority control, with a greater proportion observable for 1990. There was no 
significant change in the distribution of firms by control classifications between 1990 
and 1993. 
In summary, we conclude that, over the period from 1962 to 1993, there has been a 
major shift to majority control among New Zealand public companies: by 1993 50 
per cent of our public companies were majority controlled. This increase in majority 
controlled companies has taken place along with a decline in the proportion of our 
companies that are management controlled. Fogelberg's (1980) study found that 39.5 
per cent of the 43 largest companies in the year 1962 were management controlled. 
In contrast, by 1993 only 2.6 per cent of all public listed companies were 
management controlled. A significant increase in the proportion of minority 
controlled companies is also evident over the 1962 to 1993 period, as is a significant 
decrease in the proportion of listed companies having joint control. 
From the preceeding analysis, we can conclude that there is little evidence of a 
"managerial revolution" in terms of the control of New Zealand public listed 
companies. In fact, the reverse is the case, with companies coming more and more 
under the control of major shareholders. It therefore appears that there is likely to be 
little scope for managers to depart from actions which are in the best interests of 
shareholders. In the event that managers do pursue actions which are not in the 
interests of major shareholders then, given the high degree of control exhibited by 
these shareholders, it is likely that moves would be taken to align management's 
actions with those desired by shareholders. 
8.3 OWNERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE OF NEW ZEALAND PUBLIC 
LISTED COMPANIES 
8.3.1 Introduction 
Berle and Means (1932) gave popular credence to the notion that the twentieth 
century has seen a separation of corporate ownership from corporate control, i.e., that 
there has been a "managerial revolution", as we mentioned earlier in this chapter. It 
has been argued that such a separation of ownership from control can lead managers 
to engage in actions which are not in the best interests of shareholders. In 
management-controlled firms, shareholders - by virtue of diffuse ownership - are 
seen to be powerless to constrain managers pursuit of self-interest. Ultimately it is 
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proposed that this pursuit of self-interest by managers will be reflected in poor 
corporate performance. Hence the rationale for ownership-performance studies, 
which seek to test the proposition that various types of corporate control will 
ultimately be associated with corporate performance. 
Numerous studies have sought to determine whether the ownership structure of 
companies influences corporate financial performance (for reviews, refer Nyman and 
Silberston, 1978; Firth, 1992; Bothwell, 1980; Murali and Welch, 1989). Typically 
these studies define different types of control depending on the percentage of shares 
held by the major, i.e., largest, shareholder. 
Reviews of the ownership-performance literature all conclude that no consistent 
findings have been found (e.g., Murali and Welch, 1989; Reeder, 1975; Short, 1994). 
For example, in reviewing 26 ownership-performance studies Short (1994) recently 
commented that: 
The empirical research on the effects of ownership structure on firm 
performance spans several decades, but has failed to reach any conclusions 
as to whether the type of ownership structure does significantly affect 
performance (Short, 1994, p.206). 
One major criticism that can be levelled at previous ownership-performance studies 
is that invariably researchers have derived several control categories, based on rather 
arbitrary levels of ownership. 
An aspect of corporate control and financial performance that has been neglected is 
the direction of any link between these two variables. It is typically proposed that 
corporate control will influence financial performance. However, the reverse may 
also be the case. For example, in poorly performing firms, a dominant shareholder 
may reduce their shareholding in order to invest in more profitable activities 
elsewhere. 
8.3.2 Previous New Zealand research 
Only one previous study has examined the relationship between ownership and 
performance of New Zealand public listed companies, namely Firth (1992). The 
sample for that study comprised 149 public companies for the year 1986. Firth's 
financial data was also for the year 1986, except for the variable growth which was 
defined as growth in shareholder's equity over the previous five years. For the 
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purposes of analysis, Firth classified his companies as either owner-managed or 
owner-controlled: 
Owner-controlled firms were those where there was a single shareholder 
(or closely associated group) who owned 20% or more of the firm's stock 
and who was judged to exercise some form of control (Firth, 1992, p.6). 
Firms were classified as owner-managed if they were not owner-controlled. Firth 
found no association between control-type and either return on shareholders equity or 
growth. From this he proposed that: 
Managerial theories of the firm suggest that manager-controlled companies 
will be less profitable and perhaps show a faster rate of growth. The 
current study suggests manager-controlled firms' profitability is no different 
from other categories of companies (Firth, 1992, pp.16-17). 
There are several concerns that we should have in interpreting Firth's findings. First, 
the results may, in part, be due to the control-classification system he adopted. 
Whether or not a shareholder holds more than 20 per cent of issued capital may not 
be a sufficiently robust basis to separate companies into owner versus management 
controlled classifications. Second, as Firth's data almost exclusively focuses on a 
single year, namely 1986, there may not be time for any association to appear; the 
treatment effect will have been applied for varying durations prior to 1986; some 
long, some short. If Firth averaged his variables over a longer time period, 
performance aberrations in individual years would be less apparent, leading to a 
clearer picture of the ownership-performance relationship being given. 
Given some of the concerns expressed about previous ownership-performance 
literature, we decided that it would be instructive to conduct an analysis which sought 
to adress some of these concerns. It is to this study which we now turn our attention: 
8.3.3 Sample and Method 
Our sample comprised all companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZSE) between 1987 and 1993. Financial institutions and mining companies were 
excluded from analysis because of their unusual balance sheet characteristics. 
Companies which merged over the period of interest were also excluded, on the basis 
that there was not a single company to which we could attribute performance and 
ownership. These exclusions left us with a total of 56 companies for the purposes of 
analysis. 
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Given the rather arbitrary nature of many control-classification schemes we decided 
to operationalise ownership in a more compelling way. This was done by measuring 
ownership as the proportion of issued voting capital held by the major, i.e., largest, 
shareholder. A further consideration in selecting this method was the low incidence 
of companies in the majority and joint control classification categories of Fogelberg's 
(1980) classification scheme, thereby making any analysis which adopted that 
particular classification scheme of limited value. 
Ownership was indeterminable for one company, the Helicopter Line, which was 
consequently excluded from analysis, leaving us with a final sample size of 55 
companies. Data for ownership was collected for one year only (1990), the mid-year 
of our performance and ownership variable observations. 
Performance measures used were return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). 
Performance data were collected for each year from 1987 to 1993. For the same 
period we collected data for two control variables. The first control variable, firm 
size was measured as the natural logarithm of total tangible assets. The second 
control variable, leverage was measured as: (current + term liabilities + minority 
interests)/total tangible assets, multiplied by 100. 
Three year averages were calculated for each of the performance variables. The first, 
which relates to performance prior to 1990 averaged ROA and ROE for the years 
1987 to 1989. The second, which relates to financial performance after 1990, 
averages performance variables for the years 1991 to 1993. The first performance 
averages were chosen to allow investigation of the possibility that performance 
influences ownership; whereas the second performance averages were chosen to 
investigate the proposition that ownership impacts on corporate performance. 
8.3.4 Cross sectional analysis 
We first conducted a cross-sectional analysis with all our data for the year 1990 (refer 
Table 8.4 for the correlation matrix). No correlation was found between ownership 
and either ROA or ROE, nor was there any correlation between ownership and 
company size or leverage. 
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TABLES.4 
Correlation matrix of ownership and performance for 1990 
Own 
ROE -.2103 
ROA -.0340 .5023c 
Size -.1030 .1976 .0811 
Leverage .0771 .0196 -.2255a .0771 
Own ROE ROA Size 
.a . b, .C Note. p<.l, p<.05, p<.OOI 
Given that financial data for individual years may not provide an adequate basis for 
testing our hypotheses we derived two more correlation matrices, one relating to 
future financial performance, the other to prior financial performance. We will now 
discuss the results of these analyses: 
8.3.5 Ownership andfuture performance 
Our correlation matrix for 1990 ownership and performance variables for the three 
years following 1990 is shown in Table 8.5. We found no correlation between the 
1990 ownership variable and subsequent financial performance, either measured as 
ROA or ROE. In addition 1990 ownership was not associated with future levels of 
leverage or firm size. 
TABLES.S 
Correlation matrix of 1990 Ownership and future performance 
Own 
ROE (future) -.1052 
ROA (future) -.1824 .7617c 
Size (future) -.1394 .0572 .0617 
LeveraRe (future) . 0973 -.1336 -.0584 . .3202b 
Own ROE ROA Size 
(future) (future) (future) 
.a . b, .C Note. p<.l, p<.05, p<.OOI 
8.3.6 Prior performance and ownership 
We next looked at 1990 ownership and past financial performance (refer Table 8.6). 
From this table we see that one performance variable, past ROA, is negatively and 
significantly associated with the 1990 ownership variable. The other performance 
variable, ROE was not significant. It therefore appears that past ROA may influence 
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ownership. The nature of this possible relationship is most interesting, with lower 
levels of past ROA being associated with higher levels of current shareholdings. 
TABLE 8.6 
Correlation matrix for 1990 ownership and past performance 
Own 
ROE (past) -.2069 
ROA (past) -.2327a .8373c 
Size (past) -.1388 .2173 .0620 
Levera/?e (past) .0459 -.2004 -.1479 .2429 
Own ROE ROA Size 
(past) (past) (past) 
.a . b, .C Note. p<.l, p<.05, p<.OOl 
We elected to conduct a further analysis to explore what appears to be a relationship 
between previous ROA and corporate ownership. For this analysis we used the ROA 
average of companies for 1987 to 1989 and examined the net change in ownership 
and the percentage change in ownership by the major shareholder of each company. 
Given the unavailability of some ownership data for the year 1993 for some 
companies, our sample for this analysis was reduced to 50 companies. 
We found no correlation between average ROA for 1987-90 and either the net change 
in ownership between 1990 and 1990, or the percentage change in ownership over 
this period (r=0.09 and 0.08 respectively). Further analysis was conducted with the 
companies in our sample being divided into three categories (high, medium and low) 
based on ROA over 1987-89. We note that there is no difference in the incidence of 
change in the identity of major shareholder by ROA category (refer Table 8.7; Chi-
square statistic=4.26; not significant). 
TABLES.7 
Chi-square analysis 
ROA category No. of Observed no. of Expected no. 
companies cases of change cases 
in the identity of 
the major 
shareholder 
during 1990-93 
High 16 2 4.48 
Medium 17 4 4.76 
Low 16 8 4.48 
TABLES.S 
t-tests for net change in ownership, 
comparing ROA categories 
ROA category Medium High 
Low -0.044 0.050 
Medium 0.089 
TABLES.9 
t-tests for percentage change in ownership, 
comparing ROA categories 
ROA category Medium HiRh 
Low 1.313a 0.152 
Medium 0.891 
aSignificant at 10% level 
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of 
Furthermore, t -tests reveal no difference in net ownership change between 1990 and 
1993 between various ROA categories (refer Table 8.8). Next, we examined 
differences between ROA categories and the percentage change in ownership over 
1990 to 1993. This analysis revealed only one significant difference between 
performance categories. Companies in the low ROA category had significantly 
higher percentage changes in their ownership during 1990-93 than did companies in 
the medium ROA category, but not compared to companies in the high ROA 
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category (refer Table 8.9). This lends some support to the notion that poor ROA 
leads to increased concentration of ownership by the major shareholder; perhaps 
during times of poor performance major shareholders place a higher future value on 
shares than do other shareholders, and therefore increase their ownership stake. 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that major changes have taken place in the control of New 
Zealand public companies since 1962. In particular New Zealand companies have 
become more majority controlled and less management controlled. 
We also showed that ownership of public companies does not appear to influence 
financial performance. In addition, it appears that companies which perform poorly 
in terms of ROA are likely to have a larger relative changes in their ownership than 
do companies which perform only moderately well in terms of ROA. 
In the next two chapters, we will further investigate corporate control in New 
Zealand. In particular we will focus our attention on ownership of equities in New 
Zealand public companies by either foreign investors and institutional investors. 
Chapter 9 
POTENTIAL CORPORATE 
AND DIRECTOR INTERLOCKS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
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The Western market-driven society provides the opportunity for the existence of 
many commercial networks, one of which is the network of company directors 
(Glasberg and Schwartz, 1983). The study of networks of power between directors 
or boards of directors is described as the study of multiple directorships, or of 
directorship interlocks.l2 An interlocking directorship exists when a person serves on 
the board of more than one company. Usually the unit of analysis of study is the 
corporation, thus multiple directorships are described per company. The inter-
corporate relationship is personal between directors (Scott, 1991) and it is this 
relationship and its potential for utilisation and exploitation that drives research on 
interlocking directorates. 
Implications of the existence of interlocks in New Zealand are not hard to find. The 
legal ramifications are wide-ranging, including antitrust legislation (Carroll, 1990; 
Carroll, Stening and Stening,1990); the common law fiduciary principle that directors 
must not allow a conflict of duties (Christie, 1992); and, to a lesser extent, the 
codification of these duties under the Companies Act 1993 (McManus, 1994). 
Recent concern about the powers of directors and the power of the Business 
Roundtable is shown in the popular press (McEwin, 1992; McLouglin, 1992). In the 
United States such concerns prompted the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), in 1992, to require disclosure of interlocks where matters of executive 
compensation are concerned (Schwartz, 1993). 
Multiple directorships are not of concern per se as their mere existence cannot be 
taken to prove an active power relation (Davis and Powell, 1992; Pettigrew, 1992; 
Scott, 1991; Stinchcombe, 1990). Interlocks are indicators of potential power 
12 Some authors prefer to descrive directors on multiple boards as holding multiple board 
memberships rather than an interlocking directorate because of what they see as the negative 
connotation attached to this term (Pettigrew, 1992). 
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relationships between companies at the highest level: it cannot be inferred that 
directors exploit networks of board memberships merely because such potential 
exists (Pettigrew, 1992). An active interlocking directorate can only be said to occur 
where "the link is of actual benefit to the firms involved" (Fogelberg and Laurent, 
1974, p.17). Hence the need to maintain a careful distinction between potential and 
active interlocks. 
This chapter is primarily concerned with changes over time in the number of 
potential interlocks. The next section presents a brief review of the literature, with 
particular emphasis on the Australasian research. This is followed in section three by 
a discussion of the primary data. The fourth section of the chapter presents our 
results as they relate to the distribution of directorships; company and director 
interlocks; the influence of company size; and differences among industry sectors. 
Comparisons are also drawn between the New Zealand findings and those for 
Australia. The results are discussed more generally in the concluding section of the 
chapter. 
9.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Research on interlocking directorates is part of the broader study of managerial elites 
and corporate governance (Pettigrew, 1992). Concern over interlocking directorships 
was expressed in the United States as early as 1913 by Brandeis, although the 
beginnings of the study of corporate governance, in general, is usually attributed to 
the later work of Berle and Means (1932). Academic study of directorship interlocks 
can be traced to the work of Florence (1961) in the United Kingdom and Dooley 
(1969) in the United States. Research on interlocking directorates in North America, 
Europe and Asia has burgeoned since this time and is reviewed in Mizruchi and 
Schwartz (1987), Scott (1991), Davis and Powell (1992) and Pettigrew (1992). The 
remainder of this section concentrates on Australian and New Zealand studies. 
Rolfe (1967) studied potential interlocks between the top 50 Australian corporations 
in 1963. Hall (1983) examined the existence of potential interlocks between firms 
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange during the 1971-74 period. Stening and Wai 
(1984) studied potential directorship interlocks among the top 250 Australian firms 
from 1959-1979, reporting a trend of increasing board memberships and of potential 
interlocks. Carroll, Stening and Stening (1990) compared these data to potential 
interlocks among the top 250 Australian companies in 1986 and confirmed an 
apparent further increase in potential interlocks. However, these findings were later 
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qualified by Alexander and Murray (1992), who found an error in the tallying of data 
in the Stening and Wai (1984) paper. The revised study shows no significant change 
in interlocks from 1959 to 1986 and a fall in interlocks to 1991. 
Research on company boards and interlocking directorates in New Zealand 
commenced with Laurent (1971).13 Further research was undertaken by Fogelberg 
and Laurent (1973, 1974), Chandler and Henshall (1982) and, most recently, by Firth 
(1987). Firth's data extend through to 1984. Since then there have been very 
substantial changes in New Zealand's regulatory climate (Campbell-Hunt, Harper and 
Hamilton, 1993) and in corporate control (refer Chapters 8 and 10 of this thesis). It 
is therefore important and timely to revisit these matters. 
9.3 RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION 
Data were collected for all companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZSE) in the years 1987, 1990 and 1993. Listed companies were chosen because 
information about these companies was readily available from annual reports and 
other published sources such as The New Zealand Business Who's Who and The New 
Zealand Company Register. 
Companies numbered 292 for 1987; 143 for 1990; and 133 for 1993. A full list of 
directors was compiled for each company in each year. From this primary data set, 
we were able to compute: directorships per individual director; direct potential 
interlocks per company (company interlocks), and potential interlocks for all 
directors of each company (directorship interlocks). Note that the number of 
directorship interlocks per company will always be greater than or equal to the 
number of company interlocks per company. Indirect interlocks occur when the 
companies are joined through common director membership of the board of a third 
company. This study is only concerned with direct potential interlocks because, as 
noted by Zajac (1992, p.13), aggregation of direct and indirect links complicates the 
assessment of significance of the wider data set. For companies listed in 1993 the 
book value of total tangible assets was also noted as a measure of company size. 
Companies were also grouped by industry using the same New Zealand Stock 
Exchange industry classification system as in Firth (1987). 
13 The composition of boards of directors were examined indirectly in New Zealand additionally by 
Fogelberg (1963, 1980) and Chandler (1982). 
TABLE 9.1 
Summary of data from New Zealand studies 
197oa* 1972b 1981c 1984b 1987 1990 1993 
Number of directors 876 1291 1151 1143 1326 664 666 
Mean Number of 1.27 1.28 1.26 1.38 1.35 1.23 1.22 
directorships held 
Mean number of multiple 3.10 2.83 3.00 2.71 2.39 2.51 
directorships held 
Potential company interlocks 7.00 4.42 2.18 2.60 
Potential director interlocks 7.97 5.59 3.01 3.32 
Number of companies 160 247 208 221 292 143 133 
*Companies with assets of more than $2M only 
Sources: aLaurent (1971) and Fogelberg and Laurent (1974); bFirth(1987); cChandler and Henshall (1982) 
TABLE 9.2 
Distribution of directorships per director 
1987 1990 1993 
Number of board No. of %of Cumul. % No. of %of Cumul. % No. of %of Cumul. % 
memberships Directors Directors Directors Directors Directors Directors 
1 1053 79.41 79.41 556 83.73 83.73 567 85.14 85.14 
2 165 12.44 91.86 83 12.50 96.23 65 9.76 94.89 
3 61 4.60 96.46 13 1.96 98.19 23 3.45 98.35 
4 25 1.89 98.34 8 1.20 99.40 7 1.05 99.40 
5 13 0.98 99.32 3 0.45 99.85 3 0.45 99.85 
6 5 0.38 99.70 1 0.15 100.00 1 0.15 100.00 
7 1 0.08 99.77 
8 2 0.15 99.92 
9 1 0.08 100.00 
Total 1326 100.00 664 100.00 666 100.00 
Mean Directorships Held 1.35 1.23 1.22 
-
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9.4 RESULTS 
The findings of this study are summarised in the final three columns (1987, 1990, 
1993) of Table 9.1 which also contains comparable data from previous New Zealand 
studies. 
9.4.1 Distribution of directorships 
A fall in the total number of directors was expected if only because of the impact of 
the 1987 stock market "crash" on the pool of available directors and the number of 
listed companies. However, the extent of this fall in director numbers, from 1326 in 
1987 to 666 in 1993, was greater than many may have expected. The percentage of 
directors holding more than one directorship was 14.86% in 1993, compared with 
18.90% and 20.59% in 1984 and 1987 respectively. 
The mean number of directorships held by each director remained relatively stable 
over the period 1970 to 1981 but then increases through to 1984. The 1987-93 
period indicates a fall to levels slightly lower than in the 1970-81 period (refer Table 
9.2). The number of multiple directorships per director (i.e., the mean number of 
directorships held greater than one) ranges from 3.10 in 1962 (and 3.00 in 1984) to 
2.51 in 1993. The significance of the fall in multiple directorships in the more recent 
period since 1984 was confirmed using analysis of variance on the years 1984, 1987, 
1990, and 1993 (F=6.69; p<O.Ol). 
9.4.2 Company and director interlocks 
From the first comparable data in 1984, potential company interlocks have fallen 
from a mean of 7.00 per company to 4.22 in 1987. This general downward trend 
continues with falls to a low of 2.18 in 1990 and 2.60 in 1993. Analysis of variance 
on the years 1984, 1987, 1990, and 1993 confirmed the significance of the fall post-
1984 (F=49.37; p<O.Ol). In 1984 11% of firms had no interlocks: by 1990 this had 
more than tripled to 36%, and stood at 30% in 1993. The greatest number of 
potential company interlocks for a firm in 1984 was 26, compared with a maximum 
of 12 in 1993. 
The fall in potential company interlocks is mirrored by a reduction in potential 
director interlocks (refer Tables 9.3 and 9.4). Potential director interlocks measure 
the potential ties a company has through the number of directorships the directors on 
its board hold. As such potential director interlocks give an indication of the 
potential intensity of the interlocks arrayed around a given company. These 
interlocks fell from 7.97 mean directorships per company in 1984 (one firm having 
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directors holding 34 positions on the boards of other companies, Firth (1987), to 3.32 
in 1993 (largest number of outside directorships of 14). Once again, analysis of 
variance was applied to confirm the significance of this fall (F=38.30; p<O.OI). 
9.4.3 Influence of company size on interlocks 
Previous New Zealand studies have found at least weak evidence of a relationship 
between company size and the number of company interlocks (per company), and 
this general· relationship is confirmed here. The simple regression of company 
interlocks per company in 1993 on company size (measured by total assets, $NZ 
billion) yielded the following: 
Y = 2.31 + 0.45 X 
(t-values) (10.08) (5.12) R2=0.17 (r=0.41) 
F =26.22 (p<O.OI) 
where: Y is company interlocks per company (in 1993) 
X is value of total assets ($NZ billion, 1993) 
Firth (1987, p.279) reports only the simple correlation coefficient in his study 
(r=0.47) and our replication for 1993 confirms his findings. 
9.4.4 Industry analysis 
Industry data has been grouped to allow comparison with the data of Firth (1987). 
Table 9.5 presents a break-down of the average number of potential company and 
director interlocks for the years 1987, 1990 and 1993. 
The industries with the highest levels of potential company interlocks were 
insurance, liquor, forestry and finance and banking, although the low number of 
companies in some industries makes it difficult to draw definitive conclusions. 
These industries also had the highest number of potential director interlocks. 
Industry positions are not constant over time, perhaps as a result of differing macro-
economic conditions faced by individual industries. 
However, Firth (1987) also found the insurance and forestry industries to be among 
those with the most company interlocks. The higher levels of potential interlocks 
among these particular industries may be in part a function of the large size of firms 
(and boards) in these industries. While the findings of Firth (1987) are less 
supportive of the North American findings that financial institutions generate most 
TABLE 9.3 
Distribution of potential company interlocks 
1987 1990 1993 
Potential company No. of %of Cumul. % No. of %of Cumul. % No. of %of Cumul. % 
interlocks .firms .firms .firms firms firms firms 
0 42 14.38 14.38 51 35.66 35.66 40 30.08 30.08 
1 28 9.59 23.97 26 18.18 53.85 17 12.78 42.86 
2 49 16.78 40.75 19 13.29 67.13 22 16.54 59.40 
3 26 8.90 49.66 7 4.90 72.03 17 12.78 72.18 
4 31 10.62 60.27 14 9.79 81.82 9 6.77 78.95 
5 25 8.56 68.84 8 5.59 87.41 7 5.26 84.21 
6 29 9.93 78.77 5 3.50 90.91 6 4.51 88.72 
7 14 4.79 83.56 6 4.20 95.10 4 3.01 91.73 
8 12 4.11 87.67 5 3.50 98.60 6 4.51 96.24 
9 5 1.71 89.38 1 0.70 99.30 2 1.50 97.74 
10 5 1.71 91.10 1 0.70 100.00 1 0.75 98.50 
11 4 1.37 92.47 1 0.75 99.25 
12 1 0.34 92.81 1 0.75 100.00 
13 5 1.71 94.52 
14 5 1.71 96.23 
15 3 1.03 97.26 
16 4 1.37 98.63 
17 0 0 98.63 
18 2 0.68 99.32 
19 2 0.68 100.00 
Total 292 100.00 143 100.00 133 100.00 
Mean Potential 4.42 2.18 2.60 
Company interlocks 
TABLE 9.4 
Distribution of potential director interlocks 
1987 1990 1993 
Director interlocks No. of %of Cumul. % No. of %of Cumul. % No. of %of Cumul. % 
finns .firms .firms firms _firms firms 
0 42 14.38 14.38 51 35.66 35.66 40 30.08 30.08 
1 20 6.85 21.23 13 9.09 44.76 12 9.02 39.10 
2 32 10.96 32.19 18 12.59 57.34 15 11.28 50.38 
3 16 5.48 37.67 12 8.39 65.73 16 12.03 62.41 
4 37 12.67 50.34 8 5.59 71.33 8 6.02 68.42 
5 16 5.48 55.82 12 8.39 79.72 9 6.77 75.19 
6 29 9.93 65.75 4 2.80 82.52 7 5.26 80.45 
7 20 6.85 72.60 7 4.90 87.41 11 8.27 88.72 
8 19 6.51 79.11 6 4.20 91.61 2 1.50 90.23 
9 9 3.08 82.19 4 2.80 94.41 4 3.01 93.23 
10 10 3.42 85.62 1 0.70 95.10 3 2.26 95.49 
11 10 3.42 89.04 3 2.10 97.20 1 0.75 96.24 
12 3 1.03 90.07 0 0 97.20 3 2.26 98.50 
13 5 1.71 91.78 3 2.10 99.30 1 0.75 99.25 
14 7 2.40 94.18 I 0.70 100.00 I 0.75 100.00 
15 6 2.05 96.23 
16 2 0.68 96.92 
17 2 0.68 97.60 
18 1 0.34 97.95 
19 I 0.34 98.29 . 
20 0 0 98.29 
21 0 0 98.29 
22 0 0 98.29 
23 2 0.68 98.97 
I 24 0 0 98.97 '-------- --- --- --- ---------- ----
25 1 0.34 99.32 
26 2 0.68 100.00 
Total 292 100.00 143 100.00 133 100.00 
Mean Potential director 5.59 3.01 3.32 
interlocks per finn 
TABLE 9.S 
Company interlocks and director interlocks by industry sector 
No. of companies Mean number of Mean number of 
company interlocks director interlocks 
Industry sector 1987 1990 1993 1987 1990 1993 1987 1990 1993 
Agricultural 34 13 11 3.9 1.9 3.5 4.4 2.1 4.1 
Automotive 4 2 2 3.3 0.5 0.0 3.5 0.5 0.0 
Buildings & construction 8 3 2 5.8 0.7 0.0 6.6 0.7 0.0 
Chemicals & fertilizers 5 2 2 3.8 1.5 2.0 4.0 1.5 2.5 
Electronics & appliances 8 4 4 4.9 2.3 2.5 6.3 5.0 5.0 
Energy & fuel 13 7 7 5.2 3.6 3.3 6.4 4.6 3.3 
Engineering 11 6 3 4.6 0.5 0.3 5.0 0.5 0.3 
Finance & banking 20 . 7 7 4.7 3.6 4.1 5.5 5.1 5.9 
Food 7 4 9 3.3 0.5 2.8 3.7 0.5 2.9 
Forestry & forest products 5 7 7 8.6 3.6 3.7 12.4 6.4 5.1 
Insurance 2 0 0 10.5 - - 14.0 - -
Investment & property 85 30 21 4.5 2.2 2.5 6.3 3.1 3.6 
Liquor & tobacco 3 2 2 5.7 7 5.5 6.7 9.0 7.0 
Meat & by products 3 3 4 6.0 2 3.5 7.3 2.7 4.8 
Media & communications 16 9 5 4.2 1.7 3.6 5.0 2.9 3.8 
Medical supplies 5 4 3 6.4 2.8 2.3 7.6 2.8 2.7 
Miscellaneous services 16 12 ]2 3.4 1.3 2.3 3.6 1.5 2.6 
Retail 10 7 5 4.3 2.0 1.2 6.4 2.1 1.4 
Apparel & textiles 6 2 3 5.0 4.0 2.3 5.8 4.0 2.3 
Transport and tourism 18 7 9 4.1 3.1 2.8 4.9 3.9 3.0 
Mining & exploration 13 12 15 1.9 1.7 1.5 3.2 3.0 2.5 
Totals 292 143 133 
-_._---- . 
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potential interlocks (because of their need to access sources of capital), our 1987-93 data 
supports this proposition. Again the difficulty in distinguishing investment, property, 
insurance, finance and banking companies in the recently-deregulated New Zealand 
environment means that no definitive conclusions can be stated at this stage. 
9.4.5 Comparison with Australian findings 
The most recent Australian findings are contained in Carroll, Stening and Stening 
(1990), a study of the top 250 Australian companies (measured in terms of assets) in 
1986, and Alexander and Murray (1992) which studied the largest 250 Australian 
companies in 1991 based on revenue. These studies are not strictly comparable to the 
1987-93 New Zealand data because of their bias towards the larger Australian 
companies. Nevertheless the data for the two countries are informative and these are 
presented in Table 9.6. 
TABLE 9.6 
Australian and New Zealand comparative data 
Australia'" New Zealand 
1986a 1991b 1987 
Mean directorships per 1.31 1.19 1.35 
director 
Mean multiple directorships 2.57 2.54 2.71 
Multiple directors as a 19.51 12.36 20.59 
proportion of all directors (%) 
Potential interlocks per 6.58 4.38 
company 
No. of companies 250 250 
No. of directors 1640 1755 
Sample conSIsts of the top 250 compames In each year. 
Sources: aCarroll, Stening and Stening (1990), corrected by 
Alexander and Murray(1992); b Alexander and Murray(1992) 
and Alexander, Murray and Houghton (1994). 
4.42 
292 
1326 
1990 
1.23 
2.39 
16.27 
2.18 
143 
664 
New Zealand companies appear to have a similar mean number of directorships held; 
and similar proportions of directors holding more than one directorship (21 % and 16% 
for New Zealand in 1987 and 1990 respectively: and 20% and 12% for Australia in 1986 
and 1991 respectively). This is reflected in the comparative incidences of company 
interlocks in the two countries and a lower number of directors in New Zealand, giving 
New Zealand the lower level of potential corporate interlocks. 
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9.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We begin by discussing some implications of our findings and conclude with one 
explanation for what we have found and suggestions for further research. If the 
significance of a network of corporate power is measured by the level of potential 
interlocks between companies, this chapter shows conclusively that such power has 
declined significantly in New Zealand between 1984 - as reported in Firth (1987) - and 
the early 1990s. Potential interlocks have decreased because of falling board sizes and a 
reduced number of directorships held by each director. It appears from the 1993 data 
that multiple directorships may be set to rise slowly from a low in 1990. 
Allowing for the different sample selection methods pointed to above, there are few 
marked differences between the corporate networks of Australia and New Zealand. The 
main area of difference are that New Zealand companies have fewer potential company 
interlocks. Resource dependence theorists (for example, Pfeffer, 1987) propose that 
interlocks are a means to reduce the environmental uncertainties created by resource 
dependencies between organisation. Interlocks become ways to co-opt the environment 
and diffuse information (Pettigrew, 1992, p.166). In this light, the decrease in potential 
interlocks over the period under review here could be seen as harmful, introducing 
increased uncertainty into organisational decision making. 
Firth (1987, p.280) sought to explain what he saw as "the high level of interlocking in 
New Zealand" in terms of the need for companies to collude to increase their 
international competitiveness. Firth was writing in the mid-1980s, using data covering 
up to 1984. Since then New Zealand has further liberalised its international trading 
stance: the currency has been floated; import controls and licences have been either 
abolished or converted into tariffs; and export subsidies have been withdrawn. The 
result of all of this has been to make more imperative than ever the need to be 
internationally competitive. If Firth's explanation had been valid, we should have 
observed further increases in interlocks post-1984 when, in fact, we find conclusive 
evidence of the opposite trend. 
We contend that the observed decline in networks in New Zealand is a direct 
consequence of the rapid agglomeration of corporate assets in New Zealand since 1984. 
In 1984, the largest five listed companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
accounted for 36.5% of the total assets of all companies listed at that time, and the 
largest ten companies accounted for 48.7% of the total (Hamilton, 1991). By 1993, on 
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this same share of assets basis, the top five listed companies account for 68.5%, and the 
top ten control 84.5% of total assets. Networks of interlocks, the precursors of this 
process of agglomeration, have been usurped by it and hence are in decline. Corporate 
power in New Zealand is now much more narrowly concentrated. 
The intent of this chapter was to update research on interlocldng directorates in New 
Zealand and provide the groundwork for future research. It would be useful to follow 
this up with work to identify when and how potential interlocks become active (Davis 
and Powell, 1992; Pettigrew, 1992), and if indeed they are the harbinger of mergers and 
acquisitions. The aim should be to produce a process model describing the relationship 
of interlocks, potential and active, to observed organisational behaviour. 
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Chapter 10 
FOREIGN CONTROL 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter adds to our knowledge of foreign control of New Zealand listed 
companies. As we shall see, this knowledge is important in light of the benefits and 
potential negative consequences that foreign control can have for investors on the 
New Zealand sharemarket and corporate governance. In the next section we look at 
foreign equity investment into New Zealand between 1989 and 1993. Next, we 
proceed to examine foreign control of New Zealand listed companies. Evidence that 
foreign control has increased is supported by a study of the Top 40 New Zealand 
Stock Exchange companies. Having established an increase in foreign control of 
New Zealand listed companies we ask why this increase occurred and examine the 
benefits and possible negative consequences of foreign investment in such 
companies. 
10.2 FOREIGN EQUITY INVESTMENT INTO NEW ZEALAND 
In recent years there has been a significant increase in foreign equity investment into 
New Zealand. Statistics New Zealand report that foreign equity investment was $9.8 
billion in the year to March 1989; this increased to $23.3 billion for the year to 
March 1993. This is an increase of some 137 per cent (refer Table 10.1). 
The data for foreign direct investment (FDI) in New Zealand companies are 
particularly interesting. 14 FDI increased from $8.4 billion in 1989 to $22.3 billion in 
1993, an increase of some 165 percent (refer Table 10.1). In contrast, portfolio 
investment, which is non-direct investment in, for example, stocks and bonds, 
declined from $1.4 billion in 1989 to $0.9 billion in 1993, a decline of some 32 per 
cent. Thus, the changes in equity investment that have occurred have increasingly 
resulted in the foreign investor gaining some form of control of New Zealand 
companies. 
14 Direct investment is any investment made to acquire 25 per cent or more of the voting shares in a 
company, the purpose of the investment being to gain a voice in the management of the company. 
TABLE 10.1 
Foreign equity investment in New Zealand companies 
($NZ Millions) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 
Direct Investment 8412 12293 13 294 17703 
Portfolio Investment 1378 1561 1 766 769 
Total 9790 13854 15060 18472 
Source: Hot off the Press (1994). 
10.3 FOREIGN CONTROL OF NEW ZEALAND LISTED COMPANIES 
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1993 
22316 
932 
23248 
Having noted - in Chapter 8 - an increase in ownership concentration among listed 
companies and, above, a general increase in foreign equity investment in recent 
times, we decided to ask: to what extent is the increase in ownership concentration a 
result of increasing foreign investment? With this in mind we collected data on 
foreign ownership for those companies that were in our original control classification 
samples for the years 1985, 1990 and 1993. This simply involved identifying 
whether or not the controlling shareholder(s) in terms of Fogelberg's classification 
scheme (as given in Chapter 8) were of local or foreign origin. Information on the 
country of origin of controlling shareholders was obtained from annual reports and 
the relevant editions of the Directory of Shareholders New Zealand Public Listed 
Companies. 
Table 10.2 shows data collected on foreign control of New Zealand listed companies 
for the years 1985, 1990 and 1993. From this table, we observe that there has been a 
significant increase in foreign control of New Zealand listed companies between 
1985 (when 16.8 per cent of all listed companies were foreign controlled) and 1993 
(when 39.7 per cent of listed companies were foreign controlled). 
Two chi-square tests confirm that major changes in foreign versus domestic control 
of listed companies occurred within our control categories. For the first chi-square 
test, we find that, for 1990 there is a significant difference in the distribution of 
companies among control categories, compared to what we expect from the 1985 
data (chi-square statistic=52.65; 5 degrees of freedom; significant at alpha=0.005). 
We also find a comparable change for companies listed in 1993, compared to what 
we expect from the 1990 data (chi-square statistic=30.28; 5 degrees of freedom; 
significant at alpha=0.005). 
Control 
classifications 
Majority 
Minority 
Joint 
Management 
Totals 
TABLE 10.2 
Foreign control and control types of New Zealand listed companies: 
1985, 1990 and 1993 
1985 1990 
Foreign Total Foreign Foreign Total Foreign Foreign 
controlled controlled/ controlled controlled/ controlled 
total (%) total (%) 
18 54 33.3 21 73 28.8 31 
6 69 8.7 12 52 23.1 14 
0 10 0 0 4 0 1 
0 10 0 0 5 0 0 
24 143 16.8 33 134 24.6 46 
1993 
Total Foreign 
controlled! 
total (%) 
58 53.4 
48 29.2 
7 14.3 
3 0 
116 39.7 
-------
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From Table 10.2 we observe several major changes in foreign control. First, between 
1985 and 1990 foreign controlled companies having the minority control 
classification rose from 8.7 per cent to 23.1 per cent of all companies examined. 
Also, between 1990 and 1993 the percentage of all companies having the majority 
control classification rose from 28.8 per cent to 53.4 per cent. During this later 
period foreign minority controlled companies increased from 23.1 to 29.2 per cent 
and foreign joint controlled companies increased from zero to 14.3 per cent. 
10.4 FURTHER EVIDENCE: NEW ZEALAND STOCK EXCHANGE TOP 40 
COMPANIES 
The evidence presented above is further supported if we examine foreign ownership 
of equity in New Zealand Stock Exchange Top 40 companies. 
The sample comprises the largest 40 companies on the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange, in terms of market capitalisation, at seven points in time, starting in 
December 1989 and ending in September 1993. Shareholder data for the top 40 
shareholders of each top 40 company was examined to classify investors as either: 
local institutions; overseas institutions; local companies; overseas companies; or 
Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs). A further classification of other was 
given to private investors who were in the top 40 list of shareholders and all investors 
that did not make the top 40 list of shareholders. When interpreting the data this 
means that the other category is likely to be overestimated and all other categories 
underestimated. 
TABLE 10.3 
Ownership structure of the New Zealand sharemarket, 1989 to 1993 
Type of Investor Dec March August March Dec March Sept 
1989 1991 1991 1992 1992 1993 1993 
Local institutions 16 14 12 12 14 15 17 
Overseas institutions 10 17 22 23 24 25 27 
Local Corporates 21 15 11 11 10 9 7 
ESOPs 4 8 4 4 4 4 3 
Overseas corporates 9 6 20 20 20 19 16 
Other 40 40 31 30 28 28 30 
Totals 
Institutions 26 31 34 35 38 40 44 
Corporates 30 21 31 31 40 28 23 
Overseas 19 23 42 43 44 44 43 
Source: Ownership structure of the New Zealand Stockmarket (September 1993; March 1991), 
Doyle Paterson Brown Ltd 
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The top 40 list of shareholders was provided by Datex Services Ltd and was drawn 
directly from information held by the share registrars of each company. Table 10.3 
shows the ownership structure of the sample between December 1989 and September 
1993. With regards foreign ownership, we note that between December 1989 and 
September 1993 there was an increase in average overseas investment from 19 per 
cent per company to 43 per cent. Furthermore: 
'" total institutional investment rose significantly over the period, from 26 to 44 per 
cent 
'" between December 1989 and March 1992 local institutions reduced their 
holdings from 16 to 12 per cent, but this group increased their holdings after 
March 1992 (to 17 per cent in September 1993) 
" overseas institutions significantly increased their holdings (from 10 to 27 per 
cent) 
'" total corporate investment declined significantly between December 1989 (30 per 
cent) and March 1991 (21 per cent), increased significantly to December 1992 
(40 per cent) and has since dropped (to 23 per cent in September 1993) 
'" local corporates significantly reduced their holdings, from 21 to 7 per cent 
We observe from the above that, while foreign investment in top 40 companies rose 
significantly over the period of interest, much of this change is attributable to 
institutional as opposed to corporate investors. 
A further study (Gaynor, 1993) confirms the observed trend towards increased 
foreign control of New Zealand listed companies. Gaynor found that overseas 
investors owned 4.2 per cent of the New Zealand stock market (in terms of market 
capitalisation) in December 1986, compared to 30 per cent in December 1992. 
10.5 REASONS FOR INCREASED FOREIGN INVESTMENT INTO NEW 
ZEALAND 
It is instructive to ask why the observed increase in foreign investment in New 
Zealand listed companies has taken place. The main reason relates to the process of 
economic deregulation which has taken place in New Zealand; a process which 
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started in 1984, under Sir Roger Douglas, the then Minister of Finance. Economic 
deregulation has resulted in New Zealand moving from one of the "most regulated 
societies in the free world, to the world's freest market economy" (Passow, 1992, 
p.S). Deregulation, and in particular the Employment Contracts Act 1991 has made 
New Zealand companies more competitive and has as a consequence drawn the 
attention of foreign investors (The Economist, 1993). New Zealand's manufacturing 
sector is now seen to be " ... on average, 15 per cent more competitive than those of 
its major trading partners and 30 per cent more cost advantageous over its leading 
trade partner, Australia" (Passow, 1992, p.5). 
New Zealand's current FDI regime has been described as "very liberal [with there 
being a] lack of restrictions on capital inflows" (Colgate and Featherstone, 1992, 
p.2). From a policy viewpoint, high levels of overseas debt have led various 
governments to encourage FDI. As Colgate and Featherstone (1992) write: 
... the combination of low economic growth and relatively small domestic 
capital markets makes FDI an attractive option to help fund investment 
growth. Second, FDI provides an alternative to the use of debt to finance 
New Zealand's persistent current account deficits, and could therefore be 
seen as part of a strategy to reduce overseas debt ratios to more acceptable 
levels (Colgate and Featherstone, 1992, p.2). 
Another major factor that has led to increased foreign investment in New Zealand is 
the increasingly global nature of investment by funds managers, especially, by funds 
managers in the U.S. This diversification of global investment has occurred for 
several reasons: (1) the increasing attractiveness of countries in Asia for investment; 
(2) the increasing size of pension funds in the United States15 ; (3) a stagnant U.S. 
economy. 
Increasing international exposure by some large New Zealand companies has led to 
an improved international awareness of New Zealand as an investment destination. 
Some of New Zealand's largest companies are listed on overseas exchanges: 
Brierley's shares are also traded on the Australian and London stock exchanges; 
Fletcher Challenge ordinary shares are traded on the Australian, London, Toronto, 
Montreal, Vancouver and Frankfurt stock exchanges. In particular the listing of 
Telecom locally and internationally (Telecom is also listed on the Australian and 
New York stock exchanges), and the high profile acquisition of a major stake in this 
company by two large U.S. telecommunications companies - Ameritech and Bell 
15 It is estimated that today funds invested in pension funds equal funds invested in savings, whereas 
ten years ago savings were approximately 10 times higher than pension fund investments. 
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Atlantic - increased awareness among international investors of New Zealand as an 
investment destination. 
New Zealand has also become increasingly appealing to foreign investors because of 
our GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) exposure. Our agricultural 
industry is seen to be the most competitive in the world and therefore New Zealand is 
seen to be in a position to benefit greatly from increased international trade 
liberalisation under GATT. 
Finally, the increase in the number and size of unit trusts internationally has led to 
more funds being invested globally. 
10.6 ADVANTAGES OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
The major benefit of increased foreign investment relates to the ease with which New 
Zealand listed companies can raise equity. Raising initial finance is seen to be 
particularly difficult in New Zealand, because we suffer from endogenous capital 
constraints. Take, for example, the following observations: 
New Zealand lacks much of the financial expertise and advanced 
specialised-capital markets that have helped industry in other nations 
(Crocombe, Enright and Porter, 1991, p.111). 
Large and sophisticated capital markets by definition offer a broad range of 
sources of debt and equity funding. The New Zealand market, however, is 
limited in size. Consequently, a small company seeking capital can soon 
eliminate possible sources which a large market might be willing, due to 
competitive pressures, to accept [at] higher levels of risk (Coopers and 
Lybrand, 1993, p.38). 
The problem of raising initial finance is particularly noticeable for large raisings. 
This problem was mentioned by Crocombe, Enright and Porter (1991) who stated 
that "limited capital availability in New Zealand constrains business development 
and economic growth. Lenders and investors have limited amounts of capital to 
invest" (Crocombe, Enright and Porter, 1991, p.114). It is beneficial for New 
Zealand listed companies, and in particular large listed companies, to be able to raise 
equity through share placements to foreign investors. 
A further benefit of foreign ownership relates to liquidity of shares, i.e., the ease with 
which shares can be purchased and sold. Liquidity obviously increases as more 
investors are involved in trading on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
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Foreign investors may bring management expertise to bear on the New Zealand 
companies in which they invest, leading to improved performance. Carter Holt 
Harvey is an example where the management expertise of a new foreign shareholder 
(American company International Paper) was pivotal in restructuring, and improving 
corporate performance. International Paper appointed one of their senior executives -
David Oskin - as Carter Holt's new Chief Executive Officer. In addition to Oslan, 
two International Paper directors were appointed to Carter Holt's board of directors. 
Access to technology is another area where New Zealand companies can benefit from 
foreign ownership. For example, Milburn New Zealand is changing from coal to 
waste oil fuelled furnaces. This change which was brought about through an 
association with Milburn's major shareholder, a Swiss company. This move is 
expected to improve Milburn's profitability. 
10.7 POSSIBLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of increased foreign investment is the 
possibility that capital flight may occur. Foreign investors may liquidate their 
holdings in New Zealand companies because of local events, such as perceived 
political uncertainty under an MMP electoral system. The first MMP election will be 
held before November 1996. In discussing MMP, ANZ McCaughan (1994) note that 
"the general consensus is that New Zealand's country risk premium has risen as a 
consequence of electoral uncertainty" (p.2). 
There is some evidence (Fatehi and Safizadeh, 1994) that foreign investors will react 
differently to political instability depending on the industry or industries in which 
they invest. Therefore, the extent to which perceived political instability has negative 
consequences for New Zealand companies is likely to reflect the perceived impact on 
the industries in which these companies operate. 
International events may also prompt capital flight, for example, relative returns in 
other investment destinations become more appealing than returns available in New 
Zealand. Capital flight would have a major detrimental effect on New Zealand 
companies and New Zealand investors. It is estimated that approximately half the 
equity in New Zealand listed companies is foreign owned, therefore if a significant 
proportion of this was liquidated share prices could drop until local investors enter 
the market. These concerns are highlighted by Brian Gaynor's comment that: 
If the trend towards increasing overseas investment continues ... the New 
Zealand sharemarket will then become increasingly vulnerable to any 
changes in perception of New Zealand by overseas investors (Gaynor, 
1993, p.49). 
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By far the most controversial aspect of foreign investment is the possible effects on 
the sovereignty of New Zealand as a nation. Concerns over sovereignty invariably 
relate to listed companies in which New Zealanders, through an ownership stake held 
by the government, have an interest. In recent times, two such companies were the 
Bank of New Zealand, which was taken over by National Australia Bank, and 
Telecom, in which two American companies acquired a substantial interest. 
Objections to foreign ownership in such cases can be made on grounds that foreign 
ownership: (1) leaves the government "with less options in dealing with the control 
of the economy" (Kelly, 1992); (2) leaves New Zealand open to exploitation by 
foreign companies or countries; (3) may result in loss of employment for New 
Zealanders; (4) profits of the acquired companies will go overseas. 
The prospect of the abuse of New Zealand's resources is another possible negative 
consequence of foreign ownership. For example, if an international company with a 
controlling interest in a New Zealand forest was pushed for cash they may cut down 
forests before their optimal logging time and sell them as logs rather than process the 
logs further in New Zealand . 
. Finally, foreign investors may use their ownership in New Zealand companies to 
provide them with leverage to exploit New Zealand as a market, leading to increased 
imports and a decline in the trade balance. Yet another potentially harmful result of 
foreign ownership involves research and development, with foreign investors tending 
not to do their research and development in New Zealand. 
10.8 CONCLUSIONS 
We have found that there has been a significant increase in foreign control of New 
Zealand listed companies over recent years. In particular, the ownership of equity in 
listed companies by overseas institutions has increased markedly over recent years. 
These changes in the ownership of New Zealand listed companies have occurred 
primarily as a by-product of economic deregulation and has resulted in several 
obvious benefits to New Zealand investors and companies alike. 
The benefits of foreign investment in New Zealand listed companies appear 
substantial. There are, however, several potential negative consequences; foremost 
among which is capital flight. This should not be a concern as long as New Zealand 
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companies continue to perform well in comparison with investment targets in other 
countries. 
In the next chapter we further explore the current influence of institutional investors, 
both foreign and domestic, in New Zealand listed companies. 
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Chapter 11 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter we found that institutional investors have increased their 
influence in New Zealand listed companies. However, institutional investors are not 
an homogenous group. In fact, there are different types of institutional investors. In 
this chapter we explore the influence of these different types of institutional investors 
in New Zealand listed companies. In doing so we adopt the same method as a recent 
Australian study (Ramsay and Blair, 1993), and make comparisons with that study. 
11.2 METHODOLOGY 
In collecting and interpreting data for New Zealand companies we followed the same 
procedure as Ramsay and Blair (1993, p.166). Data was obtained from the Directory 
of Shareholders New Zealand Public Listed Companies 1994. This publication lists 
the major shareholders of New Zealand listed companies in January 1994. The 
sample comprises the 127 companies who had ordinary shares listed on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange at this time. For each company we recorded the percentage 
of ordinary shares held by each of the top 20 shareholders. This was done because 
we believed that the top 20 shareholders would, by implication, also be the most 
(potentially) influential shareholders by virtue of the voting power their 
shareholdings entitle them to. 
Following the identification of the top 20 shareholders, we noted which of these 
shareholders could be classed as institutions. Institutional investors were classed as 
either: banks, bank nominee shareholders, insurance companies, or superannuation, 
retirement fund and trustee company shareholders. As with Ramsay and Blair's study 
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of Australian listed companies, we also noted occurrences of institutions holding 
between 5 and 10 per cent of shares, or holding more than 10 per cent of shares,16 In 
the following section we discuss our findings with regards each type of institutional 
investor. 
11.3 TYPES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND THEIR 
SHAREHOLDINGS 
11.3.1 Insurance companies 
Table 11.1 shows our results for insurance company shareholders. This type of 
institutional investor was observed to be listed a total of 52 times amongst the five 
major shareholders of all 127 companies (i.e., among 635 shareholding positions). 
This equates to 8.2 per cent of the observed shareholding positions. This contrasts 
with Ramsay and Blair who found that insurance companies were listed 74 times 
amongst the largest 5 shareholders in their Australian sample i.e., 14.8 per cent of the 
observed shareholding positions. It, therefore, appears that insurance companies are 
more prevalent among the largest shareholders of Australian as compared to New 
Zealand positions. Furthermore, it appears that the ownership stakes of insurance 
companies in Australian listed companies is larger than that for New Zealand listed 
companies. In total we only found 7 occurrences in our sample where insurance 
companies held between 5 and 10 per cent of shares. In contrast, Ramsay and Blair 
found 38 such occurrences in their sample of 100 companies. In looking at insurance 
companies with over 10 per cent of shares we only found two such cases, whereas 
Ramsay and Blair found 12. 
From Table 11.1, we note that four insurance companies, namely Colonial Mutual, 
National Mutual, Norwich Union and NZI Corporation, hold noticeably more 
dominant positions in listed companies than do any other insurance companies. 
16 As an aside, we also noted the owership concentration for the top 5, top 10 and top 20 
shareholders. For the companies in our sample, the largest 5 shareholders on average held 
61 % of issued shares; the 10 largest shareholders held 68%; and the 20 largest shareholders 
held 73%. These figures for the largest 5 and largest 10 shareholders are higher than those 
found in Ramsay and Blair's (1993) sample of 100 Australian companies. They found that the 
5 largest shareholders held 54%, the 10 largest held 64% and the 20 largest held 72%. 
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TABLE 11.1 
Insurance company shareholders 
Number of times Number of Number of 
company is listed in times company times company 
the five largest holds between 5 holds more 
shareholders and 10% of than 10% of 
shares shares 
Colonial Mutual Life Assce 9 2 0 
National Mutual Life Assn 10 1 0 
Norwich Union Life Ince 10 1 0 
Tower 5 1 0 
AMP Society 4 2 0 
NZICorpn 7 0 2 
Sun Alliance Life 4 0 0 
Guardian Royal Exchange Assce 0 0 0 
Oceanic Life Ltd 1 0 0 
Prudential Assce 1 0 0 
All others (8 companies) 1 0 0 
Total 52 7 2 
11.3.2 Banks 
Ownership of equity in New Zealand listed companies by banks is limited (refer 
Table 11.2). This is primarily because the Reserve Bank Act 1989 discourages banks 
from having substantial shareholdings (under the Act equities owned by New 
Zealand registered banks are deducted from the bank's equity in determining the 
bank's capital ratio). 
TABLE 11.2 
Banks as shareholders 
Number of times Number of Number of 
company is listed in times company times company 
the five largest holds between 5 holds more 
shareholders and 10% of than 10% of 
shares shares 
Bank of New Zealand 1 0 1 
National Bank of NZ 4 2 1 
National Bank of Aust 1 0 0 
Westpac Banldng Corp 1 0 1 
Total 7 2 3 
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11.3.3 Bank nominee companies 
Table 11.3 shows our New Zealand results for bank nominee compames. An 
important point with regards interpretation of data such as that we present here is 
made by Ramsay and Blair (1993) who caution that: 
... there is an issue as to whether bank nominee companies can be classified 
as institutional investors. This is because bank nominee companies are an 
aggregation of a diverse range of individual and institutional investors 
(Ramsay and Blair, 1993, p.185). 
For our sample of 127 New Zealand companies we found bank nominee shareholders 
were represented a total of 175 times among the largest 5 shareholders i.e., they 
represented 27.6 per cent of the top 5 shareholder positions examined. In contrast, 
Ramsay and Blair found 169 occurrences of bank nominee shareholders among 500 
shareholding positions, or 33.8 per cent of positions examined. 
Bank nominee companies were also seen to be more likely to have shareholdings 
between 5 and 10 per cent (57 occurrences for the New Zealand sample vs. 70 
occurrences for the Australian sample). However, New Zealand bank nominee 
companies were more likely to hold over 10 per cent of shares (42 occurrences) 
compared to Australian bank nominee companies (29 occurrences). 
TABLE 11.3 
Bank nominee shareholders 
Number of times Number of Number of 
company is listed in times company times company 
the five largest holds between 5 holds more 
shareholders and 10% of than 10% of 
shares shares 
ANZ Bank Ltd nominee 63 26 8 
Austrac1ear 56 18 16 
Bank ofNZ Nominee 7 2 0 
CBA Nominees 0 0 0 
Chase Manhattan Nominees 1 0 0 
Citibank NZ Nominee 2 0 0 
Hong Kong and Shanghai 4 2 1 
Bank Nominee 
National Aust Bank nominee 35 9 16 
Westpac Bank nominee 7 0 1 
Total 175 57 42 
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11.3.4 Superannuation, retirement fund and trustee company shareholders 
Table 11.4 shows the New Zealand results for superannuation, retirement fund and 
trustee company shareholders. Such institutional shareholders were represented a 
total of 11 times among the 5 largest shareholders of all 127 companies, i.e., they 
comprised only 1.7 per cent of the positions analysed. This contrasts notably with 
Ramsay and Blair's study where such companies were listed a total of 20 times, i.e., 
represented 4 per cent of positions analysed. For our New Zealand sample no 
institutional investor of this category held 5% or more of shares. In contrast, Ramsay 
and Blair found 6 cases in Australian companies where institutional investors held 
between 5 and 10% of shares. 
TABLE 11.4 
Superannuation, retirement fund and trustee company shareholders 
Number of times Number of Number of 
company is listed in times company times company 
the five largest holds between 5 holds more 
shareholders and 10% of than 10% of 
shares shares 
Westpac Superannuation 8 0 2 
Nominees 
Superannuation Investments Ltd 1 0 0 
Colonial Mutual 2 0 0 
Superannuation 
. Total 11 0 2 
11.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Bank nominee companies appear to be the largest institutional shareholders in New 
Zealand listed companies. But, as bank nominee companies may hold shares on 
behalf of individuals or non-institutional companies, the influence of this group is 
indeterminable. However, we can confidently say that insurance companies are 
among the most influential major shareholders in New Zealand listed companies. 
The potential influence of banks and superannuation, retirement fund and trustee 
company shareholders appears minimal. 
The rise of institutional investors, as identified in Chapter 10 and investigated in 
more detail above, has important implications for corporate governance. Benefits 
may be apparent for both capital markets and the monitoring of listed companies. 
Hill and Ramsay (1994) in a review of the research on institutional investment, 
capital markets efficiency and liquidity, noted that companies with higher levels of 
institutional ownership more frequently released information, had less variability in 
168 
their share returns and that "shares traded heavily by institutions experience rising 
turnover, declining volatility, and narrowing bid-ask spreads" (p.298). The obvious 
concern one should have with the studies reviewed by Ramsay and Blair relates to 
causality: institutional investors may not lead to the positive outcomes just 
mentioned; rather institutional investors may be more likely to invest in companies 
with these characteristics. Given this, we should treat the findings mentioned with 
caution. 
In addition to possible capital market efficiencies institutional investors may, by 
monitoring the companies they invest in, effect significant changes in corporate 
governance and strategy that will benefit all shareholders. Black (1992) mentions 
several areas where monitoring by institutional investors may add significant value. 
The first involves the appointment of independent directors. Such directors are seen 
to benefit corporate performance for several reasons, one of which relates to their 
independence from management which, in theory, allows them to appraise the 
performance of management more effectively. Monitoring managerial performance 
is a governance function which is compromised when executive directors dominate a 
board of directors. Awareness of the desire of investors for independent 
representation on boards is a factor which has led some New Zealand boards to 
increase independent director representation on their boards. For example, Brierley 
Investments Limited (BIL) stated in their 1992 Chairman's Report: 
This board is aware of the investment community's view that boards should 
comprise significant numbers of non-executives. Accordingly as we 
review our own situation it is appropriate to have the means of 
accommodating any future additions (p.7). 
A second area where institutions can positively influence corporate performance is by 
discouraging excessive diversification. This can add value to investment targets as 
some forms of diversification (e.g., into related areas) are more beneficial to 
performance than are others e.g., diversification into unrelated product areas 
(Hamilton and Shergill, 1993a). Executive compensation is also an area where 
institutions can playa role in increasing firm value. Concern over what may be seen 
as excessive executive compensation has been expressed in the popular business 
press (Business Week, 1991; New York Times, 1992). A recent New Zealand 
example of institutional intervention in this area relates to the executive share option 
scheme which BIL attempted to introduce in late 1993. This scheme was abandoned 
(although it may reappear again according to Brierley's Chairman, Bob Matthew) 
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following private approaches to BIL by institutional investors, and public concern 
over the scheme (Walker and Fox, 1994). 
Another area where institutional shareholders can wield influence is voting rights. 
For example, in Australia, Rupert Murdoch informed shareholders in News 
Corporation that he wanted to change the voting rights in the company's shares; a 
change which would have seen the Murdoch family have greater voting rights 
attached to their shares, compared to those of other shareholders. The AIMG 
(Australian Investment Managers Group) subsequently defeated Murdoch's proposal. 
More recently, institutional investor in Goodman Fielder forced an extraordinary 
meeting at which they intend to replace much of the company's board of directors 
(McEwen, 1994). 
11.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Institutional investors, and in particular insurance companies, are among the most 
influential groups of investors in New Zealand listed companies. On a global basis 
institutional investors are playing a more active role in the direction and monitoring 
of the companies in which they invest. There is also some evidence that in New 
Zealand institutional investors are playing are being more active. 
Chapter 12 
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS AND 
SCOPE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
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These studies have sought to investigate a number of issues relating to the corporate 
governance of New Zealand listed companies. In this regard the study makes several 
contributions to the governance literature. First, a greater understanding of some of 
the central issues in corporate governance is achieved. Second, given the lack of 
governance research in New Zealand, our understanding of corporate governance in 
New Zealand is brought up to date. 
12.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The overall findings of this thesis are summarised below, under their relevant chapter 
. headings: 
Corporate governance and corporate strategy 
• from the case studies examined ownership changes appear to be the necessary 
driving force behind divestment decisions. 
• in particular, a change in the identity of a major shareholder emerges as a 
necessary prerequisite to the divestiture of poorly-performing activities. 
Corporate governance and corporate failure 
• companies having a majority of outside directors in 1985 were significantly more 
likely to fail before 1990 than were companies that did not have a majority of 
outside directors. 
• we also found that companies which did not have a divisional structure in 1985 
were more likely than companies that did have such a structure to fail before 
1990. 
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Corporate control and financial peiformance 
«I in terms of Fogelberg's (1980) classification scheme, the incidence of majority 
control of New Zealand listed companies has increased between 1962 (16.3% of 
companies were majority controlled) and 1993 (when this statistic was 50%). 
«I there has also been a significant change in the incidence of management control 
of New Zealand listed companies from 39.5% in 1962 to only 2.6% in 1993. 
'" ownership was not found to be associated with future financial performance 
(ROA and ROE). 
«I companies which perform poorly in terms of ROA are likely to have larger 
relative changes in their ownership than companies who only perform moderately 
well in terms ofROA. 
Board structure of New Zealand listed companies 
«I the board size of New Zealand listed companies has declined since 1962 (mean of 
7.2 members) to 1993 (mean of 6.1 members). 
«I the number of outsiders on boards has declined since 1980 (mean of 5.5) to 1993 
(mean of 4.6). 
• the proportion of outsiders on boards has remained reasonably stable between 
1980 and 1993 (around 75%). 
• between 1980 and 1993 outsiders dominated boards, with around 80 per cent of 
boards having more than half of their members as outsiders. 
• the incidence of CEO duality is rather low (around 14 per cent of listed 
companies in 1993). 
International comparisons of board structure 
.. it appears likely that there are differences in board structure between New 
Zealand and each of the United States, United Kingdom and Australia. 
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Board composition and company peiformance 
flI meta-analyses indicate that: larger boards and boards with a higher proportion of 
outsiders are positively associated with higher financial performance. 
Determinants of board composition 
flI the board structure of New Zealand listed companies appears irrelevant in 
determining financial performance, although board size was found to be a 
significant predictor of ROE during a time of environmental turbulence. 
flI firm size was found to be the only major determinant of board structure. 
Potential company and director interlocks 
ED there has been a large decrease in potential company and individual director 
interlocks were found to have decreased since 1984. 
Foreign control 
flI foreign equity investment into New Zealand has increased from $9.79 billion in 
1989 to $23.25 billion in 1993, an increase of 137 per cent. 
ED between 1985 and 1993, foreign control of New Zealand listed companies has 
increased from 16.8 per cent to 39.7 per cent of listed companies. 
ED with regards the Top 40 listed companies: the average shareholding by foreign 
investors has increased from 19% (December 1989) to 43 per cent (September 
1993). Over the same time the average institutional investment in Top 40 
companies rose from 10% to 27%. 
Institutional investment 
<II insurance companies are the major institutional shareholding group in New 
Zealand listed companies, holding 52 shareholding positions amongst the top 5 
major shareholders of all 127 companies in our sample. 
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«> banks playa limited role in institutional investing in New Zealand, holding only 7 
shareholding positions amongst the top 5 major shareholders of all 127 
companies in our sample. 
12.3 SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Research on corporate governance is highly topical and (potentially) highly relevant. 
Perhaps inevitably, corporate governance research to date, including that undertaken 
in this thesis, has typically examined largely transparent aspects of boards of 
directors, e.g., board size, number (and proportion) of outside directors, CEO duality. 
This situation has no doubt largely arisen due to the relative ease with which these 
variables can be obtained for research purposes. A more useful approach may be 
gained from asking questions such as: Why are some boards more effective than 
others? What is an effective board? In the event that such an approach were taken it 
is likely that more intangible, but perhaps more important factors may be highlighted, 
than have hitherto being identified. 
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Appendix 117 
MEASURING STRATEGY 
The strategic dimension of interest in this thesis is the degree of diversification 
engaged in by New Zealand public companies during either 1980-85 or 1985-90. As 
New Zealand companies are not required to publish sales data on an individual 
product or market basis, we were limited in terms of the strategy measurement 
schemes that we could adopt. We adopted what is essentially a product count 
approach to measure diversity, specifically that framework developed by Varadarajan 
and Ramanujan (1987). 
To apply the chosen framework we collected annual reports of all public companies 
listed during either 1980-85 (148 companies) or 1985-90 (54 companies).18 The 
individual products and/or services of each company were identified for the first and 
final year for which the sample was chosen. We then allocated these products and 
services the appropriate two and four-digit industry codes within the 1988 New 
Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. This is the first requirement 
ofthe method in Varadarajan and Ramanujan (1987). The next step is best explained 
with reference to Table A. 
From Table A, broad spectrum diversification (BSD) is simply the integer number of 
broadly-defined two-digit SIC industries in which a company is operating. Mean 
narrow spectrum diversification (MNSD) is, for each company, the number of the 
more narrowly defined four-digit SIC industries in which it operates, divided by its 
BSD number. Thus, a company which operates in only one two-digit industry and, 
within this, in a single four-digit industry, would fall into cell A as having very low 
diversity. If this same company were to diversify into numerous other four-digit 
industries but all within the same two-digit scope, then it would fall into cell B 
(related diversified). If, instead of diversifying into a number of four-digit industries, 
this company had chosen to move into a large number of other two-digit industries, 
17 The contents of this appendix are based largely on Hamilton and Shergill (1992). 
18 All mineral exploration and finance companies. 
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it would become a candidate for either cell C or cell D. If only one or two four-digit 
activities were carried out in each two-digit industry, then cell C would apply 
(unrelated diversification). Where a company is involved in many two-digit level 
areas and, within these, is also spread widely across numerous four-digit industries, 
then it is deemed to be very high diversified and classified to cell D. 
Broad 
spectrum 
(BSD) 
TABLE A 
Measuring diversification strategies 
L 
High 
Low 
Mean narrow spectrum 
(MNSD) 
ow H' h 19J 
Cell C CellD 
Unrelated Very high 
diversified diversity 
CellA CellB 
Very low Related 
diversity diversified 
Companies in our two samples were classified to a cell of figure I for the start and 
end points at which the sample was taken. The distinction between high and low in 
all three years was made relative to the 1980 mean values of BSD (=3.17) and 
MNSD (1.71). 
The main weakness of this measure is that it does not reflect the relative scale of the 
SIC areas in which a company is operating. Montgomery (1979) has validated the 
use of SIC-based measures in the study of company diversification. 
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Appendix 2 
LIST OF COMPANIES IN SAMPLES AND 
THEIR PRODUCTS, STRATEGY AND 
STRUCTURE 
This appendix lists all firms listed on the New Zealand stock exchange between either 
1980-85 (129 firms) and 1985-90 (54 firms). The strategic and structural classifications 
and summary of the information on products which we used to derive strategic 
classifications are given in the following format for each company: 
Strategic Strategic class 
symbol 
A Verv low diversity 
B Related diversified 
C Unrelated diversified 
D Very high diversity 
Structural Structural class 
symbol 
F Functional 
H Holding Company 
D Divisional 
ABACUS CONSOLIDATED LTD 
(formerly: British Office Supplies N.Z. Ltd) 
1980 Retailers of office equipment 
- chairs 
- desks in steel and wood 
- commercial and domestic stationery 
- filing systems and cabinets 
- calculators and copying machines 
- office layout and planning 
- curtains and carpets 
Manufacture of steel office equipment 
Interior decorators 
- commercial and domestic 
carry a wide range of imported curtain 
and upholstery fabrics, 
exclusive suits and chairs 
Importing of drawing office equipment 
Printers of business cards and letterheads, 
DH 
1985 Exited all of above except 
Office equipment manufacture 
Added: 
Packaging 
Disposable cup manufacture 
Thermoforming 
Injection moulding 
Car tyre retreader 
Tyre retailer 
AJAX McPHERSON LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of nuts, bolts, and 
screws 
1980 Same as 1980 
ALCAN NEW ZEALAND LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of aluminium joinery, 
aluminium foil, aluminium 
fabrication, rolling mill products, 
extrusions, cast iron products 
1985 Same as 1980 
ALEX HARVEY INDUSTRIES LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of glass, paper, fibre-
glass, plastic products, metal 
containers, aluminium products, 
forestry, mineral exploration 
1985 Same as 1980 
ALLFLEX HOLDINGS LTD 
1980 Animal identification tags 
Manufacturers of dairy equipment 
Equipment suppliers to vetinarians 
1985 As above. 
Added: 
Manufacture of: 
- automatic cluster removers 
- vacuum pump 
- animal containment systems 
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CH 
BD 
BD 
BF 
BF 
CD 
CD 
CH 
CH 
ALLIANCE TEXTILES LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of worsted and woollen 
clothes, carpets, blankets, machine 
yarn and wool-tops, garment manufacturing, 
wholesale of yarn, publishing of 
pattern books 
1985 Same as 1980 
A. M. BISLEY AND CO LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of agricultural 
machinery, stock feed, irrigation 
systems, grain silo; well drilling, 
development of property, forestry, 
hire purchase finance, distributor 
of agricultural machinery 
1985 Same as 1980 
ANDAS GROUP LTD 
1980 Distributor of typewriters, filing 
systems, duplicators, franking 
machines, office furniture, photo-
copiers, other office supplies 
1985 As 1980 plus distributor of computers 
and supply of computer services. 
Exited distribution of stationery 
ALLFLEX HOLDINGS LTD 
1980 Animal identification tags 
Manufacturers of dairy equipment 
Equipment suppliers to vetinarians 
1985 As above. 
Added: 
Manufacture of: 
- automatic cluster removers 
- vacuum pump 
- animal containment systems 
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BH 
BH 
CF 
CF 
AF 
AF 
CH 
CH 
ANGUS GROUP LTD 
(formerly: Scott Group Ltd) 
1980 Cabinetmakers 
Joiners 
Wholesalers to cabinetmaking, caravan 
and boat building trades 
Decorative plywood and veneered particle 
board manufacturers 
General and heavy engineering 
Stainless steel manufacturers 
Roller door manufacturers 
Diecasters 
Electroplater 
Manufacture of picture mouldings 
Manufacture of concrete mixers 
1985 Exited: all of the above 
Added: 
Construction - commercial buildings 
Ci vii engineering 
Crane manufacture and servicing 
Crane hire 
APPAREL HOLDINGS LTD 
(formerly: Manawatu Knitting Mills Ltd) 
1980 Manufacturers of 
- mens knitted outerwear and 
underwear; ladies knitted outerwear; 
- rainwear and canvas goods (eg. tents) 
1985 As above 
Exited: 
- manufacture of rainwear and 
canvas goods 
Added: 
Manufacture of women's jeans and 
casual sportswear 
Interests in petroleum exploration 
licences 
ARNOLD AND WRIGHT LTD 
1980 Manufacture and distribution of radio 
and electrical appliances 
1985 Same as 1980 
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DH 
CH 
BF 
BH 
AF 
AF 
ARTHUR BARNETT LTD 
1980 Department store operatiors 
1985 As above 
1990 As above 
ARTHUR ELLIS HOLDINGS LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of sleeping bags, 
mattresses, upholstery, beddings, 
pillows, jackets 
1985 Same as 1980 
ASEA TOLLEY ELECTRIC COMPANY LTD 
(formerly: Tolley Holdings Ltd) 
1980 Cable makers 
Switchgear manufacture 
Transformer manufacture 
Agents 
- resistance banks 
- thermal power station equipment 
- power transformers 
- high voltage and special cables 
- cable glands 
- high voltage swithchgear 
- glass insulators 
- cam switches 
- fuse switches 
- submersible water supply 
- sewage and irrigation pumps 
- float switches 
- crane power supply systems 
- bore pumps 
- capacitors 
- ring main switchgear 
- heavy duty alternators and motors 
- electric hoists and cranes 
- drives, crabs, magnets, steelwork equipment 
- micro and limit switches 
- motor control centres 
- power factor correction controllers 
- air circuit breakers 
- industrial and heavy duty motors 
- computer power supply regulators 
- instrument transformers 
- emergency lighting systems and equipment 
- batteries and emergency standby power systems 
- timers 
- insulating tapes 
- industrial plugs and sockets 
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AF 
AF 
AF 
BF 
BF 
BH 
- termination kits 
- heat shrink products 
- moulded cable terminators 
- energy management and load control 
- metering 
- fusegear 
- bulkhead fire stop systems 
- tapes and protective films 
- timers and programmers 
- cable test equipment 
- counters and printers 
- toughened glass insulators 
- vacuum contactors 
- tapes 
- information handling equipment and 
supervisory controls 
- teleprinters and associated equipment 
- communication systems 
- microprocessors 
1985 As above 
Added: Computer terminals 
Exited: Cable makers 
ASHBY BERG AND CO LTD 
1980 Suppliers of building material, 
hardware, paints, roofing, wallpaper, 
electrical goods, roofing contractor, 
timber merchants 
1985 Same as 1980 
ASSOCIATED BRITISH CABLES LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of electric cables and 
general wiring products 
1985 Same as 1980 
ATLAS CORPORATION LTD 
(formerly: Atlas Majestic Industries Ltd) 
1980 Manufacture of: 
- Stoves 
- White goods 
- Color televisions and sound equipment 
- car radios 
- motor mowers 
- freezers, refrigerators, clothes washers 
- metal work and machine tools for 
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AH 
BF 
BF 
AF 
AF 
DR 
internal and external clients 
Poultry processing 
Markets a wide range of portable radios 
Distribution of shelf appliances 
Property investment and shares in listed 
companies 
Distribution of musical instruments and 
accessories, including sheet music 
Manufacturer and distributor of 
roofing tiles and wall cladding 
Services own and others products 
1985 Manufacturing of: 
- ovens, color televisions, audio 
products and VHF radios 
Distribution of: 
- imported whiteware 
- imported vidio and hi-fi equipment 
- telephone answering machines, 
paging equipment, security systems 
and portable data entry computers 
- video and medical equipment 
- imported musical instruments 
and sheet music 
- background music 
- telephone answering machines 
- dictating machines 
- calculators etc 
AUCKLAND GAS COMPANY LTD 
1980 Manufacture and distribution of gases, 
detergents and disinfectants, 
manufacture of auto fuel systems 
1985 Same as 1980 
AURORA GROUP LTD 
1980 Construction and renting of office 
buildings, car parking buildings, 
manufacture of concrete masonry, 
pumice blocks, motor vehicle dealer, 
sand quarrying 
1985 Same as 1980 
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AUTOCRAT SANYO HOLDINGS LTD 
1980 Manufacture of television and allied 
products, alarm systems, sound 
equipment, marine radio and telephones, 
calculators, cash registers, dictation 
machines, renting of TV s and radios, 
distribution of calculators and ship 
chandlery 
1985 Same as 1980 
BAILLIE FARMERS MOTORS LTD 
1980 New and used motor vehicle dealers, 
garage service, spare parts distribution, 
vehicle financing 
1985 Same as 1980 
BRIERLEY INVESTMENTS LTD 
1980 Manufacturers of school, office, hospital 
and commercial funiture, caravans. 
Electroplating 
Gold mining 
Manufacturers reps 
Typography, computerized photo 
typesetting, photo engraving, 
lithography and polymer plates, 
rubber steros, rubber stamps and 
photo prints 
Apple grower 
Joinery manufacturers 
"Gang nail" truss fabricators 
Coal transportation 
Auctioneers 
Home appliance retailers 
Pulp mills 
Clothing retailers 
Wine makers 
Trustee companies 
Life Assurance Co. 
Insurance Risk Management 
Manufacturers: 
- pre-fabricated buildings 
- reinforcing fabric for concrete 
- fencing staples 
- chain link netting 
- gates 
- screens 
- barbed wire 
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- road trailers 
- industrial pallets 
- fencing 
- bulk rail containers 
- wirework 
General retailers 
Plumbers 
Engineers, machine tools and 
bearing merchants 
1985 As above 
Exited: 
Gold mining 
Coal transportation 
Manufacture of: 
- road trailers 
- industrial pallets 
- bulk rail containers 
Added: 
Manufacturer and importer of footwear 
Department store operators 
Meat processing 
Booksellers and Stationers 
Publishers 
Printing, publishing and packaging 
Winemakers 
Sale of printing machinery, typesetting 
systems, photolithographic materials and 
equipment. 
Manufacture of printing inks and press room chemicals 
Supply of engineering hardware 
Wine and spirit merchants 
Video hire 
Manufacture of grocery products 
Property investment and development 
Property Trusts 
Arsenic acid manufacture 
Agricultural chemical manufacuturer 
Petroleum exploration and production 
Flour miller 
Stockfeed manufacture 
Baker 
Fish processing 
Petfood manufacture 
Stationery manufacturers, paper merchants 
Paper and printing machinery merchants 
Manufacture and importing of household, 
educational and commercial stationery 
Production of copying products ego carbon 
paper, ribbons, and computer oriented 
supplies 
Oil and gas exploration 
Brewery operation 
Manufacture of cider, soft drinks and 
fruit juices 
Wool growing 
Beef cattle production 
Processing of dairy produce, fish, 
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meat, groceries. 
Flavoured milk 
Malting 
Sale of Mechanical handling equipment 
Executors and trustees 
Accounting and taxation services 
Flour and stock feed manufacture 
Ship-owners agents 
Customs clearing forwarding agents 
Transportation wholesale distribution 
Yarn spinning for carpet and weaving 
industries 
Clothing manufacturer 
Hat manufacturer 
Knitwear manufacturers 
Manufacturers of beachwear 
Manufacturers of blankets, rugs, woollen 
yarn, furnishing fabrics, woollen textiles 
Automotive importing and retailing 
Property development 
New and used motor vehicle dealers 
Department store operator 
Nails & fasteners 
Fencing, gates, docking pens, staples, 
fittings and other steel products 
Automotive supplies 
Oven trays, bread baskets, screens and 
containers 
Furniture products of light tube and wood 
holloware and kitchenware 
aluminium and stainless steel kitchenware 
brass fittings and engineering products 
- grease guns and accessories 
- oil cans 
- drum pumps 
- air dusters 
- muffler clamps 
shell moulded products 
aluminium diecasting - barbacues, 
aluminium wheels 
strapping 
screws, rivets, nuts, washers and 
special alloy nails 
contract diecasters 
keyhole ties 
Meat processing 
Yarn processing; circular knitting; 
warp knitting; dying and finishing; 
printing 
Private radio broadcasters 
Vehicle conversion for alternative fuels 
Supply of amonia and LPG 
Natural gas distribution 
Supply of appliances and engineering 
equipment to the gas industry 
Distributor of gas and electric 251 
appliances 
Assembly of underfloor gas heaters 
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Distribution of: 
- polyethylene electrofusion equipment 
- electrolocation pipe and cable locators 
- pressure gauges 
- ball valves 
Supplier of gaseous fuel automotive 
equipment 
Mechanical installation for establishing 
public and private CNG refuelling stations 
Projection screen manufacturers 
Suppliers of: 
- gas controls 
- gas metres 
- gas water heaters 
- gas regulators 
- gas valves 
- industrial heaters 
- pipeline leakage repair equipment 
- commercial cooking equipment 
- gas leakage detection equipment 
- pipeline engineering products 
Manufacturers and importers of gas heating 
equipment 
Pipeline equipment 
Timber merchants 
Radio stations 
House builders 
Civil engineering contractors 
Wholesalers of: 
- outdoor sound equipment 
-lighting 
- electrical components 
- transformers 
- voltage stabilizers 
- interference suppression devices 
- petroleum pumps 
- compressors 
- amplifiers, record players, loudspeakers 
- aquarium requisites 
- sewage pumps 
- test instruments 
- dictating machines and tape recorders 
- water turbines 
- marine pumps 
- soldering irons 
- food mixers 
- electric stoves 
- wiring cables 
- electric clocks 
- chassis brushes 
- tools and punches 
- digital multimeters and precision 
oscilloscopes 
- switch cleaning fluids 
- precision wire 
- wound and multi turn controls 
- surgical operation lights 
- capacitors 
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- cable 
- control equipment 
Aluminium joinery manufacturers 
Hardware merchants 
Wholesale of: 
- thermostats, condensers 
- catering equipment 
- electric motors 
- hair dryers 
Commercial and industrial developers 
Land developers and consultants 
Manufacture of kit-set homes 
1990 As above. 
Added: 
Hirers of contractors and industrial 
equipment 
Manufacture of motor mowers, ride-on 
mowers, hand mowers, cultivators, castings 
pot belly stoves, woodfires, vacuum pumps, 
hedge trimmers, garden blowers, gas 
heaters and barbecues 
Construction equipment materials handling 
Importers and distributors of floor 
coverings 
Manufacturers of milking machines, milk 
pumping equipment and components 
Manufacturers of foam rubber products, 
carpet underlay and textile coatings 
Manufacturers of casual sporting fashion 
and waterproof footwear 
Manufacturers of plastic foam products: 
spa pool covers, trampers mats and 
bedrolls, body boards, inner soles 
Radio news network 
Video production 
Indoor plant hire 
Plant nursery operator 
Restaurants 
Cattle farming 
Wild game trophy hunting reserve 
Leasing and rental motor vehicles 
Brewing & winemaking 
Tourist hotels 
Grocery distribution 
Restaurants 
Exited: 
Apple grower 
Life Assurance Co. 
Insurance Risk Management 
Manufacturer and importer of footwear 
Department store operators 
Publishers 
Printing, publishing and packaging 
Winemakers 
Supply of engineering hardware 
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Video hire 
Manufacture of grocery products 
Property Trusts 
Arsenic acid manufacture 
Agricultural chemical manufacuturer 
Petroleum exploration and production 
Flour miller 
Stockfeed manufacture 
Baker 
Fish processing 
Petfood manufacture 
Stationery manufacturers, paper merchants 
Paper and printing machinery merchants 
Manufacture and importing of household, 
educational and commercial stationery 
Production of copying products ego carbon 
paper, ribbons, and computer oriented 
supplies 
Oil and gas exploration 
Brewery operation 
Wool growing 
Beef cattle production 
Processing of dairy produce, fish, 
meat, groceries. 
Flavoured milk 
Malting 
Sale of Mechanical handling equipment 
Executors and trustees 
Accounting and taxation services 
Flour and stock feed manufacture 
Ship-owners agents 
Customs clearing forwarding agents 
Nails & fasteners 
Fencing, gates, docking pens, staples, 
fittings and other steel products 
Automotive supplies 
Oven trays, bread baskets, screens and 
containers 
Furniture products of light tube and wood 
holloware and kitchenware 
aluminium and stainless steel kitchenware 
brass fittings and engineering products 
- grease guns and accessories 
- oil cans 
- drum pumps 
- air dusters 
- muffler clamps 
shell moulded products 
aluminium diecasting - barbacues, 
aluminium wheels 
strapping 
screws, rivets, nuts, washers and 
special alloy nails 
contract diecasters 
keyhole ties 
Meat processing 
Yarn processing; circular knitting; 
warp knitting; dying and finishing; 
205 
printing 
Vehicle conversion for alternative fuels 
Projection screen manufacturers 
Timber merchants 
House builders 
Wholesalers of: 
- outdoor sound equipment 
-lighting 
- electrical components 
- transformers 
- voltage stabilizers 
- interference suppression devices 
- petroleum pumps 
- compressors 
- amplifiers, record players, loudspeakers 
- aquarium requisites 
- sewage pumps 
- test instruments 
- dictating machines and tape recorders 
- water turbines 
- marine pumps 
- soldering irons 
- food mixers 
- electric stoves 
- wiring cables 
- electric clocks 
- chassis brushes 
- tools and punches 
- digital multimeters and precision 
oscilloscopes 
- switch cleaning fluids 
- precision wire 
- wound and multi turn controls 
- surgical operation lights 
- capacitors 
- cable 
- control equipment 
Aluminium joinery manufacturers 
Hardware merchants 
Wholesale of: 
- thermostats, condensers 
- catering equipment 
- electric motors 
- hair dryers 
Commercial and industrial developers 
Land developers and consultants 
Manufacture of kit -set homes 
Typography, computerized photo 
typesetting, photo engraving, 
lithography and polymer plates, 
rubber steros, rubber stamps and 
photo prints 
Manufacturers reps 
"Gang nail" truss fabricators 
Auctioneers 
Life Assurance Co. 
Insurance Risk Management 
- pre-fabricated buildings 
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- fencing 
Plumbers 
General retailers 
Pulp mills 
Joinery manufacturers 
Home appliance retailers 
Manufacturers of school, office, hospital 
and commercial funiture, caravans. 
BROADWAY INDUSTRIES LTD 
(formerly: Brother Holdings Ltd) 
1980 Distribution of business machines, 
sewing and knitting machines, and 
industrial knitting machines 
1985 Distribution of business machines, 
sewing and knitting machines, and 
industrial knitting machines 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Stainless steel fabrication (vats, 
shower bases, kitchen's for McDonalds, 
urinals) 
Distribution of animal health products 
Importing and distribution of 
photographic equipment 
Management of the NZ Rural Property Trust 
CABLE PRICE DOWNER LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of electrical appliances, 
insulators, ceramic components, wiring 
devices, auto parts, ship building 
products. Civil, electrical, and 
mechanical engineers. Building 
construction. Wholesalers of electical 
and agricultural equipment. Cycle and 
automotive dealers. Quarrying. 
1985 Same as 1980 
CANTERBURY ROLLER FLOUR MILLS CO. LTD 
1980 Flour millers, manufacturers of poultry 
mashes, meal, bran, pollard 
1985 As above 
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1990 As above 
CAPITAL CITY RADIO LTD 
1980 Operators of radio station 
1985 Same as 1980 
CARBORUNDUM ABRRASIVES LTD 
(formerly: Carborundum New Zealand Ltd) 
1985 Manufacture of coated and bonded abrasives 
Manufacture of ancillary abrasive products 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Property development 
CARD RONA GROUP LTD 
(formerly: Cardrona Ski Area Ltd) 
1985 Commercial ski area operator 
1990 Hotel owner 
Investor 
CARTER HOLT HOLDINGS LTD 
1980 Builders and home handyman supplies 
Manufacture and distribution of 
Pharmaceuticals and cosmetics 
Pulp mills 
Fishing and fish processing 
Sheep and cattle farming 
Sawmillers 
Timber and builders merchants 
Manufacture of spices 
Soap manufacuters 
Joiners 
Pre-cut and pre-nailed frames 
Retailers 
Real estate agents 
LMVD 
Furniture removals and storage 
Road transport and freight service 
operators 
Logging contractors 
Coffee and tea importers 
Coffee roasters 
Food packers 
Coffee brewing equipment 
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1985 As above. 
Exited: 
Manufacture of pharmaceutics 
Real estate agents 
Added: 
Marketing of diesel engines and CNG 
conversion equipment 
1990 As above. 
Exited: 
Sheep and cattle farming 
Manufacture of spices 
Manufacture of cosmetics 
Coffee and tea importers 
Coffee brewing equipment 
LMVD 
Furniture removals and storage 
Road transport and freight service 
operators 
Food packers 
Added: 
Producers of covers ion packages for 
alternative fuelling of diesel engines 
Manufacture of horticultural packaging, 
food containers and trays: plastic 
manufacturers and thermoformers 
Manufacturers of disposable pulp and 
tissue products including toilet 
tissues, serviettes, kitchen towels, 
hand towels, disposable diapers and 
feminine products 
Manufacture of paper bags, gift wrap, 
lunch rolls, catering products, business 
machine rolls, industrial towels and wet 
wipes 
Manufacture of cultured marble vanity 
tops, basins, shower bases, shower 
and bath panels and spa baths, 
acrylic vanity tops and vanity cabinets 
Manufacture of fibre glass insulation, 
ceiling panels, noise control 
insulation, fibre glass reinforcements, 
foil insulation and building paper, 
concrete underlay, damp proof courses 
and laminated packaging 
Suppliers to the trade and consumer 
markets of glass, glazing, services and 
mirror 
Windscreen replacements, sunroofs and 
body glass 
Manufacturers and installers of steel and 
wood core access floor systems 
Manufacture of domestic and commercial 
roller doors 
Aluminium containers for carbonated 
beverages and beer 
Manufacture of office partitions, office 
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furniture, acoustic panels, stainless 
steel sink units, industrial products and 
fittings, shower screens 
Manufacture of roofing tiles and gutter 
systems 
Flexible packaging activities involve 
printing on polypropylene, cellophane, 
paper and aluminium 
CA VALIER CORPORATION LTD 
(formerly: Cavalier Elco Ltd) 
1985 Carpet manufacture 
Merchant woolscourers 
Petroleum exploration 
Manufacture of carpet stain remover 
1990 As above 
CERAMCOLTD 
1980 Manufacture and distributor of bricks, 
ceramic pipes, refractory material, 
crockery, concrete pipes. Property 
development, mineral exploration. Crane 
and fork lift hire, manufacturer of abrasive 
products, field tiles, china clay. 
Abrasion installing. Distribution of 
builders'material 
1985 Same as above 
CHRISTCHURCH PRESS CO. LTD 
1980 Publishing and printing of newspapers 
Commercial printers 
Property leasing 
1985 As above. 
Added: 
Finance company 
CITY REALTIES LTD 
1980 Property mangement 
Property investment 
Property development 
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Real estate agents 
1985 As above 
COLONIAL MOTOR CO. LTD 
1980 Distributors of motor vehicles, 
industrial motors and spares 
U sed car traders 
Engineers and motor body builders 
Service station & garage operation 
Car rental 
1985 As above 
Added: property investment and leasing 
1990 As above 
COMMAND SERVICES CORPORATION LTD 
1980 Cleaning contractors, caterers, dry-
cleaning, security services, telephone 
answering service, horticulturists and 
nurserymen, horticultural suppliers 
1985 As 1980 plus food preparation, house-
keeping service, property maintenance 
CONSOLIDATED METAL INDUSTRIES LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of: 
- steel wire nails, staples, clouts, 
panel fins, 
finishing brads both 
plain and galvanized, roofing nails 
- paper clips 
- cotter pins 
- aluminium and stainless steel cookware 
- silver plate and pewterware 
- brass pipe fittings and shaft collars 
- plumbers hardware 
- grease guns and accessories 
- pressure oil cans 
- drum pumps 
- air dusters 
- hydraulic presses 
- muffler and exhaust clamps 
- set and cap screws 
- engineers supplies 
- keyhole tie for wool bales 
- aluminium diecastings -
alloy trailer wheels, 
drill stands and 
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gem irons 
- barbacues and outdoor furniture 
- components and shell mouldings for 
engineering, plastic, electrical and 
refrigeration industries 
- industrial coatings - epoxy, teflon, 
silicon, nylon 
- hot dip galvanizing and jobbing work 
contract diecasters 
- automotive supplies 
1985 As above. 
Exited: 
Manufacture of industrial coatings 
Manufacture of silver plate and pewterware 
COOKS NEW ZEALAND WINE COMPANY LTD 
1980 Manufacture of wine 
1985 Same as 1980 
CORPORATE INVESTMENTS LTD 
1985 Finance for motor vehicles, businesses, 
industrial plant, office equipment and 
home improvements 
Property development 
Motor vehicle dealers and franchise 
holders 
General printers 
Manufacturers of casual footwear 
Contract hire of motor vehicles 
Manufacturing and contracting for fibrous 
plaster sheets and products 
1990 Added: 
Winemaker 
Wine importer 
Wholesaler/retailer of both inbound and 
outbound travel products 
Passenger and parcel transport 
Coach and bus charter contractor 
Motorhome rental 
Hamilton city bus service contractor 
Pine chip exporter 
Heavy vehicle distributor 
Parts and service for trucks 
Horticultural processor and exporter 
Manufacture and distribution of fashion 
eyewear and ophthalmic instruments 
Salmon farmer 
Seafood processor 
Fallow deer farmer - venison, live sales, 
hides and by-products, consulting 
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Tin mining 
Exited: 
Manufacturing and contracting 
for fibrous plaster sheets and products 
Motor vehicle dealers and franchise 
holders 
Property development 
CORY -WRIGHT AND SALMON LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of transformers, switch-
boards, compressors, meters, fuse 
catridges. Electrical and mechanial 
engineers. Distribution of electrical 
and engineering equipment. Aircraft 
suppliers, distribution of aluminium 
sheeting, tools, watermeters, electric 
motors 
1985 As 1980 plus manufacture of electric 
motors, starters, diesel generators, 
electric appliances, cutting tools 
CROWN CORPORATION LTD 
1980 Stock and station agents, wine and spirit 
merchants, wool brokers, travel agents, 
motor vehicle dealers, real estate and 
insurance agents, agricultural machinery 
suppliers, grocers, well drillers, meat and fish processing; 
financial services. 
1985 As 1980 plus investment. Exited whole-
saling of agricultural and construction 
machinery 
D.I.C STORES LTD 
1980 Owners and operators of department stores 
1985 Same as 1980 
DINGWALLANDPAULGERLTD 
1980 Wholesalers of: 
- grocenes 
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- tobacco 
- hardware 
- softgoods 
1985 As above 
DOMINION BREWERIES LTD 
1980 Manufacture of spirits and wine, wine and 
spirits merchants, hoteliers 
1985 As 1980. 
DONAGHY'S LIMITED 
(formerly: Donaghy's Industries Ltd) 
1980 Cold stores 
Manufacturers of: 
- cargo slings and hoists 
- truck and transport tie downs 
- cordage, webbing and braids 
- hessian and polyproprylne bags 
- specialty foods 
- seat belts 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Manufacturer of: 
- digital irrigation controls 
- electric fence controllers 
- woven geotextiles and materials handling 
products of woven polypropylene and 
polythylene including sacks, bags and 
bulk containers 
- thermoformed plastic packaging for food 
products 
1990 As above. 
Exited: 
Coldstores 
Manufacture of: 
- specialty foods 
- seat belts 
- thermoformed plastic packaging for food 
products 
Added: 
Manufacture of gear reduction boxes 
Timber processing 
Sale of building supplies and hardware 
Manufacture of outdoor leisure products 
(tents and general canvas workers) 
- industrial transmission equipment 
- non-ferrous castings 
- specialized machine tools and other 
machinery 
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EBOS GROUP LTD 
(formerly: EBOS Dental and Surgical Supplies Ltd) 
1980 Importers and distributors of dental, 
medical and surgical supplies and 
equipment 
1985 As above 
1990 As above 
EMCO GROUP LTD 
(formerly: N.Z. Motor Corporation Ltd) 
1980 Television rental 
Motor car assembly 
U sed car traders 
Motor vehicle retailers 
Industrial and marine engines 
Coachbuilders 
Alternative fuel conversion 
Manufacture of shipping containers 
Parts and service 
Trucks 
Cranes 
Tractors and earth moving equipment 
Cars and commercial vehicles 
Motor body manufacture 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Personal computer rental 
Video recorder rental 
Tyre importers and distributors 
Cycle manufacture 
Paint manufacture 
Personal and household cleaning products 
Bus chassis 
Buses 
Exited: 
Coachbuilding 
Manufacture of shipping containers 
ENDEAVOUR SERVICES CORPORATION LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of towels, absorbent terry 
shirts, industrial garments, footwear. 
Cleaning and laundry service, towel supply 
service, distribution of soaps and 
toiletries, garment rental, packaging of tea, distributor 
of vending machines 
1985 As 1980 plus manufacture of safety garments 
and windshield reflectors 
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ERNEST ADAMS LTD 
1980 Manufacturers and distributors of 
cakes, sponges, pastry, puddings, 
cookings and shortbread, slices, 
fruit mince 
1985 As above. 
Added: 
Manufacturing of: 
- icing 
1990 As above. 
FARMERS TRADING COMPANY LTD 
1980 Deapartment stores; hire purchase finance 
1985 Same as 1980 
FELTEX NEW ZEALAND LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of tyres, general rubber 
products, woven and tufted carpets, non-
woven textiles, ropes and cords, plastic 
products, steel furniture, footwear. Wool 
scouring, exporting of carpets, retreading 
of tyres, investments, sawmilling, 
nurseries, retail stores 
1985 Same as 1980 
FERNZ CORPORATION LTD 
(formerly: New Zealand Farmers' Fertilizer Ltd) 
1980 Manufacturers and distributors of 
fertilizers, sulphuric acid and chemicals 
Formulators and distributors of 
agricultural and horticltural chemicals 
and animal remedies 
Manufacturers of pharmaceutical products, 
cosmetics and cleaners 
Wholesalers of dental, medical, scientific 
products and chemicals 
1985 As above 
1990 As above. 
Added: 
Marketer and manufacturer of chemical 
spray equipment 
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Exited: 
Wholesaler of medical, scientific and 
dental products 
Manufacturer of pharmaceutical products, 
cosmetics and cleaners 
FIRESTONE NEW ZEALAND LTD 
1980 Manufacturers of tyres and tubes; 
retreading; importers of tyres 
and other rubber products 
1985 As above 
1990 As above 
FISHER AND PAYKEL 
1980 Production of wiring harnesses 
Rental of electrical goods 
Finance company 
Manufacturer and distributor of 
electrical appliances 
Cabinet and furniture manufacturer 
Importing of electrical goods and 
commercial equipment 
Electrical servicing 
Overlaying of wood-based products with 
wood and vinyl veneers 
Manufacture of industrial and 
professional electronic products 
1985 Added: 
Production of special purpose machinery 
and automated flexible manufacturing lines 
Exited: 
Production of wiring harnesses 
1990 Added: 
Manufacturer of mobility scooters 
Importing and marketing of home 
healthcare products 
Marketing of industrial products 
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FLETCHER CHALLENGE LTD 
1980 Rental of hire pools 
Building society management 
Manufacturers and wholesalers of camping, 
outdoor and equestrienne equipment 
Manufacturers of lawnmowers, bicycles, 
cultivators and solar water heaters, 
exercycles 
Importers of LPG cylinders and equipment 
LMVD 
Computer equipment distributors 
Pulp and paper 
Manufacture of concrete and concrete 
products 
Manufacture of bright, annealed and 
galvanized wire 
Property development 
Commercial construction 
Design and build contracting 
Civil engineers 
Roading 
Air conditioning and environmental 
control 
Residential building 
Building materials merchandising 
Property investment and management 
Sawmills 
Manufacture of particle boards, 
plywood and doors 
Manufacture of roll-formed steel 
sections 
Manufacture of corrugated steel 
culverts and pipes 
Manufacture of building papers and 
foils 
Wire mill 
Manufacture of galvanized and bright 
wires of fencing and manufacturing 
industries 
Agricultural and Forestry consultants 
Livestock development planning 
Fishing Fleet opertors & fish processing? 
Wool scourers 
Manufacture of particle board, bison 
board, plywood and doors 
Manufacturer of newsprint, pulp and 
sawn timber 
steels, structural steels, plate steels, 
corrugated iron, greenhouse amd farm 
buildings, building papers and foils, 
insulations materials 
Manufacturers and suppliers of concrete, 
masonry, precast concrete products, 
paving, paint, chemicals 
steel, melt extraction steel fibres, 
Manufacturers of fabricated reinforcing 
metal fasteners, stainless and bright 
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Distributors of LPG 
Building and civil engineering contractors 
Wool brokers 
Engineering products marketing - air 
compressors and other air control 
equipment, dairy factory machinery, 
control panels, effluent treatment 
plant, generators, farm machinery, 
grain storage and handling equipment, 
measuring instruments, irrigation pumps, 
emergency lighting equipment, machine 
tools, metal working machinery, numerical 
control equipment, packaging machinery, 
process control equipment, pumps and 
pumping equipment,seperators, stainless 
steel fittings, systems design 
Stock and station agents 
Merchant bankers 
Financiers 
Personal loans 
Mortgage management 
American Express agents 
Insurance Agents 
Real Estate Agents and Auctioneers 
Property development 
Computer service bureau 
Property, real estate and shopping centre 
development consultants and project 
managers 
Builders supply and timber merchants, 
sawmillers and timber processors 
Harware stores 
1985 As above 
Exited: 
Rental of hire pools 
Building society management 
Manufacturers and wholesalers of camping, 
outdoor and equestrienne equipment 
Manufacturers of lawnmowers, bicycles, 
cultivators and solar water heaters, 
exercycles 
Added: 
Bloodstock 
Export of fresh, frozen and canned 
foodstuffs 
Appliance retailing 
Motor vehicle rental 
Motor vehicle leasing 
Shipping company 
Insurance 
Mechanical engineering 
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1990 As above 
Added: 
Urea manufacture 
Manufacture of chemical methanol, 
amonia and urea 
Marine engineering construction 
Textile importers 
Transport serving the building industry 
Exited: 
Bloodstock 
Export of fresh, frozen and canned 
foodstuffs 
Importers of LPG cylinders and equipment 
Computer equipment distributors 
LMVD 
Appliance retailing 
Vehicle rental 
Motor vehicle leasing 
Insurance 
Merchant bankers 
Mortgage management 
American Express agents 
Mechanical engineering 
Computer service bureau 
FOVEAUX RADIO LTD 
1985 Radio broadcasters 
1990 As above 
GENERAL PROPERTIES LTD 
1980 Property investment 
1985 As above 
GOLDEN BAY CEMENT COMPANY LTD 
1980 Manufacture and shipping of cement 
fishing, forestry, berry cropping 
1985 Same as 1980 
GOODMAN GROUP LTD 
1980 Bakery products, flour millers, 
yeast manufacture, yarn processing, 
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distribution of beverage and slaughtering equipment. 
1985 As 1980 plus cereal food manufacture 
GROCORP PACIFIC LTD 
1985 Fruitgrowers 
1990 As above 
GROSVENOR PROPERTIES LTD 
1980 Property investment 
1985 As above 
HENRY BERRY LTD 
1980 Wholesale and retail grocers, suppliers of 
office equipment and machines, fruit and 
vegetable canners, distribution of electrical 
equipment, manufacture of industrial 
cleaners and air cleaner equipment 
1985 As 1980 plus laundry service, manufacture 
of uniforms, fashion clothes, commercial 
kitchen equipment 
leI NEW ZEALAND LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of agricultural chemicals, 
animal vaccines, pharmaceutical products, 
resin, dyestuffs, chemicals, explosives, 
plastic pipes, footwear, clothing, wall-
papers, slide fasteners, non-ferrous metals 
paints, synthetic yarn. Mineral exploration. 
1985 Same as 1980 
IVON WATKINS-DOW LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of agricultural chemicals, 
pesticides, fertilisers, stock remedies, 
surfactants, industrial chemicals, insulation 
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material, spray equipment, plastic pac1dng 
material 
1985 Same as 1980 plus manufacture of timber 
preserving chemicals 
HALLENSTEIN GLASSON HOLDINGS LTD 
1980 Retailers of men's and boys clothing, 
footwear and women's apparel 
Clothing manufacture 
1985 As above 
1990 As above 
HAURAKI ENTERPRISES LTD 
(formerly: Radio Hauraki N.Z. Ltd) 
1980 Private radio broadcasters 
1985 As above 
HUME INDUSTRIES (N.Z.) LTD 
1980 Manufacturer of concrete tanks, 
reserviors and other pre-cast 
concrete products 
General and structural engineering 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Manufacturer of: 
- plastic pipes, containers, hose etc 
- polyethelene pipes 
- plastic cosmetic tubes 
- spiral welded steel pipes and 
fabricated steel products 
- earthenware pipes and fittings 
- polythene coating applications 
- shrink sleeves and tape 
Sale of welding equipment 
HUTTON'S N.Z. LTD 
(formerly: Gear Meat Co. Ltd) 
1980 Wholesale butchers 
Retail butchers 
Rendering plant operation 
Property investment 
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Farming 1 
1985 Exited all of the above. AH 
Added: 
Meat processing 
INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING LTD 
1980 Private radio broadcasters AF 
1985 As above AF 
INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS LTD 
1980 Newspaper printers and publishers AD 
Commercial printers 
Stationers 
Television commercials 
Closed circuit television 
Film production 
1985 As above CD 
Exited: 
Television commercials 
Closed circuit television 
Film production 
Added: 
Radio broadcasting 
Carrying company 
1990 As above CD 
Added: 
Travel agents 
Investments 
Exited: 
Radio broadcasting 
JAMES HARDIE IMPEY 
1980 Paint manufacturer AD 
Paint, glass and wallpaper merchants 
1985 As above. DD 
Added: 
Paint, glass and wallpaper merchants 
Manufacturer of paints and stains 
Wholesaling of furnishing fabrics and 
wallcoverings 
Manufacturer of envelopes 
Merchandising of paper and commercial 
stationery 
Glass merchants and contractors 
Retailer of home decorative products 
Distribution of building supplies 
Manufacture and distribution of domestic 
and electrical switchgear and accessories 
Manufacturer of adhesives, fillers, wall 
preparations and car products 
Manufacture of fibre cement building 
products including weather boards and 
panel boards 
Manufacture of pressure, sewer, stormwater 
and drain pipes 
Manufacture and distribution of PVC 
plumbing fittings, pipes, bathroom 
products, acrylic spa pools and baths 
Importing and merchandising of chemicals 
and raw materials for paint and plastic 
industries, textile machinery and 
accessories, commercial laundry and dry 
cleaning equipment 
JAMES SMITH LTD 
1980 Operators of departmental stores 
1985 Same as 1980 
JOHN BURNS & CO. LTD 
1980 Manufacture of decorative, functional 
building products 
- wooden roofing tiles 
- wall panelling 
- partitions 
- flooring 
Manufacture of steel and non-ferrous 
metal products 
Manufacture of: 
- kitchens 
- commercial kitchen equipment 
- transmission equipment 
- load lift units 
- fork lift components 
- bulldozer components 
- dump-truck trays 
- commercial dishwashers 
- meat saws 
- commercial potato peelers 
Wholesaler of: 
- marine hardware and supplies 
- builders hardware, tools, plumbers 
and engineers supplies 
- photographic supplies 
224 
AF 
AF 
DF 
DH 
- home care supplies 
- outboard motors 
Rigging for marine and forestry trades 
Ships chandler 
Ships providor 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Manufacture of water beds 
Sale and service of food equipment used 
in commercial kitchens, hotels, hospitals, 
cafeterias, and retail outlets ego 
butcheries, cake kitchens and bakeries, 
glasswashers 
Mechanical servicing contractors 
Exited: 
Manufacture of decorative, functional 
building products 
Manufacture of: 
- load lift units 
- fork lift components 
- bulldozer components 
- dump-truck trays 
- commercial dishwashers 
- meat saws 
- commercial potato peelers 
Wholesaler of: 
- marine hardware and supplies 
- builders hardware, tools, plumbers 
and engineers supplies 
- photographic supplies 
- home care supplies 
- outboard motors 
Rigging for marine and forestry trades 
Ships chandler 
Ships providor 
JOHN EDMONDS HOLDINGS LTD 
1980 Manufacture of wood joinery. Retailing of 
hardware and sports goods 
1985 Same as 1980 
JOHN WEBSTER & CO. 
1980 Manufacture of shirts, ties, socks, 
belts, trousers and knitwears, 
topcoats, pyjamas, jackets, handkerchiefs 
1985 As above 
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KINGS GATE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION LTD 
(formerly: Vacation Hotels Ltd) 
1980 Tourist hotel owners and operators 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Property investment 
Hotel management 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Owner of properties including a 
shopping centre and marina 
LANE'S INDUSTRIES LTD 
1980 Manufacture of knitted fabrics and 
elastics 
Commission transfer printers 
1985 As above 
LANE WALKER RUDKIN INDUSTRIES LTD 
1980 Manufacture of yarn, lingerie, knitwear, 
sportswear, pantyhose, hosiery goods, 
mens' and womens' underwear, manufacture of textile 
fabric and outerwear 
1985 Same as 1980 
LD NATHAN AND CO LTD 
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1980 Manufacture of food stuffs, beer and soft CD 
drinks. Retailing of grocery and fancy 
goods. Spirits and wine merchants. Hotel 
owners, travelling and shipping agents, tea and coffee production CD 
1985 Same as 1980 plus financing, investment, 
property development; exited hotels 
LEYLAND INVESTMENT CO LTD 
1980 Investment 
CD 
AF 
1985 Same as 1980 
LION BREWERIES LTD 
1980 Restaurants 
Hotel owner and operator 
Wholesale wine and spirit merchants 
and distributors 
Specialized suppliers and consultants 
to the catering industry 
Recycling bottles 
Grain and seed merchants 
Barley malters 
Brewers 
Soft-drink manufacturers 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Caterers 
Wine producer 
Spirit bottlers 
Exited: 
Recycling bottles 
Grain and seed merchants 
Soft-drink manufacturers 
Specialized suppliers and consultants 
to the catering industry 
LUSTEROID HOLDINGS (NZ) LTD 
1980 Manufacture and distribution of paints, 
spray guns, sand papers 
1985 Same as 1980 
MAGNUM CORPORATION LTD 
(formerly: Rothmans Industries Ltd) 
1980 Manufacturer of tobacco products 
Selling agents of tobacco products 
and smokers requisites 
Winemaker 
Grocery retailing 
Property investment and development 
Farming 
Manufacture of umbrellas and tents 
Manufacturers of electronic motor 
controllers 
Laminator and gravure printers 
Computer management, data processing 
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and systems consultancy 
Manufacturers agents NZ inkmakers 
Liquor distributor 
1985 As above DD 
Exited: 
Farming 
Manufacture of umbrellas and tents 
Manufacturers of electronic motor 
controllers 
Manufacturers agents NZ inkmakers 
Liquor distributor 
Added: 
Photolithography 
Confectionary distributor 
Wholesalers: 
- groceries 
- housewares 
- electrical appliances 
Liquor retailing 
Fruit juice producer 
1990 As above DD 
Added: 
Brewing 
Tourist hotels· 
Exited: 
Photolithography 
Confectionary distributor 
Manufacturer of tobacco products 
Selling agents of tobacco products 
and smokers requisites 
Computer management, data processing 
and systems consultancy 
MAIR ASTLEY HOLDINGS LTD 
1980 Ventilating and heating manufacturer DR 
Wool scouring 
Wool exporters 
Exporters of foodstuffs 
Automotive glass 
Architectual glass 
Mosaic glass 
- industrial felts and cloth 
Food processing machinery 
- fibre glass rovings 
Importers of: 
- industrial chemicals 
- agricultural chemicals 
- food processing chemicals 
Industrial machinery 
Exporters of leather 
1985 As above DR 
Added: 
Game processors and exporters 
Tanners 
Fellmongerers 
Wool yarn spinners 
Merchandising of: 
- hides, skins, tallow, meat and 
bonemeal 
Arable and horticultural crops 
Exited: 
Exporters of foodstuffs 
Exporters of leather 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Fish processing and exporting 
Bulk liquids storage 
Exited: 
Automotive glass 
Architectual glass 
Mosaic glass 
- industrial felts and cloth 
- food processing machinery 
- fibreglass rovings 
McALPINE INDUSTRIES LTD 
1980 Manufacture of deep freezers, fridges, mille 
farm chillers, glass washers. Air 
conditioning engineers. Repairs and servicing 
of machines, manufacture of ice-making 
equipment 
1985 Same as 1980 plus manufacture of dishwashers 
and washing machines 
McKECHNIE BROTHERS (N.Z.) LTD 
1980 Manufacturers of: 
- aluminium and brass extrusions 
- copper tube 
- aluminium ingots 
- continuously and centrifigally cast 
bronze products 
- machined brushes for industrial use 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Manufacture of: 
- compressed air fittings 
- gauges 
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MILBURN NEW ZEALAND LTD 
(formerly New Zealand Cement Holdings Ltd) 
1980 Manufacturer of: 
- cement 
- agricultural lime 
- burnt lime 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Quarrying - stone and aggregate 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Manufacture of concrete paving and 
masonary products 
Ready mixed concrete 
MANTHEL HOLDINGS LTD 
1980 Dealers of motor cars and boats 
1985 Same as 1980 
M O'BRIEN AND CO LTD 
1980 Manufacture of works and sports wear 
1985 Same as 1980 
MONTANA WINES LTD 
1980 Wine making. Vineyard owners. Wholesaling 
and retailing of wine 
1985 Same as 1980 
MORRISON-PIM (HOLDINGS) LTD 
1980 Manufacture of printing and duplicating ink, 
oil and water-based ink. Distribution of 
printing machinery, typesetting and photo-
mechanical equipment, manufacture of offset 
printing ink; importing of graphic art 
supplies and photo-composition equipment 
1985 Same as 1980 
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MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD 
1980 Manufacture of auto parts, car bodies, fire 
extinguishers. Assembly of cars. Franchise 
holders of cars. Dealers in motor cycles and 
cars. Wholesaling of tractors and earthmoving 
equipment. Hire purchase financing 
1985 Same as 1980 
MOUNT COOK GROUP LTD 
1980 Airline 
Skiplanes 
Coach tours 
Tour operator 
Freight - land 
Ski-field operation 
Helicopters 
Agricultural aviation 
Catamaran cruises 
Rental car 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Motorhomes 
Exited: 
Rental cars 
1990 As above 
Exited: 
Catamaran cruises 
Agricultural aviation 
Motorhomes 
Added: 
Aircraft maintenance 
NEIL HOLDINGS LTD 
1980 Timber merchants 
Joinery manufacturers 
"Gang nail" truss fabricators 
House builders 
Real estate agents 
Civil engineering contractors 
Wholesalers of: 
- outdoor sound equipment 
-lighting 
- electrical components 
- transformers 
- voltage stabilizers 
- interference suppression devices 
- petroleum pumps 
- compressors 
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- amplifiers, record players, 
loudspeakers 
- aquarium requisites 
- sewage pumps 
- test instruments 
- dictating machines and tape recorders 
- water turbines 
- manne pumps 
- soldering irons 
- food mixers 
- electric stoves 
- wiring cables 
- electric clocks 
- chassis brushes 
- tools and punches 
- digital multimeters and precision 
oscilloscopes 
- switch cleaning fluids 
- precision wire 
- wound and multi turn controls 
- surgical operation lights 
- capacitors 
- cable 
- control equipment 
Manufacturers of: 
- heavy duty transformers 
- switchgear 
- and ranges 
Commercial cooking and 
heating manufacturing 
Aluminium joinery manufacturers 
Hardware merchants 
Wholesale of: 
- thermostats, condensers 
- catering equipment 
- electric motors 
- hair dryers 
1985 Added: 
Commercial and industrial developers 
Land developers and consultants 
Manufacture of kit -set homes 
Exited: 
Manufacture of: 
- ranges 
- commercial cooking equipment 
- heaters 
Real estate agents 
Manufacturers of heavy duty 
transformers and switchgear 
NEWMAN'S GROUP LTD 
(Formerly: TNL Group Ltd) 
1980 Freight cartage and forwarding 
Storage 
Bulk lime and super spreading 
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Railway operators 
Customs and shipping agents 
Passenger and travel services 
Coach tours 
Rental car operators 
Civil engineers 
Cattle stud, sheep and cattle farming 
Formulation and marketing of chemicals 
for farming and horticultural purposes 
Manufacture of vibratory and pollution 
control equipment 
Manufacturer of stock remedies 
Mineral extraction, processing and 
marketing 
Manufacturers of agricultural machinery 
LMVD 
Subdividers 
Ready mix concrete 
Yacht charter 
Travel agents 
Hire of motor caravans 
Horticulturalists; kiwifruit orchardists 
Export agents 
Gold mining 
Manufacturers of chemical pumps 
and synthetic and nylon bearing materials 
1985 Added: 
Airline operator 
Exited: Cattle stud, sheep and 
cattle farming 
Manufacture of 
agricultural machinery 
Manufacture of 
vibratory and pollution control equipment 
Subdividing 
Civil engineering 
Railway operators 
NEW ZEALAND FOREST PRODUCTS LTD 
1980 Builders supplies and hardware 
Sawmiller 
Pulp and paper mills 
Land subdivision 
Plywood and timber mills 
Manufacturers of foil containers 
Paper bags 
Paper importing 
Insurance 
Blow-in type insulation 
Iron and steel merchants 
Cardboard manufacture 
Manufacture of vinyl sheet materials, 
PVC extrusions and mouldings, gutter 
rainwear, spouting and downpipes 
Shipping, travel and custom agents 
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Manufacture of joinery and other 
building components 
Manufacture of rainwear, taupaulins and 
other canvas goods 
Housing construction 
Box makers 
Pre-cut houses 
Swimming pools 
Garden furniture 
Launch and lighter services 
Fishing trips 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Manufacturers of automobile trim 
components 
Manufacturers of greeting cards, 
gift wrap, stationery and playing cards 
Marine engineers and gearboxes 
Sale of construction machinery 
Motor vehicle importing and retailing 
including tractors 
Container handling and storage 
Investments 
Home appliance merchants 
Pallet manufacturers 
Farm building suppliers 
Exited: 
Swimming pools 
Blow-in type insulation 
Iron and steel merchants 
NEW ZEALAND LIGHT LEATHERS LTD 
1980 Tanners 
1985 As above 
1990 As above 
N.Z.NEWS 
1980 Newspaper printing and publishing 
Commercial printing 
Magazine publishers 
Production of TV commercials and films 
Publishers of business directories and 
maps 
Video producers and distributors 
1985 As above. 
Added: Mail order 
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NEW ZEALAND REFINING CO. LTD 
1980 Oil refiners 
1985 As above 
1990 As above 
NEW ZEALAND SALMON CO. LTD 
1985 Salmon farming 
Mussel farming and processing 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Processing of salmon 
Raising ova and King Salmon smolt for sale 
Manufacture of feed products for own use 
and for sale 
Farming and processing of tomatoes for 
sale as aseptic or frozen tomatoe paste 
Farming and sale of fresh market tomatoes 
Processing sweet corn, kiwifruit and 
apples 
Manufacture of fibre drums and drum-making 
machinery 
NORMEDIA CORPORATION LTD 
(formerly: Northland FM Radio Ltd) 
. 1985 Radio broadcasting 
1990 As above 
NUHAKA FARM FORESTRY FUND 
1980 Farm forestry 
1985 As above 
1990 As above 
NUPLEX INDUSTRIES LTD 
(formerly: Revertex Industries N.Z. Ltd) 
1980 Premixed plasters 
Floor covering contractors 
Manufacturers of synthetic resin 
emulsions 
- acrylic emulsions 
- alkyd resins 
- PV A emulsions 
- polyester resins 
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Water emulsified epoxies 
Sprayed finishes 
Plastic spray coatings 
Chemicals and fertilizers 
Seamless flooring 
Exterior weatherproof coating 
Archetectual coatings and rubber 
latex compounds 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Manufacture of industrial chemicals 
Exited: 
Fertilizers 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Distributor of: 
- floor coverings 
- floor insulation materials 
- vinyl tiles and sheet, cork, 
parquet, adhesives and levelling 
compounds and flooring installation 
materials 
Exited: 
Floor covering contractors 
Manufacture of industrial chemicals 
NZ INDUSTRIAL GASES LTD 
1980 Manufacture of industrial gases, medical 
gases, welding equipment, medical equipment 
electric welding machines. Suppliers of 
medical equipment and welding equipment 
1985 Same as 1980 
NZSTEELLTD 
1980 Manufacture of steel sheets, billets, pipes, 
tin plates, rectangular hollow section, 
rolling mill products, coiled strips, 
structural sheet. Galvanising sheet 
1985 Same as 1980 
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OHL CORPORATION LTD 
(formerly: Optical Holdings Ltd) 
1980 Importers and wholesalers of ophthalmic 
optical products including spectacle 
frames, lenses and cases, contact lens 
solutions and accessories, sight testing 
and laboratory equipment 
Wholesa,lers of fashion sunglasses and 
accessones 
Manufacturers and exporters of spectacle 
frames and sunglasses 
1985 As above 
Added: wholesaling of sunscreen and 
depalatory cream 
OPIO FORESTRY FUND 
1985 Farm forestry 
Leases a farm block 
1990 As above 
OTAGO PRESS AND PRODUCE LTD 
1980 Daily and community newspapers 
General printers 
Fruit and produce mart 
Builders supplies and hardware merchants 
Real estate agents 
Poultry dealers 
Egg pulp manufacture 
Egg distributors 
Fruit and produce auctioneers 
Fruit and produce wholesalers 
1985 Added: 
Exporting of horticultural products, 
fish and seafoods 
Poultry processing 
Exited: 
Egg pulp manufacture 
PACER KERRIDGE CORPORATION LTD 
(formerly: Pacer Pacific Corporation Ltd; National Bloodstock Corporatid) 
1985 Horse breeding 
Racehorse synicates 
Publishing 
1990 As above. 
Exited: 
Publishing 
Added: 
237 
BH 
BD 
AH 
AH 
DH 
DH 
CH 
Cinemas 
Leasing - photographic equipment 
Property rental 
Hotel owner 
Finance 
PARAPINE 
(formerly: Genestock) 
1985 Cattle grazing facilities 
Sale of embryos/animal improvement services 
Dairy farm operation 
Livestock sale - beef 
1990 Timber processing 
Timber and Hardware merchants 
PDL HOLDINGS LTD 
1980 Manufacturers of: 
- electrical accessoriers ego switches, 
sockets etc 
- industrial switch gear 
- kitchen step stools 
- plastic tableware 
- picnic sets 
- garden watering devices 
-toys 
- electrical appliances 
Custom injection moulders 
Toolmakers 
Blowmoulders and extruders 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Manufacturers of: 
- process control systems 
- can openers 
Exited: 
Manufacture of: 
- plastic tableware 
- picnic sets 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Manufacturers: 
- metal turned parts and pressings 
- electric motor speed systems for 
industrial use 
- air movement products 
Importer of industrial electrical 
products 
Exited: 
- kitchen step stools 
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- toys 
- can openers 
- garden watering devices 
- process control systems 
PROGRESSIVE ENTERPRISES LTD 
1980 Supermarket operators. Property developers. 
Manufacturers of delicatessen, fast food and family 
restaurant 
1985 Same as 1980 
RADIO AVON LTD 
1980 Operators of radio station 
1985 Same as 1980 
RADIO OTAGO LTD 
1980 Private radio broadcasters 
1985 As above 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Calender advertising 
RADIO PACIFIC LTD 
1985 Radio station 
1990 As above 
REGINA CONFECTIONS LTD 
1980 Manufacturers of chocolates and 
confectionary 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Manufacture of health and 
breakfast foods 
R & W HELLABY LTD 
1980 Meat processing 
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1985 As above 
ROBT. JONES INVESTMENTS LTD 
1985 Property investment 
1990 As above 
R W SAUNDERS LTD 
1980 Manufacture of apparel and lingerie 
horticulture 
1985 Same as 1980 
SANFORD LTD 
1980 Wholesale and retail fish merchants 
Manufacturers of fish meal and fertilizers 
Cool store operators 
Fish processing 
Ice manufacturers 
Owns and operates own fishing fleet 
Poultry merchants 
Marine engineers 
Ship, yacht, boat builders and designers 
Ship repair 
Manufacturing of fish oil 
1985 Exited: 
Poultry merchants 
Manufacturers of fish meal and fertilizers 
Entered: mussel farming, harvesting 
and processing 
1990 As above 
REID FARMERS LTD 
1980 Wool brokers 
Rural financing 
Grain, seed and produce merchants 
Seed dressers 
Real estate agents 
Stud stock 
Insurance agents 
Stock and station agents 
General merchants 
Retailers 
Sale of farm machinery 
Wine and spirit merchants 
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1985 As above 
Exited: 
Wine and spirit merchants 
Added: 
Valuers 
Fertilizer 
1990 As above 
Added: Wool scouring and dumping 
SMITHS CITY MARKET 
1980 Retailer of DIY products 
Finance company 
General goods auctioneers 
Furniture and appliance stores 
Real estate agents 
Medical furniture manufacture 
1985 As above. 
Added: Video libraries 
Exited: Medical furniture manufacture 
1990 As above. 
STEEL AND TUBE HOLDINGS LTD 
1980 Steel, tube and steel product merchants 
Reinforcing contractors 
Steel cutting, bending and profiling 
services 
Indent and commission agents 
Plumbing and electrical merchants, 
building service engineers and 
manufacturers 
Electric motor manufacturers 
Nail, staple, fencing and concrete 
reinforcing mesh manufacturers 
Wire product manufacturers 
Steel grating manufacturers and 
galvanizers 
Industrial fastening systems merchants 
Refrigeration and automotive tubing 
manufacturers 
Mechanical engineers and contractors 
Steel product fabricators and engineers 
Propety owners and lessors 
Specialist engineers for oil and gas 
industry 
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1985 As above 
Added: 
Investments 
Suppliers of technical equipment, plant 
and process systems engineers 
Instrumentation and process control 
engineers 
Industrial machinery 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Marketers, project managers and 
manufacturers of exclusive technical 
products and engineered systems to 
primary processing and secondary 
industry 
Manufacture of: 
Special purpose machinery 
Pressure vessels 
Tanks - mild steel, stainless steel 
Carcass freezers 
Heat exchangers 
Meat industry conveyors 
Evaporating plants 
Combustion engine boiler parts 
Project management 
Plant hire 
Boilermakers 
Agencies: whiting, harvey 
distribution of motor vehicles 
Wholesaling of timber and other 
building materials 
Exited: 
Refrigeration and automotive tubing 
manufacturers 
Propety owners and lessors 
Electric motor manufacturers 
Investments 
SALMOND INDUSTRIES LTD 
1980 Manufacture of cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, 
brushes, toiletry, food products, animal 
foods, wholesale of surgical 
equipment and photographic goods. Retail 
of pharmaceuticals 
1985 Same as 1980 
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THE SELBY SHOE CO LTD 
1980 Manufacture ofwomens' shoes 
1985 Same as 1980 
SKELLERUP INDUSTRIES LTD 
1980 Manufacture of PVC flooring, rubber and 
canvas footwear, industrial garments, 
transmission belts, carpet cushion, water-
proof clothing, moulded rubber goods, dipped 
rubber goods, plastic products. Wholesaling 
and retailing of rubber goods 
1985 Same as 1980 plus computer services, 
swimming pool construction, salt-making. 
Manufacture of dairy equipment and medical 
equipment 
SMITH-BIOLAB LTD 
1980 Manufacture of pharmaceaticals, laboratory 
diagnostic material, cosmetics, scientific 
equipment, plastic packaging. Suppliers of 
scientific equipment 
1985 Same as 1980 
SOUTHLAND FROZEN MEAT LTD 
1980 Processing and exporting of meat. Pelt and 
garment manufacturing and tanners. Frozen 
freight haulage 
1985 Same as 1980 
TAG CORPORATION LTD 
(formerly: Spedding Consolidated Ltd) 
1980 Wholesalers of: 
- electrical appliances and accessories 
- hardware 
- gift lines 
- leisure products 
- CNG and LPG fuel systems 
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- ceilings and partitions insulation 
- educational products 
- bathroom scales 
- baby cups 
- marine motors 
- jigsaws 
- gas cookers 
- kitchen rollers 
- power tools 
- digital clocks 
- cassette tapes 
- carpet sweepers 
- kitchenware 
- radios and cassettes 
- digital watches 
- wallpaper 
- car vehicle ramps 
Manufacturers of 
- electric appliances 
- aluminium boats 
- waste disposal units 
- other sheet-metal products 
- cooking oils 
- detergents, disinfectants 
- cordials 
- petfood 
- John West canned foods 
Contract packagers 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Distributors of food and related products 
Financial services 
Insurance broking 
Property investment 
Agent for Tongan Government 
Rental of commercial buildings 
Exited: 
Wholesalers of: 
- gift lines 
- leisure products 
- bathroom scales 
- baby cups 
- marine motors 
- jigsaws 
- gas cookers 
- kitchen rollers 
- power tools 
- digital clocks 
- cassette tapes 
- carpet sweepers 
- kitchenware 
- radios and cassettes 
- digital watches 
- wallpaper 
- car vehicle ramps 
Manufacturers of 
- electric appliances 
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- aluminium boats 
- waste disposal units 
- other sheet-metal products 
- cooking oils 
- detergents, disinfectants 
- cordials 
- petfood 
- J ohn West canned foods 
Contract packagers 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Rental of apartment buildings 
Importation, manfacture and distribution 
of lighting products and electrical 
switchgear 
Manufacture of sheet metal products 
Exited: 
Distributors of food and related products 
- electrical appliances and accessories 
- hardware 
TAYLORS GROUP LTD 
(Formerly: Taylors Drycleaning And Laundry Services Ltd) 
1980 Dry cleaning and laundry service 
Garment rental 
Linen hire 
1985 As above 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Dyeing and custom finishing for the 
garment industry 
Stockists of uniforms and work apparel 
TRANS ASHBURTON LTD 
1980 Goods and haulage operators, lime crushing 
1985 Same as 1980 plus lime crushing 
TRANSMARK CORPORATION LTD 
(formerly: Moyes and Groves Industries Ltd) 
1985 Manufacture of industrial valving 
Suppliers of valves, electronic flow 
measurement and control systems 
General merchandising - supplies 
consumable engineering goods, 
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hacksaw blades, drills, nuts and bolts, 
abrasives, pipe fittings and hand tools 
Supplies engineering workshops with 
items such as specialist lathes and 
milling equipment; supplies specialist 
equipment to the pulp and paper 
industries 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Casting foundry specializing in 
stainless and cast steel products 
Importers and distributors of: 
- calculators 
- electronic cash registers 
- watches and clocks 
- electronic musical instruments 
- hi-fi and horne stereo, car audio, 
televisions, VCRs, microwave ovens, 
horne appliances, audio equipment, 
audio and video tapes, floppy disks 
TRIUMPH INDUSTRIES LTD 
(formerly: Consolidated Enterprises Ltd) 
1985 Importer, distributor and retailer 
of computer equipment and associated 
peripherals 
Software data base operation 
1990 Manufacturer of water cylinders, 
fuel kits, stainless steel products 
and other sheetmetal products 
TRANSPORT (NORTH CANTERBURY) LTD 
1980 Goods, logs, and stock haulage contractors 
1985 Same as 1980 
UEB INDUSTRIES LTD 
1980 Manufacture of tufted carpets, paperboard 
packaging, paper bags, fibre and coorugated 
containers, building paper, waxed paper, wall 
paper and pulp. Wool scouring and spinning, 
sheep farming, manufacture of furniture 
and stock feed. Hotels. Data processing. 
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1985 Same as 1980 exited hotels and stock feed 
manufacture 
VENTURE PACIFIC LTD 
(formerly: New Zealand Venture Capital Corporation Ltd; 
Pacific Venture Capital Ltd) 
1985 Venture capital investors 
1990 As above 
WAIKATO STUD LTD 
1985 Thoroughbred horse breeding 
1990 As above 
WAITAKI NZ REFRIGERATION LTD 
1980 Processing and exporting of meat, pelts, 
hides, casings, tallows, deer essence. 
Tanners, printers, motel owners, retail 
butchers. Manufacturing of knitwears and 
concrete masonry, pig farming and 
manufacture of pharmaceutical raw material 
1985 Same as 1980 
WASTE MANAGEMENT N.Z. LTD 
1980 Manufacturers of: 
- fire extinguishers, carbon dioxide 
and dry ice plants 
- pneumatic products 
1985 As above. 
Added: 
Waste collection and disposal services 
Haulage 
1990 Exited all of the above except: 
Sanitary and garbage disposal services 
WATTlE INDUSTRIES LTD 
1980 Manufacture of prepared food, breakfast 
food, ice cream, poultry and stock feed, 
cake, baby food. Processing of meat and 
fish, can making, horticulture, grocery 
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distribution, refrigerated haulage, 
flour milling and fish 
meal manufacture 
1985 Same as 1980 
WELGAS HOLDINGS LTD 
(formerly: Wellington Gas Co. Ltd) 
1980 Distribution of gas 
Projection screen manufacturers 
Manufacturers and importers of gas 
heating equipment 
Heating engineers 
Sale of 
- industrial and commercial gas equipment 
- bottled gas and cylinders 
- gas appliances 
- gas central heating systems 
- gas controls 
- gas cookers 
- gas heaters 
- gas metres 
- gas regulators 
- industrial heaters 
- domestic heaters 
- cooking equipment 
- commercial cooking equipment 
- catering equipment 
- gas water heaters 
- gas central heating systems 
- gas controls 
- gas metres 
- gas regulators 
Sale of LPG appliances for the leisure 
craft and caravan markets 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Supplier of gaseous fuel automotive 
equipment 
Mechanical installation for establishing 
public and private CNG refuelling stations 
Investments 
WILKINS AND DAVIES CONSTRUCTION LTD 
1980 Civil and electrical engineers, building 
construction and quarry masters, construction of habours 
and power houses 
1985 Same as 1980 
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WILLIAMSON JEFFREY LTD 
1980 Manufacture of stationery products, printing 
machines and plastic products. Wholesaler 
of stationery products 
1985 Same as 1980 
WILSON & HORTON LTD 
1980 Newspaper publishers and printers 
Commercial printers 
Printing of stationery 
Printing of greeting cards 
Booksellers 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Television and video recording studios 
Manufacture of plastic bank cards 
Stationery merchandising 
1990 As above 
Added: 
Direct marketing 
Printers of magazines, travel 
brochures, books, and mail order 
catalogues 
Computer software and systems for 
newspapers and general printers 
Exited: 
Television and video recording studios 
WILSON NEILL LTD 
1980 Exporters of seafood and venison 
Exporters of opossum slans 
Exporters of horticultural products 
Hotels 
Taverns 
Retailers of: 
- appliances 
- musical instruments 
Liquor retailers 
Fish processing 
Financiers 
1985 As above 
Exited: 
Retailing of musical instruments 
Exporters of horticultural products 
Financiers 
249 
CF 
CD 
AD 
CD 
CD 
DD 
DD 
1990 As above 
Exited: 
Exporters of seafood, venison and 
opposum skins 
Home appliance retailers 
Liquor retailing 
Hotels 
Taverns 
Added: 
Brewing 
Wine and spirits 
Fruit juice manufacture 
Tanners 
Property investment and development 
WINSTONELTD 
1980 Manufacture of brick, roofing tiles, 
concrete blocks, refractory material, PVC 
pipes and sheeting, glass, ready mix 
concrete. Suppliers of building and road 
material. Flooring and roofing contractors, 
civil construction, quarry masters 
1985 Same as 1980 plus manufacture of wood pulp 
and plywood. Forestry, saw milling, and 
plumbing supplies 
WORMALD INTERNATIONAL NZ LTD 
1980 Manufacture of industrial safety equipment, 
fire protection system, protective clothing, 
burglar alarm system, electronic aids for 
handicaps. Builders' supplies, structural 
steel and pipe, transmission conveyors. 
Suppliers of medical equipment 
1985 Same as 1980 plus manufacture of fire 
engines, pressed metal and industrial doors 
XS CORPORATION LTD 
(formerly: Manawatu Radio Company Ltd) 
1985 Private radio broadcasters 
1990 As above 
YATES CORORATION LTD 
1980 Manufacture of home garden products 
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Grower of seeds 
Manufacture of stock feed 
Processing of chickens, hens and turkeys 
Blueberries 
Mining and processing of sphaghnum 
peat moss 
Manufacture of fertilizer 
Real estate 
Insurance consultants 
Manufacturers of egg pulp and dried egg 
products 
Marketing of eggs 
Distributors of: 
- edible oils 
- dried food and nuts 
- canned salmon 
- canned pineapple 
- air sterilizers 
- spices 
- herbs 
- hog casings 
- smallgoods cooking and smoking equipment 
- salt 
- machinery 
and merchandise to farmers 
Fruit and produce mart 
Seed cleaning 
Grain drying 
1985 As above 
Added: 
Manufacture of pet food 
Citris fruit grower 
Kiwifruit grower 
Manufactuerer of electric fence 
energizers and accessories 
Irrigation 
Pop-up sprinkler systems 
Exited: 
Real estate 
Insurance consultants 
Distributors of: 
- edible oils 
- dried food and nuts 
- canned salmon 
- canned pineapple 
- air sterilizers 
- spices 
- herbs 
- hog casings 
- smallgoods cooking and smoking equipment 
- salt 
- machinery 
and merchandise to farmers 
Fruit and produce mart 
Seed cleaning 
Grain drying 
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Appendix 3 
STRATEGY, PERFORMANCE 
AND CONTROL VARIABLES, 1985-90 
COMPANY A E C L ROA ROE G SALE!:; SIZE LE~ 
!Arthur Barnett 1 0 0 0 5.92 0.24 41.16 10.43 0.48 
Cant. Roller Flour 1 0 0 0 16.93 15.60 -5.48 7.73 0.37 
Firestone 1 0 0 0 10.99 8.37 1. 06 10.93 0.26 
P:JZ Refining 1 0 0 0 1. 37 10.56 20.25 14.44 0.92 
P:JZ Light Leathers 1 0 0 0 15.21 15.29 0.89 9.78 0.51 
Taylor's 1 0 0 0 12.10 9.84 18.08 9.74 0.56 
Cardrona 1 0 0 0 10.34 7.40 -3.17 9.40 0.30 
Foveaux 1 0 0 0 25.94 14.72 11.29 6.56 0.35 
GeneralProperties 1 0 0 0 1. 91 -10.77 54.28 11. 03 0.47 
Hallensteins 1 0 0 0 12.99 10.51 13 .28 11.07 0.49 
tt:1ilburn 1 0 0 0 12.58 9.73 10.09 11.83 0.45 
P:Jormedia 1 0 0 0 -3.54 -17.35 123.85 7.75 0.79 
P:Juhaka 1 0 0 0 -0.11 -0.11 47.96 8.93 0.01 
opio 1 0 0 0 0.32 0.21 -7.36 7.19 0.01 
Radio otago 1 0 0 0 18.05 22.53 34.30 8.54 0.51 
Radio Pacific 1 0 0 0 37.54 35.82 16.23 7.86 0.40 
RJI 1 0 0 0 4.98 3.16 127.31 13.60 0.41 
Triumph 1 0 0 0 -10.28 -215.65 -3.56 8.21 0.48 
lVenture Pacific 1 0 0 0 -14.04 -34.21 147.09 9.78 0.25 
lWaikato Stud 1 0 0 0 -2.96 -42.10 14.67 9.70 0.45 
XS 1 0 0 0 4.18 3.61 25.05 7.59 0.99 
Carborundum 1 0 0 0 7.19 -21.96 0.63 9.40 0.47 
Grocorp 1 0 0 0 -5.12 -9.74 329.17 9.67 0.30 
Ernest Adams 0 1 0 0 20.12 14.65 14.33 9.44 0.26 
EBOS 0 1 0 0 11.50 5.74 18.70 9.32 0.59 
FERNZ 0 1 0 0 12.59 11.42 6.51 12.48 0.61 
Colonial Motor 0 0 1 0 12.61 10.28 2.40 11.39 0.43 
Independent Newspapers 0 0 1 0 15.51 13.05 23.59 12.25 0.43 
Sanford 0 0 1 0 26.32 21. 73 16.89 11. 08 0.45 
Wilson & Horton 0 0 1 0 23.68 16.92 25.87 12.07 0.41 
Cavalier 0 0 1 0 12.38 13.26 10.58 11. 50 0.57 
Pacer Kerridge 0 0 1 0 -1. 08 -35.28 103.56 11.65 0.71 
Brierley Investments 0 0 0 1 9.98 15.46 33.87 15.92 0.80 
Carter Holt Harvey 0 0 0 1 12.38 18.87 35.62 14.43 0.60 
Donaghy's 0 0 0 1 13.25 10.07 16.30 11. 21 0.44 
Fisher & Paykel 0 0 0 1 17.28 12.87 7.63 12.68 0.40 
l'iagnum 0 0 0 1 13.32 11. 42 20.55 13.46 0.34 
l'iair Astley 0 0 0 1 10.01 10.73 10.72 12.13 0.68 
Mount Cook 0 0 0 1 9.23 8.05 10.73 11. 31 0.45 
Nuplex 0 0 0 1 12.24 12.48 7.01 10.49 0.41 
PDL 0 0 0 1 10.05 7.99 30.54 11. 77 0.71 
Reid 0 0 0 1 15.79 11. 99 9.06 10.49 0.59 
Steel & Tube 0 0 0 1 8.80 5.17 8.58 12.57 0.49 
TAG 0 0 0 1 11. 06 10.08 32.63 10.36 0.63 
Wilson Neill 0 0 0 1 18.63 26.73 214.08 12.47 0.59 
Fletcher Challenge 0 0 0 1 10.17 17.23 26.39 16.10 0.65 
Smiths City 0 0 0 1 8.82 4.88 29.55 11.77 0.62 
Appendix 4 
DIVESTMENT DIARIES 
ABACUS 
Ownership Directors Mana!?ement Divestments 
In September 1981 the joint major 3 directors, previously the joint In September 1982 the incumbent Nov 1982 to 
shareholders sell their holding to the major shareholders, retire (September Managing Director retires. He is July 1983 
Managing Director. By January 1981). succeeded by an executive who is December 1982 
1982 the Managing Director has New Chairman elected. seconded from the company of the 
30.9% of issued capital. new major shareholder. 
In March 1982 a new major 
shareholder emerges with 18.6% of Two representatives of the new major 
issued capital. shareholder appointed (May 1982) 
June 1982: One director resigns 
November 1982: One director 
appointed No change August 1984 
In September 1983 a new major 
shareholder emerges when the March 1983: One director resigns 
previous major shareholder sells 
their 26% holding to the Managing Two new directors appointed in 
Director and associated parties March and May 1984. 
March 1984: One director retires 
ANGUS 
Ownership Directors Mana{?ement Divestments 
Company taken over. Two directors representing new major No change in CEO July 1983 
The new major shareholder holds shareholder appointed. Two November 1983 
51 % of issued capital (June 1983). directors, one March 1984 
of whom was an executive director, April 1984 
retire (September 
(September 1983) 1983) 
Two directors who were, prior to the 
takeover, the joint major shareholders 
retire 
(October 1983) 
ATLAS 
Ownership Directors Manaf?ement Divestments 
Between Jan 1980 and Feb 1981 CEO resigns from board (April 1980) CEO replaced by a Management May to Sept 
two individuals jointly become the Board consisting of the Chairman 1980 
new major shareholder increasing Two directors resign (Dec 1980) and the two individuals who June 1981 jointly become the new major Sept 1980-
their holding from Two new major shareholders shareholder (April 1980) Aug 1981 
3.2% to an estimated 30%. appointed to board. Two more 
Previous major shareholder was an directors resign. Board size is now 3 
insurance company with no board (August 1981) 
representation 
HUTTON'S 
Ownership Directors Manaf?ement Divestments 
Two companies jointly acquire 40% Four directors appointed. Two New CEO (1978) 
of equity (June 1977). directors resign (1977-78) 
Restrictive voting provisions mean New CEO (1979) 
that there is no dominant 
shareholder; shareholders are 
permitted one vote for every 10 
shares held, up to a maximum of 
250 votes. New Chairman appointed (Feb 1978). In Nov. 1980 one of the joint July 1980 
Outgoing Chairman resigns. major shareholders assumes August 1980 
Restrictive voting provision on management control April 1981 
shares removed (August 1979). By Four directors resign (1978-80) April 1982 
January 1980 joint major 1981 to 1982 
shareholders have voting rights General manager of one of the joint balance dates 
proportional to the 44.3% of equity major shareholders is appointed to 
they now hold. board (Dec. 1980) 
Two more directors appointed (1981-
82) 
TOLLEY 
Ownership Directors ManaRement Divestments 
Major shareholder sells 45.1 % 4 directors, representatives of the Not relevant; holding company September I 
holding to another company (July outgoing major shareholder, resign with no CEO. 1984 I 
1984) (July 1984) 
PARAPINE 
Ownership Directors Manaf{ement Divestments 
Major shareholder sells 19.7% May 1987, 
holding to another company (March August 1987 to 
1986) August 1988, 
June 1986 to 
August 1987 
WASTE MANAGEMENT 
Ownership Directors ManaRement Divestments 
3 individuals jointly acquire 50% of By August 1985 all three joint major In 1985 one of the joint major January 1987 
issued shareholders are appointed to the shareholders becomes M.D. Between 
shares (March 1985) board. August 1985 
and August 
Chairman retires and is replaced 1986 
(1985) 
In May 1986 the joint major Chairman retires and is replaced (Feb 
shareholders 1986) 
sell 24.9% of issued capital to a 
company which in November 1986 Two directors of other major 
becomes the major shareholder shareholder appointed to board (June 
when it acquires an additional 15% 1986) 
of issued capital, 
making them the largest 
shareholder. (November 1986) 
The aforementioned company 
increases their holding to 54% (Jan 
1987) 
Appendix 5el 
SAMPLES OF FAILED 
AND NON .. FAILED COMPANIES 
FAILURES (16 COMPANIES)'" SURVIVORS (31 COMPANIES) 
ASTEC (-1.82) Arthur Barnett 
Andas Group Ltd (-3.00) Brierley Investments Ltd 
Angus (-2.04) Brother Industries 
Autocrat Sanyo Holdings (N.z.) Ltd (-12.94) Carter Holt Harvey 
Baillie Farmers Motors Ltd (-0.19) Canterbury Roller Flour 
Cook's New Zealand Wine Co. Ltd (-1.10) Colonial Motor 
DIC Stores Ltd (0.13) Donaghy's 
ICI New Zealand Ltd (-0.21) Ernest Adams 
John Edmonds Holdings Ltd (-0.18) EBOS 
Leyland Investment Co. Ltd (-66.60) Fisher and Paykel 
M. O'Brien and Co. Ltd (-0040) Fletcher Challenge Ltd 
Montana Wines Ltd (-0.36) FERNZ 
RW Saunders Ltd (-1.19) Firestone 
Southland Frozen Meat Ltd (-0042) Hallensteins 
Selby Shoe Co. Ltd (0.14) Independent Newspapers 
Waitaki N.z.R. Ltd (-0.67) Kingsgate 
Magnum 
Mair Astley 
Milburn 
New Zealand Light Leathers 
New Zealand Refining 
Nuplex Industries 
PDL 
Reid Farmers 
Steel and Tube 
Sanford 
Smiths City 
TAG 
Wilson and Horton 
Wilson Neill 
Waste Management 
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'" .. Z-scores are m brackets. Followmg AddIson and HamIlton (1988) a Z-score of 0.15 or less sIgmfies 
distress. 
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Appendix 5192 
CORPORATE FAILURE DATA 
Note: 
Variable Explanation 
FAIL Whether or not the company failed during 1985-90 
SIZE Firm size 
IC Industrial concentration 
LEV Leverage 
A Very low diversity 
B Related diversified 
C Unrelated diversified 
D Very high diversity 
F Functional structure 
H Holding company structure 
D Divisional strategy 
FIT Strategy-structure fit 
OWN Percentage of issued voting capital held by maior shareholder 
N Board size 
N OUT Number of outsiders on board 
POUT Proportion of outsiders on board 
MAJ Maiority of board are outsiders 
DUAL CEO Duality 
EC Executive chairperson 
II CEO duality-number of outsiders interaction 
12 CEO duality-proportion of outsiders interaction 
13 Executive chairperson-number of outsiders interaction 
14 Executive chairperson-proportion of outsiders interaction 
PROT Industry protection 
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COMPANY FAIL SIZE IC LEv A E C L F Ii LFI'l OWl'i 
~TEC 1 10.82 0.1122 0.58 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 51. 0 
Andas 1 10.60 0.1071 0.68 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 38.8 
Angus 1 9.75 0.1071 0.50 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 50.0 
Autocrat 1 10.62 0.1122 0.60 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 50.3 
Baillie 1 9.13 0.1098 0.42 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 54.6 
Cook's 1 10.37 0.2550 0.52 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 60.5 
DIC 1 10.73 0.1098 0.59 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 55.0 
ICI 1 12.16 0.1631 0.46 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 75.0 
J. Edmonds 1 10.00 0.1071 0.43 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 19.9 
Leyland 1 9.41 0.5083 0.05 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 35.6 
!i O'Brien 1 9.09 0.1666 0.52 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 53.7 
Montana 1 10.98 0.2550 0.35 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 43.8 
RW Saunders 1 8.91 0.1666 0.28 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 20.0 
SFM 1 12.15 0.2550 0.47 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 50.1 
Selby 1 8.50 0.1666 0.27 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 19.7 
Waitaki 1 12.97 0.2550 0.49 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 39.8 
A.Barnett 0 9.90 0.1098 0.35 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5.1 
BIL 0 14.84 0.5083 0.79 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5.8 
Brother 0 8.57 0.1071 0.52 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 28.9 
CHH 0 13.27 0.1893 0.56 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 23.5 
CRF 0 7.32 0.2550 0.42 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 7.1 
Col. Motor 0 11. 28 0.1098 0.45 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 27.0 
Donaghy's 0 10.88 0.1666 0.42 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 24.2 
E. Adams 0 8.87 0.2550 0.38 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 26.7 
EBOS 0 8.74 0.1071 0.40 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 23.4 
F&P 0 12.25 0.1122 0.45 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 26.5 
FCL 0 15.15 0.1071 0.59 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 13.8 
FERNZ 0 12.36 0.1631 0.54 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 21.1 
Firestone 0 10.87 0.1631 0.40 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 83.3 
HB 0 11.10 0.1098 0.35 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 13.7 
INL 0 11.33 0.3451 0.43 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 21.2 
Kingsgate 0 11.60 0.1349 0.53 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 91.8 
!Magnum 0 12.28 0.2550 0.45 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 16.2 
!Mair 0 11.65 0.1071 0.76 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 9.8 
!Milburn 0 11.39 0.3364 0.40 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 42.1 
IIiZLL 0 9.79 0.1666 0.81 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 50.0 
~Z Refin 0 14.41 0.1631 0.76 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 23.7 
~uplex 0 10.28 0.1631 0.51 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 65.0 
PDL 0 11.10 0.1122 0.55 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 60.7 
Reid 0 10.31 0.1071 0.59 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 27.7 
S&T 0 12.05 0.1122 0.45 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 24.7 
Sanford 0 10.77 0.2550 0.49 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 17.6 
Smiths city 0 10.84 0.1098 0.65 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 16.4 
TAG 0 8.37 0.1071 0.57 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 60.4 
WV. Horton 0 11.62 0.3451 0.35 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 13.9 
WV. Neill 0 10.49 0.1098 0.56 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 32.3 
WV. Mngt 0 9.32 0.1122 0.38 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 71.2 
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COMPANY 1:1. N OU'! P OU,! MAl! DUAL EC I1 IL! I3 I4 PRO'! 
iASTEC 7 6 0.86 1 0 0 6 0.86 6 0.86 28 
lAndas 7 6 0.86 1 0 0 6 0.86 6 0.86 0 
Angus 9 8 0.89 1 0 0 8 0.89 8 0.89 0 
Autocrat 9 5 0.56 1 0 0 5 0.56 5 0.56 28 
Baillie 6 5 0.83 1 0 0 5 0.83 5 0.83 0 
Cook's 6 5 0.83 1 0 0 5 0.83 5 0.83 28 
DIC 7 7 1.00 1 0 0 7 1.00 7 1. 00 0 
ICI 6 4 0.67 1 0 0 4 0.67 4 0.67 8 
J. Edmonds 6 4 0.67 1 0 0 4 0.67 4 0.67 0 
Leyland 4 3 0.75 1 1 1 6 1. 50 6 1. 50 0 
M O'Brien 5 5 1. 00 1 0 0 5 1. 00 5 1.00 104 
W-rontana 10 8 0.80 1 0 0 8 0.80 8 0.80 28 
RW Saunders 7 6 0.86 1 0 0 6 0.86 6 0.86 104 
SFM 12 11 0.92 1 0 0 11 0.92 11 0.92 7 
Selby 6 5 0.83 1 0 0 5 0.83 5 0.83 104 
Waitaki 10 7 0.70 1 0 0 7 0.70 7 0.70 7 
A.Barnett 8 4 0.50 0 0 0 4 0.50 4 0.50 0 
BIL 8 1 0.13 0 0 1 1 0.13 2 0.25 0 
Brother 6 5 0.83 1 0 0 5 0.83 5 0.83 0 
CHH 8 6 0.75 1 0 1 6 0.75 12 1. 50 14 
CRF 4 4 1. 00 1 0 0 4 1. 00 4 1. 00 7 
Col. Motor 9 5 0.56 1 0 0 5 0.56 5 0.56 0 
Donaghy's 7 6 0.86 1 0 0 6 0.86 6 0.86 38 
E. Adams 6 3 0.50 0 1 1 6 1.00 6 1. 00 7 
EBOS 8 5 0.63 1 0 0 5 0.63 5 0.63 0 
F&P 9 5 0.56 1 0 0 5 0.56 5 0.56 28 
FCL 14 6 0.43 0 1 1 12 0.86 12 0.86 0 
FERNZ 10 9 0.90 1 0 0 9 0.90 9 0.90 8 
Firestone 7 4 0.57 1 1 1 8 1.14 8 1.14 22 
HB 8 4 0.50 0 0 0 4 0.50 4 0.50 0 
INL 9 6 0.67 1 0 0 6 0.67 6 0.67 11 
Kingsgate 7 5 0.71 1 1 1 10 1. 43 10 1.43 0 
[:'!agnum 7 6 0.86 1 0 0 6 0.86 6 0.86 28 
tMair 10 5 0.50 0 0 0 5 0.50 5 0.50 0 
W-rilburn 9 8 0.89 1 0 0 8 0.89 8 0.89 12 
INZLL 10 10 1.00 1 0 0 10 1. 00 10 1. 00 38 
INz Refin 11 11 1. 00 1 0 0 11 1. 00 11 1. 00 22 
lNuplex 10 9 0.90 1 0 0 9 0.90 9 0.90 8 
PDL 6 2 0.33 0 0 1 2 0.33 4 0.67 28 
Reid 11 9 0.82 1 0 0 9 0.82 9 0.82 0 
S&T 9 6 0.67 1 0 0 6 0.67 6 0.67 28 
Sanford 7 5 0.71 1 0 0 5 0.71 5 0.71 7 
Smiths City 5 1 0.20 0 0 0 1 0.20 1 0.20 0 
TAG 5 5 1. 00 1 0 0 5 1.00 5 1. 00 0 
Krv. Horton 10 5 0.50 0 0 0 5 0.50 5 0.50 11 
ilAL· Neill 7 4 0.57 1 0 0 4 0.57 4 0.57 0 
ilAL· Mngt 8 5 0.63 1 0 0 5 0.63 5 0.63 0 
Appendix 6@1 
BOARD STRUCTURE DATA, 1980 
Key: 
N 
N_OUT 
%_OUT 
M_OUT 
Dual 
EC 
Board size 
Number of outsiders 
Percentage of outsiders 
Majority of outsiders 
CEO duality 
Executive chairperson 
COMPANY N N_OUT 
Arnold & Wright 6 2 
Arthur Barnett 7 3 
Ashby Bergh 6 6 
Arthur Ellis 7 4 
ABACUS 7 6 
Associated British Cables 8 7 
Allex Harvey Inds 9 8 
AM Bisley & Co. 6 3 
ASTEC 7 6 
Ajax 7 4 
Auckland Gas 7 5 
Alcan 5 4 
Allflex 8 5 
Alliance 9 8 
Andas 6 5 
Angus 5 4 
Apparel 5 3 
Atlas 5 4 
Auroa 6 4 
Autocrat 4 3 
Brierley Investments 7 2 
Baillie 7 5 
Broadway 6 4 
Cory-Wright Salmon 7 5 
City Realties 5 5 
Carter Holt Harvey 7 4 
Consolidated Metal 6 6 
Cable Price Downer 10 7 
Canterbury Roller Flour 4 4 
Capital City Radio 8 7 
Ceramco 11 5 
Christchurch Press 7 7 
Colonial Motor 9 6 
Command 9 7 
Cook's 8 7 
P_OUT ~OUT DUAL 
33.33 0 1 
42.86 0 0 
100.00 1 0 
57.14 1 0 
85.71 1 0 
87.50 1 0 
88.89 1 0 
50.00 0 0 
85.71 1 0 
57.14 1 0 
71. 43 1 0 
80.00 1 0 
62.50 1 1 
88.89 1 0 
83.33 1 0 
80.00 1 1 
60.00 1 0 
80.00 1 0 
66.67 1 1 
75.00 1 1 
28.57 0 1 
71. 43 1 0 
66.67 1 0 
71. 43 1 0 
100.00 1 0 
57.14 1 0 
100.00 1 0 
70.00 1 1 
100.00 1 0 
87.50 1 0 
45.45 0 0 
100.00 1 0 
66.67 1 0 
77.78 1 0 
87.50 1 0 
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EC 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Crown 9 8 88.89 1 1 1 
Dingwall and Paulger 6 2 33.33 0 0 0 
Dominion Breweries 8 6 75.00 1 1 1 
DIC 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Donaghy's 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Ernest Adams 5 2 40.00 0 1 1 
EBOS 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
EMCO 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
Endeavour 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Fisher and Paykel 9 5 55.56 1 0 0 
Fletcher Challenge 11 6 54.55 1 0 0 
FERNZ 11 10 90.91 1 0 0 
Farmers Trading Co. 8 8 100.00 1 0 0 
Feltex 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Firestone 6 2 33.33 0 1 1 
Golden Bay Cement 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Goodman 7 3 42.86 0 1 1 
Grosvenor 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Henry Berry 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
HB 8 3 37.50 0 0 0 
Hauraki 7 5 71. 43 1 0 0 
Hume 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Hutton's 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Independent Broadcasting 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
ICI 8 5 62.50 1 1 1 
Independent Newspapers Ltd 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Ivon Watkins Dow 10 9 90.00 1 0 0 
John Burns & Co. 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
John Edmonds 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
James Smith 8 6 75.00 1 1 1 
John Webster & Co. 7 4 57.14 1 1 1 
James Hardie Impey 6 4 66.67 1 1 1 
Kingsgate 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
LD Nathan 10 9 90.00 1 0 0 
. Lane Walker Rudkin 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
Lane's 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Leyland 5 4 80.00 1 1 1 
Lion 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Lusteroid 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
M O'Brien 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Morrison PIM 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Magnum 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Mair Astley 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
MantheI 4 1 25.00 0 1 1 
McAlpine 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
MCKechnie 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Milburn 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Montana 11 9 81.82 1 0 0 
Motor Holdings 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
Mount Cook 10 9 90.00 1 0 0 
NZ News 11 8 72.73 1 0 0 
NZ Refining 11 11 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ Steel 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
NZ Forest Products 12 9 75.00 1 0 0 
NZ Industrial Gases 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
NZ Light Leathers 10 10 100.00 1 0 0 
Neil 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Newman's 11 9 81.82 1 0 0 
Nuhaka 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
Nuplex 8 6 75.00 1 1 1 
Optical Holdings Ltd 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Otago Press & Produce 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
PDL 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
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Progressive 8 3 37.50 0 0 0 
Radio Avon 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Radio Otago 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
RW Hellaby 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
RW Saunders 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Regina 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Reid 10 8 80.00 1 0 0 
Steel and Tube 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Soutland Frozen Meat 11 10 90.91 1 0 0 
Salmond 7 5 71. 43 1 1 1 
Sanford 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
Selby 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Skellerup 7 0 0.00 0 0 1 
Smith-Biolab 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Smiths City 6 4 66.67 1 1 1 
Trans Ashburton 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
TAG 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Transport North Canterbury 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Taylor's 6 4 66.67 1 1 1 
UEB 8 4 50.00 0 0 0 
Wilkins & Davies 7 5 71. 43 1 0 0 
Wilson & Horton 9 6 66.67 1 0 0 
Wilson Neill 6 3 50.00 0 0 0 
Waste Mngt 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Waitaki 9 7 77.78 1 0 0 
Wattie 11 9 81.82 1 0 0 
Welgas 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Wiljeff 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Wins tone 10 8 80.00 1 0 0 
Wormald 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Yates 10 5 50.00 0 0 0 
265 
Appendix 6.2 
BOARD STRUCTURE DATA, 1985 
COMPANY N N_OUT P_OUT M_OUT DUAL EC 
Arnold & Wright 8 4 50.00 0 1 1 
Arthur Barnett 8 4 50.00 0 0 0 
Ashby Bergh 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Arthur Ellis 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
ABACUS 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
Assocate British Cables 9 7 77.78 1 0 0 
Alex Harvey Industries 10 9 90.00 1 0 0 
AM Bisley 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
ASTEC 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Ajax 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Auckland Gas 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Alcan 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
All flex 8 7 87.50 1 1 1 
Alliance 10 8 80.00 1 0 0 
Andas 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Angus 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Apparel 9 3 33.33 0 1 1 
Atlas 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Auroa 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Autocrat 9 5 55.56 1 0 0 
Brierley Investments 8 1 12.50 0 0 1 
Baillie 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Broadway 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Cory-Wright & Salmon 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
City Realties 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Carter Holt Harvey 8 6 75.00 1 0 1 
Corporate Investments Ltd 5 2 40.00 0 1 1 
Consolidated Metal Inds 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Cable Price Downer 10 9 90.00 1 1 1 
Canterbury Roller Flour 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Capital City Radio 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Carborundum 6 3 50.00 0 0 0 
Cardrona 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Cavalier 10 5 50.00 0 0 0 
Ceramco 11 6 54.55 1 0 0 
Christchurch Press 8 8 100.00 1 0 0 
Colonial Motor 9 5 55.56 1 0 0 
Command 10 7 70.00 1 0 0 
Cook's 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Crown 14 10 71.43 1 0 0 
Dingwall & Paulger 6 3 50.00 0 0 0 
Dominion Breweries 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
DIC 7 7 100.00 1 0 0 
Donaghy's 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Ernest Adams 6 3 50.00 0 1 1 
EBOS 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
EMCO 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Endeavour 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Fisher and Paykel 9 5 55.56 1 0 0 
Fletcher Challenge 14 6 42.86 0 1 1 
FERNZ 10 9 90.00 1 0 0 
Farmers Trading Co. 7 7 100.00 1 0 0 
Feltex 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Firestone 7 4 57.14 1 1 1 
Foveaux 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Golden Bay Cement 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
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General Properties 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Goodman 11 7 63.64 1 0 0 
Grocorp 8 6 75.00 1 1 1 
Grosvenor 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Henry Berry 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
Hallensteins 8 4 50.00 0 0 0 
Hauraki 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Hume 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Hutton's 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Independent Broadcasting 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
ICI 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Independent Newspapers 9 6 66.67 1 0 0 
Ivon Watkins Dow 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
John Burns & Co. 5 4 80.00 1 1 1 
John Edmonds 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
James Smith 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
John Webster & Co. 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
James Hardie Impey 12 9 75.00 1 0 0 
Kingsgate 7 5 71.43 1 1 1 
LD Nathan 10 8 80.00 1 0 0 
Lane Walker Rudkin 7 4 57.14 1 0 0 
Lane's 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Leyland 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
Lion 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Lusteroid 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
M O'Brien 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Morrison PIM 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Magnum 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Mair Astley 10 5 50.00 0 0 0 
Manthel 4 1 25.00 0 0 1 
McAlpine 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
MCKechnie 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Milburn 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Montana 10 8 80.00 1 0 0 
Motor Holdings 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
Mount Cook 8 8 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ News 10 9 90.00 1 0 0 
NZ Refining 11 11 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ Salmon 6 3 50.00 0 0 0 
NZ Steel 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
NZ Forest Products 12 8 66.67 1 0 0 
NZ Industrial Gases 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
NZ Light Leathers 10 10 100.00 1 0 0 
Neil 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Newman's 9 7 77.78 1 0 0 
Normedia 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
Nuhaka 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Nuplex 10 9 90.00 1 0 0 
Optical Holdings Ltd 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Otago Press and Produce 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
opio 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Pacer Kerridge 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
PDL 6 2 33.33 0 1 1 
Parapine 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Progressive 9 6 66.67 1 0 0 
Radio Avon 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
Radio Otago 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Radio Pacific 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Robt. Jones Investments 5 4 80.00 1 1 1 
RW Hellaby 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
RW Saunders 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Regina 6 3 50.00 0 0 1 
Reid 11 9 81.82 1 0 0 
Steel and Tube 9 6 66.67 1 0 0 
Southland Frozen Meat 12 11 91.67 1 0 0 
Salmond 6 5 83.33 1 1 1 
Sanford 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
Selby 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Skellerup 7 3 42.86 0 0 1 
Smith-Biolab 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
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Smiths City 5 1 20.00 0 0 0 
Trans Ashburton 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
TAG 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
TNC 9 9 100.00 1 0 0 
Taylor's 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Transmark 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Triumph 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
UEB 9 6 66.67 1 0 0 
Venture Pacific 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Wilkins & Davies 10 7 70.00 1 0 0 
Wilson Horton 10 5 50.00 0 0 0 
Wilson Neill 7 4 57.14 1 0 0 
Waste Management 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
Waikato Stud 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
waitaki 10 7 70.00 1 0 0 
Wattie 12 10 83.33 1 0 0 
Welgas 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
Wiljeff 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Wins tone 11 7 63.64 1 0 0 
Wormald 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
XS 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
Yates 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
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Appendix 683 
BOARD STRUCTURE DATA, 1987 
COMPANY N N_OUT P_OUT M_OUT DUAL EC 
Arthur Barnett Properties 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
Arthur Barnett 7 4 57.14 1 0 0 
Associated British Cables 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
Acadia 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Aden 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Advantage 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Agland 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Agricola 6 3 50.00 0 0 0 
Aahead 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Ajax 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Akron 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Allegra 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Allflex 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
American. Strategic Inv'ts 8 8 100.00 1 0 0 
Amuri 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Angora 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Angus 11 10 90.91 1 0 0 
Anzon 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Apparel 9 6 66.67 1 0 0 
Apple 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Arahi 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Ararimu 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Areco 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
Argus 9 3 33.33 0 0 0 
Arpac 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Ascent 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Ascot 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Asia Pacific Trading 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Aurora 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Aust. res 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
Australis 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Autocrat 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
AW NZ Investments 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Baillie 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Bancorp 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Barclays 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Baycorp 5 2 40.00 0 1 1 
Beta 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Bexley 5 2 40.00 0 1 1 
Brierley Investments Ltd 10 0 0.00 0 0 1 
Blandford 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
Bank of New Zealand 7 7 100.00 1 0 0 
BNZ Finance 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Bowen 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
Bridgecorp 8 6 75.00 1 0 1 
Broadway 6 3 50.00 0 0 0 
Capital 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Caprana 4 2 50.00 0 0 0 
Carborundum 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Cardrona 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Carr 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Cashcorp 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Cashmere 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Cavalier 9 4 44.44 0 0 0 
CCL 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
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Ceramco 9 7 77.78 1 0 0 
Cerebos 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Ceres 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Chambard 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Charter 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Chase 8 0 0.00 0 1 1 
Carter Holt Harvey 8 6 75.00 1 1 1 
Corporate Investments Ltd 6 2 33.33 0 1 1 
City 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Clearwood 6 5 83.33 1 1 1 
Colonial 9 6 66.67 1 0 0 
Commercial 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
Commodore 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Como 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Compass 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Coronet Equities 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Coronet fe 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Coronet UK 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Countrywide 11 10 90.91 1 0 0 
Cable Price Downer 12 9 75.00 1 0 0 
Canterbury Roller Flour 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Crowe 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Crown 10 7 70.00 1 0 0 
Cruise 5 1 20.00 0 0 0 
Cue 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
Cory-Wright Salmon 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Damba 6 3 50.00 0 1 1 
De red 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Donaghy's 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Dunbar 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Ernest Adams 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
Eastern Equities 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Ebos 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Electrocorp 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Energycorp 5 0 0.00 0 1 1 
Environ 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Enzed 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Epicorp 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Equiticorp 11 5 45.45 0 0 0 
Euro nat 5 2 40.00 0 1 1 
Euro pac 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Excell 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Fisher & Paykel 11 6 54.55 1 0 0 
F&R 5 2 40.00 0 0 0 
Fletcher Challenge Ltd 15 9 60.00 1 0 0 
Fay Richwhite & Co. 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Feltex 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Fernz 11 9 81.82 1 0 0 
Firestone 6 4 66.67 1 1 1 
First city 6 5 83.33 1 1 1 
Fortuna 6 3 50.00 0 0 0 
Foveuax 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Fullers 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Gaxe 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
General 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Genestock 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Goodman Fielder Watties 11 6 54.55 1 0 0 
Gold Resources 3 1 33.33 0 1 1 
Goldcorp 5 2 40.00 0 0 0 
Grocorp 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Hawkes Bay Transport 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Hamelyn 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Harcourt 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Hallensteins 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
Helicopter 5 2 40.00 0 0 0 
Heritage 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
Holdcorp 6 1 16.67 0 1 1 
Horner 3 1 33.33 0 0 0 
Hotel 8 6 75.00 1 1 1 
Independent Broadcasting 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
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ICI 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Independent Newspapers 11 8 72.73 1 0 0 
Interpac 9 7 77.78 1 0 0 
Invesco 7 3 42.86 0 1 1 
Investment Finance 7 3 42.86 0 0 0 
Ivon Watkins Dow 8 8 100.00 1 0 0 
Jarden Europe 5 4 80.00 1 1 1 
J.Edmond 7 7 100.00 1 0 0 
J.Smith 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Jarden & Co 7 4 57.14 1 0 0 
Judge 7 3 42.86 0 0 0 
Kaurex 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Kearns 7 7 100.00 1 0 0 
Kenwood 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Kidd 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Kingsgate 8 6 75.00 1 1 1 
Kiwi Bear 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Kiwi Gold 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
Kiwi Oil 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Kupe 7 7 100.00 1 0 0 
L&M 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Lakeland 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
Landmark 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Lanes 8 4 50.00 0 0 0 
Laser 5 3 60.00 1 1 1 
Laurenson 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
LD Nathan 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Leisureland 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
Leverage 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Leyland 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Leyland Growth 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Lion 9 7 77.78 1 0 0 
London 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Lane Walker Rudkin 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
Michael Hill 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
M.hold 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
Madison 7 3 42.86 0 1 1 
Magnum 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Main 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Mainstay 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Mainzeal 3 0 0.00 0 1 1 
Mair 11 6 54.55 1 0 0 
Markham 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Max 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Maxwell 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Mayfair 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Mckechnie 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Metro 7 2 28.57 0 0 0 
Milburn 9 7 77.78 1 0 0 
Mineral 6 4 66.67 1 1 1 
Miniskips 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Mirage 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Morton 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Mount Cook 7 6 85.71 1 1 1 
Mutual 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Mainzeal Properties 3 2 66.67 1 1 1 
National Bloodstock 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
National Pacific 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Newmans 12 10 83.33 1 0 0 
Normedia 7 7 100.00 1 0 0 
Nuhaka 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Nuplex 10 8 80.00 1 0 0 
NZ Equities 5 2 40.00 0 0 0 
NZ Gold 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ News 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
NZ Petroleum 8 8 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ Refining 11 11 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ Salmon 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
NZ Ski 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
NZ Steel 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
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NZ Forest Products 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
NZI 12 8 66.67 1 0 0 
NZ Light Leathers 10 10 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ Oil and Gas 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
Optical Holdings Ltd 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
oil 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Omni 3 1 33.33 0 1 1 
opio 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Otago 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Owens 10 9 90.00 1 0 0 
Perry Dines 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Pacer 8 7 87.50 1 1 1 
Pacific As 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
Pacific Sun 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
Paladin 3 2 66.67 1 1 1 
Panz 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Paynter 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
PDL 6 2 33.33 0 1 1 
Petroleum 11 10 90.91 1 0 0 
Pharmol 7 7 100.00 1 0 0 
Platinum 5 4 80.00 1 1 1 
Powercorp 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Premiur 5 4 80.00 1 1 1 
Primacq 5 1 20.00 0 0 0 
Prime site 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Prime west 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
Prodigal 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Producorp 7 3 42.86 0 0 0 
Progressive 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Prorada 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Prudential 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
Qtron 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Radio Avon 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Radio. Otago 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Radio. Pacific 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Ra Ora 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Rada 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Rank 3 1 33.33 0 0 0 
. Regal 6 3 50.00 0 0 0 
Reid 11 10 90.91 1 0 0 
Ren Props 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Renouf 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Restech 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Richmond 7 3 42.86 0 0 0 
RJI 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
RW Saunders 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Steel & Tube 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
Southern Petroleum 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
Sanford 7 3 42.86 0 0 0 
Scenic 3 2 66.67 1 1 1 
Sigma 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Skeggs 3 0 0.00 0 1 1 
Skms 3 2 66.67 1 1 1 
Smart 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Ssmiths 8 3 37.50 0 1 1 
Ssomex 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Sound 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
South 7 2 28.57 0 1 1 
Sspectrum 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
ssmith 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
St Martins 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Stars 7 4 57.14 1 1 1 
Strada Ent 2 1 50.00 0 0 0 
Strata 2 1 50.00 0 0 0 
Strategic C 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Strathmore 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
Striker 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
Summit 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Tag 5 4 80.00 1 1 1 
Taylors 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
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Technicorp 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Terrace 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Theseus 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
Transequity 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Transmark 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Transpac 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Triple M 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Triumph 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Troy 6 3 50.00 0 1 1 
Tulwest 4 2 50.00 0 0 0 
UBIX 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Unigroup 8 4 50.00 0 0 0 
United Resource Inv't 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
Venture Pacific 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Venturecorp 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Waikato stud 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Wilkins & Davis 11 6 54.55 1 0 0 
Wilson.Horton 9 4 44.44 0 0 0 
Wilson.Neil 11 8 72.73 1 0 0 
Waitaki 11 8 72.73 1 0 0 
Waste 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Welgas 11 10 90.91 1 0 0 
Wellesley 5 2 40.00 0 1 1 
Woodcorp 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
Woodstock 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Wormald 8 6 75.00 1 1 1 
XS 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
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Appendix 6.4 
BOARD STRUCTURE DATA, 1990 
COMPANY N N_OUT P_OUT M_OUT DUAL EC 
Agland 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Agricola 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Ahead 3 1 33.33 0 0 0 
Air New Zealand 9 9 100.00 1 0 0 
Amuri 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Aorangi 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Apparel 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Apple feilds 7 4 57.14 1 0 0 
Arahi 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
Ararimu 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Arthur Barnett 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Arthur Barnett Properties 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Ascott 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Asian 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Australis 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
Bank of New Zealand 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
BNZ Finance 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Baycorp 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Blandford 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Bridgecorp 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Brierley Investments Ltd 9 3 33.33 0 0 1 
Broadway 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Canterbury Roller Flour 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Carborundum 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Cardrona 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Carr 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Carter Holt Harvey 8 5 62.50 1 1 1 
Cavalier 8 3 37.50 0 0 0 
Ceramco 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Chambard 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
City realties 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Colonial Motor 9 8 88.89 1 1 1 
Consolo hard 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
Corporate Investments Ltd 8 3 37.50 0 1 1 
Countrywide 9 7 77.78 1 0 0 
Creditcorp 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Crowe 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
Cue 3 1 33.33 0 1 1 
Dunbar Sloane 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Darnba 6 4 66.67 1 1 1 
Donaghy's 9 6 66.67 1 0 0 
Eastern equities 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
EBOS 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Elders 11 10 90.91 1 1 1 
Ernest Adams 7 4 57.14 1 0 0 
Euro national 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
FERNZ 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
Fay Richwhite & Co. 7 3 42.86 0 0 0 
Firestone 5 3 60.00 1 1 1 
Fisher and Paykel 8 5 62.50 1 0 0 
Fletcher Challenge 12 8 66.67 1 0 0 
Fortex 10 6 60.00 1 0 0 
Foveaux 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Further 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
General Props 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Goodman Fielder Wattie 12 7 58.33 1 0 0 
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Girvan 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Gold 3 0 0.00 0 1 1 
Grocorp 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Hallensteins 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Helicopter 6 2 33.33 0 0 0 
Heritage 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
IEP 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Independent Newspapers Ltd 12 10 83.33 1 0 0 
Jarden 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
Kenwood 5 2 40.00 0 0 0 
Kingsgate 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Kiwi Gold 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Kiwi International 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Kupe 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Lasercorp 5 3 60.00 1 1 1 
Lectrica 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
Leisure Lea 3 1 33.33 0 0 0 
Lion 11 6 54.55 1 0 0 
London Pacific 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Macraes 4 2 50.00 0 0 0 
Magnum 9 6 66.67 1 0 0 
Mainzeal 6 2 33.33 0 1 1 
Mair Astley 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Max Marine 3 2 66.67 1 1 1 
Max Resource 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
McConnel 7 4 57.14 1 0 0 
Michael Hill 5 2 40.00 0 0 1 
Milburn 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Mineral 6 4 66.67 1 1 1 
Mount Cook 8 8 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ Duty Free 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ Refin 11 11 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ Salmon 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
NZ Light Leathers 7 7 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ Petroleum 10 10 100.00 1 0 0 
Normedia 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Nuhaka 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Nuplex 10 9 90.00 1 0 0 
. NZ oil and Gas 5 3 60.00 1 1 1 
Otago Press and Produce 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
opio 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Owens 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
PDL 6 2 33.33 0 1 1 
Pacer Kerridge 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
Panz 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Parapine 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Paynter 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
Perry Dines 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Pharmol 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Platinum 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
Premiur 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Property Link 7 7 100.00 1 0 0 
RJI 7 1 14.29 0 1 1 
Radio otago 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Radio Pacific 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Rank 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Regal 6 2 33.33 0 0 0 
Reid 10 9 90.00 1 0 0 
Renouf corp 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Renouf props 3 1 33.33 0 0 0 
Restech 4 0 0.00 0 0 1 
Sanford 7 3 42.86 0 0 0 
Scenic 3 2 66.67 1 1 1 
Shortland 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Smiths City 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Spectrum 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Ssb 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Steel and Tube 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Stevens kms 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Sthn petrol 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
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Strada 2 1 50.00 0 0 0 
Strathmore 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
Summit 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
TAG 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
TV3 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
Taylor's 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Transmark 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Triumph 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
U-bix 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
United Resources Inv't Hlgs 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
Venture Pacific 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Waikato Stud 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Waste Management 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Wilson Horton 9 4 44.44 0 0 0 
Wilson Neill 8 4 50.00 0 0 0 
Woodcorp 4 2 50.00 0 0 0 
XS 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
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Appendix 6.5 
BOARD STRUCTURE DATA, 1993 
COMPANY N N_OUT P_OUT M_OUT DUAL EC 
Arthur Barnett 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Advantage 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
Agland 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Air nz 11 10 90.91 1 0 0 
Amuri 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Apple 6 3 50.00 0 0 0 
Ascot 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Asian props 5 2 40.00 0 1 1 
Baycorp 4 2 50.00 0 0 0 
Best 5 3 60.00 1 1 1 
Brierley Investments 12 5 41.67 0 0 0 
BNZ Finance 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Broadway 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Carr 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Cavalier 8 3 37.50 0 0 0 
CDL 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Cedenco 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Ceramco 9 6 66.67 1 0 0 
Carter Holt Harvey 9 7 77.78 1 0 0 
Corporate Investments Ltd 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Colonial 8 8 100.00 1 0 0 
Creditcorp 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Canterbury Roller Flour 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Cue 3 2 66.67 1 1 1 
Cultus 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Dunbar Sloane 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Damba 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
DB 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Defiance 5 0 0.00 0 1 1 
Designer 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Donaghys 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
Dorchester 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Ernest Adams 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
Energy Direct 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Eastern Equities 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
Ebos 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Enerco 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Evergreen 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Fisher & Paykel 9 5 55.56 1 0 0 
Fay Richwhite 8 3 37.50 0 0 0 
Fletcher Challenge Ltd 13 9 69.23 1 0 0 
Fernz 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
Firestone 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
Fortex 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Fruitfed 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Gold resources 3 3 100.00 1 0 0 
Goodman 11 8 72.73 1 0 0 
GPG 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
Grocorp 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Gulf 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Hallensteins 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Helicopter 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Heritage 4 2 50.00 0 0 1 
Huttons 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Independent Newspapers 11 9 81. 82 1 0 0 
Jarden asia 7 3 42.86 0 0 0 
Jarden china 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
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Kingsgate 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Kiwi gold 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
Kiwi property 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Kiwi intl 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Kupe 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Lectrica 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Lion nathan 11 8 72.73 1 0 0 
Lane Walker Rudkin 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Michael Hill 5 2 40.00 0 1 1 
Macraes 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Mainzeal 7 4 57.14 1 0 1 
Mair Astley 6 5 83.33 1 1 1 
Mannor Inns 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
Mastertrade 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
Max res 3 1 33.33 0 0 1 
McConnell 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Milburn 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Mineral Resources 5 4 80.00 1 1 1 
Mr Chips 4 3 75.00 1 0 0 
Mt Cavendish 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
Noel Leeming 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Northland Port 7 7 100.00 1 0 0 
Natural Gas 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
Nuhaka 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Nuplex 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
NZ Duty Free 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
NZ Petroleum 7 7 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ Refining 11 11 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ Rural Properties 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
NZ Salmon 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
NZ Light Leathers 6 6 100.00 1 0 0 
New Zealand oil and Gas 4 2 50.00 0 1 1 
opio 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Owens 11 10 90.91 1 0 0 
Power Beat 5 3 60.00 1 0 0 
Ports of Auckland 8 8 100.00 1 0 0 
Property Link 7 7 100.00 1 0 0 
Ports of Tauranga 9 9 100.00 1 0 0 
Perry Dines 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Parapine 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Paynter 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
PDL 6 2 33.33 0 1 1 
Progressive 8 7 87.50 1 0 0 
Radio Otago 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Radio Pacific 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Regal 5 2 40.00 0 0 0 
Reid 9 8 88.89 1 0 0 
Restech 3 1 33.33 0 0 0 
Robt. Jones Investments 7 4 57.14 1 0 0 
Steel & Tube 7 5 71.43 1 0 0 
Sanford 6 3 50.00 0 0 0 
Shortland 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Shotover 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
Skellerup 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Spectrum 4 4 100.00 1 0 0 
Ssb 8 6 75.00 1 0 0 
Stevens kms 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Sthn petrol 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Strada 2 1 50.00 0 0 0 
Strathmore 3 2 66.67 1 1 1 
Summit 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Tag 6 4 66.67 1 1 1 
Tasman Agriculture 6 4 66.67 1 0 0 
Taylors 7 6 85.71 1 0 0 
Telecom 10 9 90.00 1 0 0 
Transmark 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Triumph 3 2 66.67 1 0 0 
U-bix 5 4 80.00 1 0 0 
URIH 4 3 75.00 1 1 1 
Williams & Kettle 10 8 80.00 1 0 0 
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Wilson Horton 8 4 50.00 0 0 0 
Wilson Neill 4 2 50.00 0 0 0 
Wairarapa 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Wang 5 5 100.00 1 0 0 
Waste Management 6 5 83.33 1 0 0 
Whitcoulls 5 2 40.00 0 1 1 
Appendix 7.1 
CORPORATE 
AND FOREIGN CONTROL 
CLASSIFICATIONS, 1985 
Explanatory note: 
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This appendix and the two appendices that follow provide the corporate control 
classifications of New Zealand public listed companies. These classifications follow 
Fogelberg's (1980) classification scheme. The entry for each company contains the 
following information: 
COMPANY NAME 
Identity of major shareholder(s) X F 
[representative(s) of major shareholder(s) on board] 
where: 
X denotes the percentage of issued voting capital held by the major shareholder 
F denotes that the company is foreign controlled. In the event that a company is not 
. foreign controlled then the letter F is not present in this column. 
ALCAN NZ LTD 
A1can Aluminium Ltd 
MAJORITY CONTROLLED 
(54 COMPANIES) 
ALEX HARVEY INDUSTRIES LTD 
ACI New Zealand Ltd 
AJAX MCPHERSON LTD 
McPherson's (NZ) Ltd 
AMBISLEY & CO. LTD 
Jedi Corporation Ltd 
ANGUS GROUP 
69.2 F 
55.6 
50.3 F 
80.0 
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Angus Corporation Ltd 50.0 
ASTEA TOLLEY ELECTRIC COMPANY 
ASEA Electric (NZ) Ltd 51.0 F 
ASSOCIATED BRITISH CABLES LTD 
BICC pIc 58.5 F 
AURORA GROUP LTD 
Feltex NZ Ltd 54.0 
AUTOCRAT SANYO HOLDINGS (NZ) LTD 
Sanyo Electric Coy Ltd and 50.3 F 
associated interests 
BAILLIE FARMERS MOTORS LTD 
Brierley Investments Ltd 54.6 
CAPITAL CITY RADIO LTD 
Brierley Investments Ltd 51.0 
CHRISTCHURCH PRESS CO. LTD 
Pyne Gould Guiness Ltd 52.4 
COMMAND SERVICES CORPORATION LTD 
Pritchard Services Group Holdings 66.7 F 
PtyLtd 
COOKS NZ WINE CO. LTD. 
Brierley Investments Ltd 60.5 
CONSOLIDATED METAL 
Brierley Investments Ltd 81.0 
CORPORATE INVESTMENTS LTD 
Masfen and Wigglesworth interests 76.4 
CORYmWRIGHT AND SALMON LTD 
Tatra Investments Ltd 55.8 
DIC Stores Ltd 
Brieley Investments Ltd 55.0 
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DINGWALL & PAULGER 
Dingwall & Paulger families SO.S 
EMCO 
Steel and Tube Holdings Ltd 64.4 
FIRESTONE 
Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. 83.3 F 
GOLDEN BAY CEMENT CO. LTD 
Associated International Cement Ltd SS.2 F 
GOODMAN GROUP LTD 
Goodman Nominees Ltd and associated S1.0 
interests 
HAURAKI ENTERPRISES 
Brierley Investments Ltd S2.6 
HUME INDUSTRIES (NZ) LTD 
Hume Holdings (NZ) Ltd 77.7 F 
HUTTON'S 
Brierley Investments Ltd 7S.S 
ICINZLTD 
ICI Australia Ltd 7S.0 F 
INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING 
Independent Newspapers Ltd SO.6 
IVON WATKINS-DOW LTD 
Dow Chemical Company Ltd S1.0 F 
JAMES HARDEY IMPEY LTD 
Hardie Holdings (NZ) Ltd 71.8 F 
JOHN BURNS AND CO. LTD 
Acropolis Investments Ltd SO.7 
KINGS GATE INTERNATIONAL 
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lit Poh Investments Private Ltd 91.8 F 
LANE'S 
Brierley Investments Ltd 53.2 
MANTHEL HOLDINGS LTD 
MantheI family and associates 60.3 
MCALPINE INDUSTRIES LTD 
Rangitira Ltd 51.2 
MCKECHNIE BROTHERS (NZ) LTD 
McKechnie Bros Ltd, England 68.9 
MILBURN 
Holderbank Financiere Glaris Ltd 42.1 F 
M O'BRIEN AND CO. LTD 
Lane Walker Rudkin Industries Ltd 53.9 
MORRISON-PIMHOLDINGS LTD 
Brierley Investments Ltd 61.6 
NEIL 
Brierley Investments Ltd 98.0 
NZ INDUSTRIAL GASES LTD 
BOC Group pIc 61.4 F 
NZ LIGHT LEATHERS 
Amalgamated Products Ltd 50.0 
NUPLEX 
Monsanto Australia Ltd 65 F 
OHL 
Optical Holdings Ltd and Masfen, PH 50.02 
PDL 
Stewart family interests 60.7 
REGINA 
Charter Corporation Ltd 
SOUTHLAND FROZEN MEAT LTD 
Fletcher Challenge Ltd 
TAG PACIFIC 
Anthony Group Ltd 
TAYLORS 
Robertson, RD and Taylor, JS 
DD Robertson Investments and 
associates 
TRANS ASHBURTON LTD 
Brierley Investments Ltd 
WASTE MANAGEMENT 
Bowkett, HK; Jamieson, JA and Baigent, 
HK 
WATTlE INDUSTRIES LTD 
Goodman Group Ltd and NZ Forest 
Products Ltd 
WILLIAMSON JEFFERY LTD 
. Brierley Investments Ltd 
WORMOLD INTERNATIONAL NZ LTD 
W ormold International Ltd 
YATES CORPORATION LTD 
Equitycorp 
ABACUS 
MINORITY CONTROLLED 
(69 COMPANIES) 
Mellon Management Ltd 
[Borren, A; Strange, AW; McKenzie, GE] 
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58.6 
50.1 
60.4 F 
53.1 
53.5 
71.2 
50.4 
55.2 
60.0 F 
75.0 
44.4 
ALLFLEX 
McPhail, WC; Bisland, R; Garden, GJ 
[all directors] 
ANDAS GROUP LTD 
Brierley Investments Ltd 
[Thompson, C] 
APPAREL 
Polo Investments (1984) Ltd and 
associated interests 
ARNOLD AND WRIGHT LTD 
Zellcote Spray Co (1975) Ltd 
[Wise, PH] 
Arnold family 
[Arnold, LR; Arnold, SA] 
ARTHUR ELLIS HOLDINGS LTD 
Northern Feather International Ltd 
[Stapleton, PJ] 
ASHBY BERGH & CO. LTD 
John Edmond Holdings Ltd 
[Edmond, AM; Edmond, WLF] 
ATLAS 
Ceramco Corporation Ltd 
[Clark, TE; Bellew, WG] 
Bidwill and Gibbs interests 
[Bidwill, CR; Gibbs, AT] 
AUCKLAND GAS CO. LTD 
Welgas Holdings Ltd 
[Beyer, TJN; Revell, HW] 
BROADWAY 
Southbury Investments Ltd 
(Hubbard, AR; Simpson, TM; Mayne, JM) 
[Rolleston, HJD] 
CABLE PRICE DOWNER LTD 
Crown Corporation Ltd 
[Lough, NV; Steele, RW] 
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33.8 
38.8 
38.4 
31.7 
29.3 
32.9 F 
44.0 
39.5 
32.2 
24.9 
28.9 
20.0 
285 
CARBORNUDUM 
Carbo Holdings Ltd 18.9 
(Greenstreet, RA and Latham, CA) 
[Greenstreet, RA] 
CARDRONA 
Lee, JA 18.0 
Dueease, WE 19.9 
[both directors] 
CAVALIER 
Timpson, AC and Biel, GCW interests 34.4 
[both are directors] 
AMP Society 5.7 
CERAMCOLTD 
Kupe Petroleum NL 15.4 
[Grayburn, PW; Hamilton, GSA] 
CITY REALTIES 
National Insurance Co. 32.1 
ESt. John, DS] 
COLONIAL MOTOR 
Gibbons family and associates 27.0 
[FN, GH, JG, MH Gibbons] 
CROWN CORPORATION LTD 
Cable Price Downer Ltd 24.3 
[Lough, NV; Steele, RW] 
DOMINION BREWERIES LTD 
Brierley Investments Ltd 30.8 
[Brierley, RA; Hancox, BA] 
DONAGHY'S 
Kinnears Ltd (Aust) 24.2 F 
[Millar, RN] 
EBOS 
United N.Z. Nominees Ltd 23.4 
(Brierley Investments Ltd) 
[Martin, RT] 
ENDEA VOUR SERVICES CORPORATION LTD 
Plowman family and associates 34.6 
[Plowman, JH; Plowman, NH] 
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ERNEST ADAMS 
Adams family interests 26.7 
(from Directory of Shareholders 19/12/84) 
[HA and RH Adams] 
FELTEX NZ LTD 
Equiticorp 47.7 
[Syme, JMR; Hawkins, A W; Gunthorp, I] 
FERNZ 
Fertilizer Holdings Ltd 21.1 
[Smith, BC] 
FISHER & PAYKEL 
Fisher and Paykel families and associates 26.5 
[Fisher, G; Paykel, GA; Paykel, M; 
Wilson, W; Norton, RH] 
FOVEAUX RADIO 
Radio A von Ltd and its directors 27.6 
[Jenkins, TH; Kirkpatrick, IJ; 
Mortlock, PL; Wesney, N] 
GROCORP 
NZI Properties Ltd 18.4 
(Leyland Capital) 
[Jewell, RW; McGrath, JP] 
GROSVENOR PROPERTIES 
Fletcher Challenge Ltd and associated 47.8 
interests 
[Hodgetts, JW] 
HENRY BERRY LTD 
Ceramco Ltd 40.0 
[Nichols, W A; Smith, KMP] 
INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS 
News Ltd 21.2 F 
[Macpherson, J A] 
JAMES SMITH LTD 
Smith family and associates 25.6 
[Smith, DA; Smith, BK; Baird, RW; 
Nelson, JL] 
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JOHN EDMONDS HOLDINGS LTD 
Edmond family 19.9 
[Edmond, LF; Edmond, AM] 
JOHN WEBSTER AND CO. LTD 
Goldsmith family 33.9 
[Goldsmith, AJ] 
LD NATHAN CO. LTD 
Woolworths Australia Ltd 19.4 F 
[Waldron, CT] 
LEYLAND INVESTMENT CO. LTD 
Strevens family and associates 35.6 
[Strevens, WJ] 
LION 
Myers, AD and associated interests 20.3 
[Myers, AD; Fernyhough, CJ] 
MAGNUM (ROTHMANS) 
Godolphin Laing Ltd 16.2 
(Butland, KD; Comes, PJ; 
MacDonald, OA; Matthew, RH) 
[all except Comes are directors] 
MONTANA WINES LTD 
Seagram Company Ltd 43.8 
[MacLennan, AR] 
MOUNT COOK 
Air New Zealand Ltd 30.0 
[Dalgety, JD; Hunter, MF] 
DB Hotels Ltd 26.9 
[Fletcher, JR] 
NZ FOREST PRODUCTS LTD 
Watties Industries Ltd 23.8 
[Pettigrew, R; Gunn, OR; Hunt, WA; 
Lyon, CS] 
NZREFINING 
BP Oil New Zealand Ltd 23.7 
[Black, EH; Milward, RJ; Revell, AA] 
Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd 19.2 
[Makeig, RWL; Marrett, RAJ 
Shell New Zealand Holding Co. Ltd 17.1 
[Dineen, BMJ; Skinner, PD] 
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NZSALMON 
Renouf Portfolio Management Ltd, 17.1 
Judge, JF and Underwood, S 
[both are directors] 
NEWMAN'S 
Goodman Group Ltd 24.6 
[Goodman, PLB] 
NZNEWSLTD 
Brierley Investments Ltd 36.1 
[Hancox, BA; Brierley, RA; 
McDonald, DH] 
NUHAKA 
Caxton Paper Mills 23.9 
OPIO 
Feltex Industries Ltd 40.9 
AMP Society 20.0 
[Dingle, JR; Huse, HW; Keppel, CJ; 
Hambling, EG; Valentine, GW] 
OTAGO PRESS AND PRODUCE 
Fraser family and associates 15.3 
. [Fraser, TC] 
Smith family and associates 19.2 
[Smith, JCS] 
PACER KERRIDGE 
Phillips, DW & SB [both directors] 22.4 
PARAPINE (GENESTOCK) 
Alpha-Laval Agriculture International 19.1 F 
[West, E] 
RADIO AVON LTD 
Skope Venda Ltd 15.0 
[Robertson, AW; Stewart, RJ] 
RADIO OTAGO 
Radio A von Ltd 20.0 
[Kirkpatrick, II] 
Rutherford, WJ [a director] 10.7 
Gilks, JW and associates 8.9 
[Gilles, JW is a director] 
REID FARMERS 
Waitaki NZR Ltd 27.7 
[Valentine, JA; Hutton, AR; Ryan, JM] 
RWSAUNDERSLTD 
Brierley Investments Ltd 20.0 
[Iggo, TG] 
SALMOND INDUSTRIES LTD 
E H Linnel & Co Ltd 29.8 
[Salmond, GW; Salmond, IR] 
SANFORD 
Amalgamated Dairies Ltd 17.6 
and Goodfellow, WD 
[Goodfellow, WD] 
SELBY SHOE CO. LTD 
Tullamore Hldgs Ltd 19.7 
[Ellis, KR] 
SKELLERUP INDUSTRIES LTD 
Skellerup family 24.1 
[Skellerup, PJR; Skellerup, GW; 
Skellerup, CV] 
STEEL AND TUBE 
Fletcher Metals Ltd 24.7 
[Fair, JC; Smith, JG] 
TRANS MARK 
Moyes and Groves family interests 48.7 
and associates 
[Groves, MW; Moyes, VR; Moyes, GR; 
Tanner, MJ] 
TRANSPORT (NORTH CANTERBURY) HOLDINGS LTD 
Grant family 27.7 
[Grant, RL; Grant, RS] 
UEB INDUSTRIES LTD 
NZ Forest Products Ltd 39.1 
[Papps, LM; Hunt, WA; Pettigrew, R; 
Walker, PO] 
VENTURE PACIFIC 
Investment Finance Corporation Ltd 33.4 
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[Ross, DJ; Farquhar, DN] 
WAITAKI NZ REFRIGERATION LTD 
Wattie Finance Ltd 
[Lyon, CS; Morriss, WT] 
WELGAS 
Brierley Investments Ltd 
[Beyer, TJN; Brierley, RA] 
WILKINS AND DAVIES CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD 
Steel and Tube Holdings Ltd 
[Lowis, DW] 
WILSON NEILL 
Herbert, CF [a director] 
WINS TONE LTD 
Brierley Investments Ltd 
[Collins, PD; Hancox, BA] 
BRIERLEY 
Brierley, RA [ a director] 
AMP Society 
JOINT CONTROLLED 
(10 COMPANIES) 
FLETCHER CHALLENGE 
AMP Society 
NML Association of Australasia Ltd 
Employee Share Purchase and Pension 
Schemes (including trustees holdings) 
[Fletcher, JA; Fletcher, J; Sadler, DG; 
Trotter, RR; Small, IR] 
LANE, WALKER, RUDKIN INDUSTRIES LTD 
Rudkin and Lane families 
[Rudkin, PH is Managing Director; 
Rudkin, NH; Rudkin, AJ is an Executive 
Director] 
39.8 
24.6 
22.8 
32.3 
34.1 
5.8 
4.9 
8.3 
4.3 
13.8 
5.9 
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NORMEDIA 
McCully, MS [a director] 11.6 
Northern Publishing Co. Ltd 8.4 
[Barrow, GA] 
Johnston, PL [a director] 8.9 
RADIO PACIFIC 
Finlayson, RJ 12.0 
Lowe, DSR 9.6 
South Pacific Travel Holdings Ltd 8.6 
(partly owned by Wadsworth, AG) 
RJI 
Robert Jones Holdings Ltd 9.1 
and its nominees 
[Jones, R] 
SMITHS CITY 
Smiths City Market (Investments) Ltd 13.4 
and asscociated interests 
[Smith, DR; Smith, KGC; Smith, CD; 
Beattie, H] 
Government Insurance Commissioner 16.4 
TRIUMPH INDUSTRIES LTD 
Leggett, RJ and White, WN 8.0 
[both are directors; Leggett is M.D.] 
. Dominion Mortgage Services Ltd 8.5 
(Challenge Corporate Services -
subsidiary of Fletcher Challenge Ltd) 
[not represented on board] 
W AIKATO STUD 
Centurion Securites and associated 13.3 
parties 
(Castle, CD; Lawrey, JS; Kelly, DD; 
Knight, RF; Hatchwell, JE) 
[Castle, CD; Lawrey, JS] 
Albers, EG [a director] 7.1 
NZ Guardian Trust Co. 6.5 
XS 
Plimmer,BK 12.0 
Egerton, TC 4.3 
[both are directors] 
MANAGEMENT CONTROLLED 
(10 COMPANIES) 
ARTHUR BARNETT LTD 
Government Life Insurance Corp 
Barnett family interests 
[Barnett, AM; Barnett, A W; Barnett, MG] 
CANTERBURY ROLLER FLOUR 
Brand, J [director] 
Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd 
CARTER HOLT HARVEY 
Carter family interests 
NML Association of Australia 
AMP Society 
Courtnay Nominees Ltd (Todd Group) 
Fisher & Paykel Industries Ltd 
CML Assurance Society Ltd 
Carter family interests are represented on the board 
by RHA, KFL and KCA Carter. 
FARMERS TRADING CO. LTD 
AMP Society 
NML Association of Australia Ltd 
State Insurance Office 
Employee Share Purchase Scheme 
Westpac Banking Corp 
Governement Life Insurance Office 
Norwich Union Life Insurance Society 
NZ Guardian Trust Co Ltd 
AMP Fire and General Insurance Coy 
GENERAL PROPERTIES 
J arden Properties Ltd 
[not represented] 
Moller Holdings Ltd 
[Moller, NR - not an executive] 
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance 
HALLENSTEINS 
Hugh Wright Ltd 
(no obvious representation) 
Halsted interests 
[Halsted, IJ] 
Friedlander, EM [a director] 
5.1 
4.3 
7.1 
5.4 
2.1 
23.5 
10.7 
5.7 
2.9 
2.4 
7.2 
2.8 
2.7 
2.7 
2.4 
1.7 
1.2 
1.2 
1.0 
19.4 
7.5 
7.1 
13.7 
3.5 
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MAIRASTLEY 
Government Insurance Commisioner 
NML Association 
State Insurance 
Andrae & Co Ltd and associated interests 
(Gould, MG; Herrick, TM; Nicholls, PW; 
Nicholls, PA; Nicholls, RNV) 
Young, RM; Stokes, BW; Mair, AJ and 
associated interests 
Shadwell, AD [Managing Director] 
PROGRESSIVE ENTERPRISES LTD 
Wilson, W [non-executive director] 
SMITH-BIOLAB LTD 
AA Mutual Insurance Coy Ltd 
[not represented] 
Smith, TW [a director] 
WILSON HORTON 
AMP Society 
NZ Guardian Trust Co. 
Wilson and Horton family interests 
9.8 
8.9 
5.0 
9.3 
5.3 
0.3 
3.7 
11.9 
0.6 
13.9 
5.4 
1.7 
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Appendix 7.2 
CORPORATE 
AND FOREIGN CONTROL 
CLASSIFICATIONS, 1990 
MAJORITY CONTROLLED 
(73 COMPANIES) 
AGLAND HOLDINGS 
Strand (NZ) Ltd 
(Strand (Australia) Ltd) 
AGRICOLA 
Stratacorp Financial Ltd 
(National Provident Fund) 
AHEAD GROUP 
Arnton Enterprises Ltd 
AORANGI HOLDINGS 
Primacq Holdings Ltd 
APPLE FIELDS 
Kain family interests and 
associates 
APPAREL HOLDINGS 
Brierley Investments Ltd 
ARAHI 
Goldcorp Holdings Ltd 
ARARAIMU HOLDINGS 
Hawkins family and associated 
interests 
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50.5 F 
83.4 
61.5 
65.0 
50.8 
70.6 
68.3 
63.5 
ARTHUR BARNETT PROPERTIES 
Arthur Barnett Ltd and associated 
interests 
ASCOT MANAGEMENT 
Broadway Industries Ltd 
AUSTRALIS INTERNATIONAL 
Thwaites, JS 
BNZ 
The Crown 
BNZFINANCE 
Bank of New Zealand 
BROADWAY 
Hubbard, A; Rolleston, HJD; Farrant, IF; 
Nichol, JE; Andrews, P A and associates 
CARDRONA 
Farrant, IF; Paynter, JR; 
Maclachlan, DHD; Healy, CP 
and associates 
CARR BUSINESS SERVICES 
Carr family interests 
CITY REALTIES 
Gulfpac Limited and Zelas Enterprises 
Ltd (Gulf Resources and Chemical Corp.) 
CONSOLIDATED HARDWOOD 
Walker, AL and Walker, LK 
CORPORATE INVESTMENTS LTD 
Masfen, PH 
EROS 
Theseus Investments Ltd 
ELDERS 
Carter Holt Harvey 
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69.5 
62.1 
61.4 
51.6 
78.8 
61.8 
74.6 
59.2 F 
91.2 F 
81.0 
56.7 
60.9 
52.7 
FAY RICHWHITE 
Fay, M and Richwhite, DM 
FIRESTONE 
BridgestonelFirestone Inc. 
FOVEAUX RADIO 
Radio Otago Ltd and its directors 
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
Fortuna Corporation Ltd 
GIRVAN CORPORATION 
Intrax Investments Ltd 
GOLD RESOURCES 
Mineral Resources NZ Ltd and 
associated interests 
INDUSTRIAL EQUITY (PACIFIC) 
Brierley Investmnents Ltd 
KINGS GATE INTERNATIONAL 
. Ballas Nominees (Private) Ltd 
(Jit King Investments Pte Ltd) 
KIWI GOLD 
Smith, MJ; Boniface, IN; Holland, WB; 
Cleland, AL and associates 
KIWI INTERNATIONAL 
Moondance Ventures Ltd 
LASERCORP 
PDL Holdings Ltd and associated 
interests 
LECTRICA 
Tag Corporation Ltd 
LEISURE LEA 
Crowder, G; Lake, TJ; Chartres, LJ 
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72.1 
83.3 F 
91.6 
71.3 
74.1 
54.0 F 
70.0 
71.0 F 
63,8 
85.1 
67.3 
51.9 F 
81.8 
LONDON PACIFIC 
SheIco Investments Ltd 
MAXWELL MARINE 
Cunby, GM and associates 
MCCONNELL DOWELL 
McConnell and Dowell families 
MICHAEL HILL INTERNATIONAL 
Hill, M and associated persons 
MINERAL RESOURCES LTD 
United Resource Investment Holdings 
Ltd and associated interests 
MAGNUM (ROTHMANS) 
Brierley Investments Ltd 
MILBURN 
Holderbank Financiere Glaris Ltd 
MOUNT COOK 
Air New Zealand Ltd 
NZDUTYFREE 
Agena Investments Ltd 
NZ LIGHT LEATHERS 
Strong & Fisher (Holdings) pIc 
NZ PETROLEUM 
Triton Energy Corporation Ltd 
NORMEDIA 
XS Corporation Ltd 
NUPLEX 
Chemplex Australia Ltd 
and Snipe Nominees Ltd 
297 
57.3 F 
59.5 
68.4% 
58.3 
57.0 F 
70.8 
80.3 F 
8004 
67.4 
82.0 F 
63.7 F 
66.0 
73 F 
OWENS GROUP 
Owens family and associated interests 
PANZ 
Portfolio Investments Ltd 
PARAPINE (GENESTOCK) 
Wells, G. 
PAYNTER CORPORATION 
Kiwicorp Financial Ltd and 
associated interests 
PDL 
Stewart family interest 
PERRY DINES 
Rich Dale Investments Pte Ltd 
and associates 
PLATINUM GROUP METALS 
Taylor, GR; Norton, AM and McColl, GR 
. PREMIER MINING SECURITIES 
Neda Investments Ltd 
PROPERTY LINK HOLDINGS 
Tag Corporation Ltd and Anthony 
Group Ltd 
RADIO OTAGO 
Cargill Holdings 
RANK 
Rank Commercial Ltd 
RENOUF PROPERTIES 
Renouf Corporation Ltd 
SCENIC CIRCLE CORPORATION 
Hagaman family 
298 
52.5 
54.6 
62.6 
82.9 
56.9 
82.9 F 
50.5 
50.7 
68.1 F 
51.1 
65.2 
95 F 
61.3 
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SHORTLAND PROPERTIES 
Heriot Properties Ltd, Heriot 55.4 
Nominees Ltd and Courtnay Nominees 
Ltd 
SOUTHERN PETROLEUM 
Brierley Invesments Ltd 71.8 
SPECTRUM RESOURCES LTD 
Corporate Investments Ltd 51 
STEVENSKMS 
Vivax Holdings Ltd, Attwood Financial 86.1 F 
Services Ltd, Wahn Investments Ltd 
(Zuellig Group) 
STRADA ENTERTAINMENT TRUST 
Emperor Investments Ltd 77.2 
STRATHMORE GROUP 
Thomson family 79.1 
STEEL AND TUBE 
Tubemakers of Australia Ltd 50.01 F 
TAG PACIFIC 
Anthony Australia Pty Ltd 52.0 F 
TAYLORS 
Robertson family interests 65.7 
UNITED RESOURCE INVESTMENT HOLDINGS 
Radford, Kennedy and associated 63.0 F 
interests 
VENTURE PACIFIC 
Stratacorp Financial Services Ltd 
(National Provident Fund Ltd) 
WAIKATO STUD 
Hodgson, AG 
WASTE MANAGEMENT 
Pacific Waste Management 
MINORITY CONTROLLED 
(52 COMPANIES) 
AIR NEW ZEALAND 
Brierley Investments Ltd 
[Matthew, RH; Cushing, SJ; 
Collins, PD; Reddy, PL] 
AMURI 
PCG Investments Ltd 
(Pyne Gould Corporation Ltd) 
[Dewar, RD; Gould, GH] 
ARTHUR BARNETT LTD 
Otago Sunday Times [JCS Smith] 
Cargill Holdings Ltd [Gilks, JW] 
ASIAN PROPERTIES 
Joye,IE 
Carpenter, JB 
[both are directors] 
BAYCORP 
McLaughlin family interests 
[McLaughlin, NJ; McLaughlin, KG] 
BLANDFORD LODGE 
Cale Nominees Ltd (Freyer family) 
[Freyer, B; Freyer, J] 
300 
85.9 
60.5 
62.9 F 
39.0 
33.6 
20.9 
20.1 
19.8 
20.0 F 
21.8 
37.5 
301 
BRIDGECORP 
F AI Met Life Group 40.2 F 
CARBORNUDUM 
Hallam, D 33.1 
Ryan,B 43.8 
CARTER HOLT HARVEY 
Carter, KF and RH [directors] 22.4 
CAVALIER 
Timpson, AC and Bie!, GCW interests 36.3 
[both are directors] 
COLONIAL MOTOR 
Gibbons family and associates 28.3 
[GH, JG, MH and PC Gibbons] 
COUNTRYWIDE 
Bank of Scotland 40.0 F 
[Pattullo, DB; Gibson, AT] 
General Accident Insurance Co. NZ Ltd 20.0 
CREDIT CORP 
. Johnstone, SH; Dykes, RJ and 47.4 
associates 
[both are directors] 
CUE ENERGY 
Albers, EG and Hill, DB 48.1 F 
[both are directors] 
DAMnA 
Van Dam family and associates 37.1 
[Van Dam, GJ; Van Dam, CQ; Van Dam, WA] 
DONAGHY'S 
Oakwood Securities Ltd 24.8 
[GJ Marsh; Greenslade, RWM; Valentine, MG] 
DUNBAR SLOANE 
Burdon, PR [on board] 18.0 
EASTERN EQUITIES 
Roebuck, PJ [a director] 29.1 
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ERNEST ADAMS 
Adams family interests 23.8 
(from Directory of Shareholders 6/12/89) 
[HA and RH Adams] 
EURO-NATIONAL 
Riom Enterprises Ltd 30.8 
(Collins, JM; McMahon, PD; 
Spencer, JB; Allbon, SM; Starkey, R) 
[Spencer, JB; Starkey, TR] 
Impala Pacific Ltd 24.9 
(Renouf Corporation Ltd) 
[Davidson, BC; Strange, A W] 
FERNZ 
Falls Creek Investments Ltd 29.5 
[Hoggard, KM and Rathbone, DJ 
- both directors] 
FLETCHER CHALLENGE 
Employee Share Purchase Schemes, 24.6 
Pension Plan and Unit Trust 
(including trustees holdings) 
[Fletcher, JA; Fletcher, J; Sadler, DG; 
Trotter, RR; Wilson, R] 
FORTEX GROUP 
. Indu Farm Holding A.G. Ltd 21.3 F 
[Fehlmann, PO; Finlayson, RJ] 
GENERAL PROPERTIES 
N avistar Group Ltd 49.8 
[GRLane] 
GROCORP 
Nitto Tochi Tatemono Co. Ltd 49.99 F 
(Sanyo Securities Ltd, Japan) 
[Tsuchiya, S; Yamada, S; McGrath, JP] 
HALLENSTEINS 
TC Glasson [a director] 31.8 
HERITAGE MINING 
Atkinson, PR [a director] 31.9 F 
INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS 
News Ltd 49.7 F 
[Macpherson, JA; Searby, RH; Cowley, KE] 
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JARDEN MORGAN LTD 
Sentrybank Corporation Ltd 42.6 
(New Zealand Insurance) 
[Kember, HJ; Clark, DA] 
KENWOOD STUD 
Rangitira Ltd and McKenzie, RA 41.4 
[not represented] 
KUPE 
Euro National Corporation Ltd *42.9 
[Chennells, MG; Starkey, TR] 
LION NATHAN 
Myers, AD; Congreve, RL; Mace, CR; 35.3% 
Ricketts, GT; Cooper, PC and 
associated persons 
[all of the above are directors] 
MACRAES MINING 
Union Gold Mining Co. Hlgs (N.Z.) Ltd 49.0 
[O'Connor, P; Crossley, WJ] 
MAINZEAL 
Menzies, PF; Roy, J and associates 33.5 
[both are directors] 
MAIRASTLEY 
Mainzeal Group Ltd 49.9 
[King, JC; Menzies, PF; Roy, J] 
NZ OIL AND GAS 
Kennedy, HD; Radford, RA and 42.9 F 
associates 
[both directors] 
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NZREFINING 
BPlEuropa Companies 23.7 F 
[Newman, DAR] 
Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd 19.2 
[Peach, EAF; Atkinson, GA] 
Shell New Zealand Holding Co. Ltd 17.1 
[Dineen, BMJ; Dohmel, KAF] 
NZSALMON 
National Bank ofN.Z. Ltd and 15.8 F 
Nichol, JE [a director] 
NUHAKA 
Caxton Paper Mills 8.7 
Greenwood, WJ 5.9 
CML Assurance Society Ltd 19.4 
OPIO 
Feltex Industries Group Ltd 40.9 
[Dingle, JR; Valentine, GW; Smith, KV; 
Wakeling, TALM; Ritchie, DS] 
PACER KERRIDGE 
Kerridge family interests 35.2 
[Kerridge, RJ] 
RADIO PACIFIC 
South Pacific Travel Holdings Ltd 25.7 
[Wadsworth, AG] 
REID FARMERS 
Pyne Gould Corporation Ltd 41.8 
[Dewar, RD] 
RENOUF CORPORATION LTD 
Ariadne Australia Ltd 36.5 F 
[Capp, WB; Boyte, MR] 
South Pacific Merchant Finance Ltd 10.2 
Euro-National Corporation Ltd 8.3 
RJI 
Jones, R [a director] 27.3 
SALMOND SMITH BIOLAB 
AA Insurance Ltd 32.3 
[Knight, RF] 
SANFORD 
Amalgamated Dairies Ltd, Avalon 
Investment Trust and Goodfellow, WD 
[Goodfellow, WD] 
TRANSMARK 
Alstrada Services Ltd 
(Giltrap, CJ; Berry, HP) 
[both directors] 
TRIUMPH INDUSTRIES LTD 
Thompson family interests 
[Thompson, I] 
U-RIX 
Fernbank Industries Ltd 
[Langford, V; Hill, DS] 
WILSON NEILL 
Herbert, CF; Marsh, GJ; Valentine, JA; 
O'Donnell, BJ 
[all of the above are directors] 
XS 
McCully, MS; Goodfellow, PJ; 
Johnston, PL and Provan, KR 
. [Goodfellow is a director] 
FISHER & PAYKEL 
JOINT CONTROLLED 
(4 COMPANIES) 
Fisher and Paykel families and associates 
[Fisher, G; Paykel, GA; Paykel, M] 
National Nominees Ltd 
REGAL SALMON 
Shagin, TM 
Austad, J 
[both directors] 
43.1 
24.9 
22.8 
43.0 
23.6 
47.6 
13.4 
13.3 
6.9 
2.9 
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TV3NETWORK 
Metromedia Holdings Ltd 
[Egerton, T; Impey, B] 
Sherry, MM 
(not represented) 
NBC International 
WILSON HORTON 
AMP Society 
ANZ Nominees Ltd 
Trustees for staff share issues, 
Wilson and Horton family interests 
[Wilson, WJ; Horton, HM] 
BRIERLEY 
MANAGEMENT CONTROLLED 
(5 COMPANIES) 
ANZ Banking Group Ltd 
National Australia Bank Ltd 
AMP Society 
Brierley, RA [a director] 
CANTERBURY ROLLER FLOUR 
Tony Duke Kennels Pty Ltd 
Brand, J [ director] 
Guardian Assurance PLC 
CERAMCO 
AMP Society 
(not represented) 
National Provident Fund Board 
(not represented) 
Bidwill, CR [a director] 
GOODMAN FIELDER WATTlE 
AMP Society 
Barcora Pty Ltd 
AvilockLtd 
NMLGroup 
Asian Food Holdings Ltd 
Pendal Nominees Ltd 
Goodman family interests 
[Goodman, PL; Goodman, PH] 
5.8 
11.2 
7.5 
18.5 
6.5 
7.7 
6.6 
4.9 
4.8 
3.7 
9.8 
6.6 
5.0 
12.8 
6.5 
2.3 
10.4 
9.6 
9.2 
5.4 
4.4 
3.3 
0.1 
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SMITHS CITY 
National Provident Fund Board 
Tower Corporation 
20.4 
18.7 
307 
Appendix 7 .. 3 
CORPORATE 
AND FOREIGN CONTROL 
CLASSIFICATIONS, 1990 
AGLAND 
Strand (Australia) Ltd 
MAJORITY CONTROLLED 
(58 COMPANIES) 
ASCOT MANAGEMENT 
Oregon Forestry 
BEST 
Huljich family interests 
BNZFINANCE 
BNZ 
BROADWAY 
Hubbard, AR and Rolleston, HJD 
CBS FORESTS 
South Pacific Forests Holdings 
CDL 
CDL Hotels International 
CREDIT CORP 
Baycorp 
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71.1 F 
75.1 F 
66.7 
77.9 F 
57.2 F 
78.1 
72.3 F 
90.0 
CUE 
Albers, EG and associates 
DAMBA 
Van Dam family 
DB GROUP 
Tarax Holdings 
(Asia Pacific Brewing, BIL, Heineken) 
DEFIANCE 
Defiance Mills Ltd 
EBOS 
Kraus,P 
ENERCO 
BIL 
FAY RICHWHITE 
M. Fay, D.M. Richwhite and associated interests 
. FIRESTONE 
Bridgestone Firestone Inc 
GOLD RESOURCES 
Mineral Resources and associated interests 
GROCORP 
Sanyo General Capital Co. Ltd 
GUINESSPEAT 
GPGplc 
GULF RESOURCES 
Gulf USA Corporation 
HUTTON'S 
BIL 
309 
85.5 F 
51.6 
54.7 F 
100.0 F 
62.3 
69.7 F 
77.31 
83.33 F 
53.1 F 
50.2 F 
58.75 F 
91.15 F 
51.0 F 
KINGS GATE INTERNATIONAL 
Ballas and Frasers Nominees 
KIWI INTERNATIONAL 
Moondance Ventures Ltd 
KUPE 
CDL Hotels International Ltd 
LANEmWALKER RUDKIN 
BIL 
LECTRICA 
Pirika Investments Ltd (D. Malley) 
MAIRASTLEY 
Mainzeal Group Ltd 
MASTERTRADE 
PDL Holdings Ltd and associated interests 
McCONNELL DOWELL 
Australian Register Control 
MICHAEL HILL 
Hill,RM 
MILBURN 
Zealhoff Holdings Ltd 
(Holderbank Financiere Glaris) 
NORTHLAND PORT 
Northland Regional Council 
NZ LIGHT LEATHERS 
Strong and Fisher (Holdings) pIc 
NZOG 
Mineral Resources Ltd and associated interests 
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79.0 F 
79.27 
52.39 F 
70.0 F 
59.6 
50.27 
65.56 
58.3 F 
53.80 
73.02 F 
72.33 
82.05 F 
52.39 F 
NZ PETROLEUM 
Triton Energy Corporation Ltd 
PARAPINE TIMBER 
G R Wells and associate interests 
PAYNTER 
Kiwicorp Financial Services Ltd 
PDL HOLDINGS 
Stewart family interests 
PERRY DINES 
Rich Dale Investments Ltd 
PORTS OF AUCKLAND 
Auckland Regional Council 
PORT OF TAURANGA 
Quayside Securities Ltd 
(Bay of Plenty Regional Council) 
PROGRESSIVE 
Foodland (NZ Holdings) 
RADIO OTAGO 
Otago Sunday Times Ltd 
SHORTLAND PROPERTIES 
Heriot Properties Ltd 
(Todd Group) 
SHOTOVERJET 
Hill, GR] 
SKELLERUP 
BIL 
SOUTHERN PETROLEUM 
Petrocorp Exploration Ltd 
311 
59.90 F 
59.48 
55.78 
58.4 
53.2 F 
79.99 
55.25 
57.5 F 
50.1 
65.28 
52.94 
50.33 F 
85.00 
SPECTRUM RESOURCES 
Corporate Investments Ltd 
STEEL AND TUBE 
Tubemakers of Australia Ltd 
STEVENSKMS 
Zuellig Group Ltd 
STRADA ENTERTAINMENT TRUST 
Emperor Enterprises Ltd 
STRATHMORE GROUP 
Thomson family interests 
SUMMIT GOLD 
Orion Resources NL 
TAYLORS 
Spotless Catering Services (NZ) Ltd 
TELECOM 
. Ameritech Holdings Ltd 
and Bell Atlantic Holdings 
WASTE MANAGEMENT 
Pacific Waste Management Ltd 
WHITCOULLS 
Rank Commercial Ltd 
WILSON NEILL 
Cadenza International Ltd 
[Adkins, PJ] 
312 
68.81 
50.6 F 
95.32 F 
77.04 
77.51 F 
50.8 
54.76 
64.21 F 
61.95 F 
70.11 
50.01 F 
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MINORITY CONTROLLED 
(48 COMPANIES) 
ADVANTAGE 
Gordon, NP and Smith, RD 34.0 
[both are directors] 
AIR NEW ZEALAND 
BIL 35.4 F 
[Matthew, RH] 
AMURI CORPORATION 
PGC Corporation Ltd 47.6 
[Dewar, RD; Gould, GH; Gould, GAC; 
Elworthy, RF; Weir, R] 
APPLE FIELDS 
Kain family interests 40.2 
[Kain, GTC; Kain, GC] 
ARTHUR BARNETT 
Otago Sunday Times 42.3 
[Smith, JCS] 
ASIAN PROPERTIES 
Carpenter, JB 40.4 F 
BAYCORP 
Ceramco 34.9 
[Bidwill, CR] 
CAVALIER 
Timpson and Beil family interests 29.1 
CEDENCO 
Manaco 25.0 
[represented by Cedenco executives] 
CHH 
BILlInternational Paper 32.6 F 
[Cushing, SJ; Butler, RC; Dillion, JT; 
Hancox, BA; Oskin, DW] 
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CIL 
Masfen, PH [a director] 48.0 
COLONIAL MOTOR COMPANY 
Gibbons family interests 47.6 
[Gibbons, PC; Gibbons, MH; Gibbons, IG; 
Gibbons, IP] 
CULTUS 
Fay, M. and Richwhite, DM [directors] 32.4 
DONAGHY'S 
Directors and families 20.0 
[Marsh, IG; Greenslade, RWM] 
DORCHESTER 
Dorchester and Smyth Ltd 31.4 
[Chinn, F; Alpe, CC; King, BD] 
ENERGY DIRECT 
Energy Direct Community Trust 20.0 
[Burke, IB; Gibbs, EL; Abernethy, AS] 
FERNZ 
. Falls Creek No.2 Pty Ltd 24.17 F 
+ Grantali Pty Ltd 
[Hoggard, KM; Rathbone, DI] 
FLETCHER CHALLENGE LTD 
class as MINORITY CONTROLLED 
FRUITIFED 
N.Z. Fruitgowers Charitable Trust 30.00 
[Taylor, PW] 
HALLENSTEINS 
Glasson, TC [a director] 19.98 
HERITAGE 
Atkinson, PR [a director] 41.0 F 
INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS 
News Ltd, Australia 49.7 F 
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LION NATHAN 
A D Myers [a director] 27.78 
MACRAES 
Union Gold Mining Co. NL 35.00 F 
[Fogarty, BT; Bennett, ML; O'Connor, P.] 
MAINZEAL 
Menzies, PF and Roy, J 26.94 
[both directors] 
NZI Corporation 32.24 
[represented by?] 
MANOR INNS 
Parrant family interests 27.6 
[Parrant, LJ] 
MINERAL RESOURCES 
R A Radford and associated interests 41.30 F 
[a director] 
MOUNT CA VENDISH 
Waterwheel NBOS Ltd 23.89 
[North, M] 
MRCHIPS 
Edgar, ES [a director] 45.3 
NATURAL GAS 
Petroleum Corporation of N.Z. 33.3 
[Falconer, WJ; Fletcher, AG] 
Australian Gas Light Pty Ltd 33.3 
NOEL LEEMING 
RS Bhatnagar [a director] 29.23 
NZDUTYFREE 
Agena Investments Ltd 47.0 
[Seamer, MJ] 
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NZREFINING 
BP Oil New Zealand Ltd 23.66 F 
[Newman, D; Bumton, N; Gailey, G] 
Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd 19.20 
[Law, J; Johnson, R] 
Shell New Zealand Holding Co. Ltd 17.14 
[Dineen, B; Kool, F] 
NZ RURAL PROPERTIES 
Blue Ribbon Holdings Ltd 37.61 
[Cushing, SJ] 
NZSALMON 
National Bank of New Zealand 21.6 F 
[Nichol, JE] 
OWENS GROUP 
Owens, RA and associates 34.1 
[Owens, RA] 
POWER BEAT 
Moari Development Corporation 20.33 
[Ward-Holmes, W] 
Witehira, P [a director] 18.28 
. RADIO PACIFIC 
Totalisator Agency Board 26.7 
Lowe, DSR [a director] 6.0 
REGAL 
Competrol Pacific Ltd 25.0 F 
REID FARMERS 
Pyne Gould Corporation Ltd 43.72 
[Elworthy, RF; Martin, SD] 
RES TECH 
Laht Investments 21.71 F 
[Thompson, JL] 
Maxton Investments Ltd 20.02 
Marup Investments Ltd 12.50 
Dalray Investments Ltd 8.17 
[Johnson, TW] 
RJI 
E. Van Otterloo and associated parties 
[a director] 
SANFORD 
Amalgamated Dairies Ltd and associated intersts 
[Goodfellow, WD] 
TASMAN AGRICULTURE 
EIL 
[Exton, GH] 
TRANSMARK CORPORATION 
M.S. Shriro and D. Wilson 
TRIUMPH INDUSTRIES 
CED Distributors Ltd 
[Thompson, MR] 
U-BIX 
Moari Development Corporation 
and associated interests 
[Ward-Holmes, W.G.; Knox, CF] 
WANG NEW ZEALAND LTD. 
Wang Laboratories Ltd 
[Tucci, lM.; Fisher, H.] 
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28.61 F 
45.02 
37.0 
43.73 
34.0 
27.65 
30.0 F 
BIL 
JOINT CONTROLLED 
(7 COMPANIES) 
Franklin Resources Ltd, USA 
[Wah, LC] 
DESIGNER TEXTILES 
[INSERT] 
DUNBAR SLOANE 
Sloane, DR and associates [a director] 
EASTERN EQUITIES 
Roebuck, PJ [a director] 
ERNEST ADAMS 
Adams family interests 
[Adams, HA+RH] 
WAIRARAPA ELECTRIC 
Centralpower Ltd 
Masterton Distict Council 
[Lodge, AG] 
WILLIAMS & KETTLE 
N .Z. Rural Properties Ltd 
[Cushing, SJ] 
CRF 
Brand, J [a director] 
CERAMCO 
Bidwill, CR 
MANAGEMENT CONTROLLED 
(3 COMPANIES) 
318 
10.9 F 
13.0 
14.3 
9.4 
9.67 
12.00 
12.18 
8.0 
3.3 
JARDINE FLEMING CHINA REGION 
management controlled (1.4% = largest shareholding) 
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Appendix 8 
I>ERFORMANCE AND CONTROL VARIABLES, 1987-93 
V ARIABLE: ROE 
COMPANY 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
A BARNETT 8.62 0.83 -7.77 -17.02 -42.69 3.81 10.37 
BIL 13 .02 10.42 13.68 15.78 7.65 7.70 9.64 
BROTHER 21. 35 5.77 7.69 15.24 7.95 12.04 12.17 
CIU! 21. 25 12.68 14.52 13.96 10.28 8.24 7.82 
COL. MOTOR 20.31 2.28 8.08 4.28 2.92 5.71 8.51 
DONAGHY'S 11.06 6.42 8.03 9.38 9.54 10.48 11.14 
E. ADAMS 17.33 11. 93 16.17 14.72 10.05 10.71 10.83 
EBOS 2.17 4.85 7.89 -18.69 4.95 6.97 13.78 
F&P 13.68 15.33 10.79 9.83 1. 79 3.54 7.62 
FCL 13.78 18.93 18.51 16.43 11. 72 -3.75 9.88 
FEHNZ 7.48 12.38 16.12 17.66 12.08 18.67 19.30 
l"IHI!:STONE 13.17 4.3~ -0.26 0.52 -2.33 4.44 10.81 
lIB 15.27 ]1.69 6.65 8.40 13.61 20.02 27.78 
Ii'lL 9.32 13.29 12.07 13.74 9.88 16.85 21. 67 
KINGSGATE 0.43 1. 36 -5.72 -4.88 -8.29 -5.65 -39.43 
MAGNUM 8.46 5.07 13.48 8.07 5.09 6.91 -4.91 
MAIR 15.86 10.62 5.13 6.87 8.15 18.40 -8.99 
MILBURN 12.50 9.45 10.02 10.14 7.37 9.69 13.51 
NZ REFIN 10.63 8.91 6.27 18.12 19.80 19.40 49.16 
POL 9.50 2.37 9.40 -7.96 3.85 20.58 22.24 
H. OTAGO 16.84 21.00 19.39 32.56 29.84 24.90 39.38 
HEll) 1 1. I I I () . ., 'j I!J.5i1 14. !:lIj ·14.611 15.51 13.24 
S6t'l' J. I" !l.G] -(). 4 B 3.55 J.% 7.99 16.04 
SANFORD 18. '/4 13.59 21. 87 17.74 11.08 16.61 15.56 
TAYLOR'S 26.05 11. 54 -4.12 -5.39 -10.27 -36.92 -7.31 
WHORTON 17.27 15.61 16.27 17.30 12.84 13.35 14.12 
W NEILL 50.67 35.38 19.37 11. 34 -6.35 -11. 45 -141. 33 
W. MNGT 11.74 11.58 14.99 19.91 14.94 15.28 14.61 
CIL 21.79 25.46 18.72 12.91 8.77 -107.22 31.13 
GROCORP 1. 37 -4.93 -12.36 -25.49 6.51 11.15 -9.64 
NZ SALMON -25.63 -26.05 -3.63 -16.14 -26.54 11. 03 10.84 
l'ARAPINE -372.59 -1262.50 7.03 21.42 6.58 13.51 16.92 
R. PACIFIC 38.24 36.43 16.88 13.95 4.18 24.93 26.27 
RJI 2.21 3.56 3.10 3.39 -7.04 -28.32 -198.62 
'.l'RANSMARK 11. 24 30.39 18.16 21. 04 22.60 11.74 -13.11 
TRIUMPH 48.50 -45.32 -5.56 6.93 13.38 -7.27 0.37 
AMURI 2.71 2.65 2.86 4.32 3.92 -2.14 9.94 
APPLE 24.78 4.01 5.64 5.03 6.83 6.63 9.82 
BAY CORP 42.77 59.31 14.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 78.01 
CARR 33.33 15.00 31. 58 -25.52 -75.77 -36.02 2.45 
CAVALIER 7.88 5.06 22.32 18.13 17.66 20.83 15.09 
D.SLOANE 1. 57 -24.57 6.73 7.69 9.01 0.82 -11. 38 
DAMBA 31.11 21. 44 13.86 19.83 7.49 1.02 10.42 
E.EQ 10.20 -21. 95 12.58 3.7S 12.93 20.45 7.90 
GULF 3.03 3.95 5.0c) 3.C)') 3.36 3.25 4.93 
IIELI 9.97 6.73 10.23 14 .19 16.09 17.57 17 .81 
LECTRICA 10.37 0.17 -9.15 -4.86 -83.95 -95.82 -263.51 
MASTER 4.01 6.44 -3.68 4.54 -10.73 -2.37 3.88 
MCCONNEL -4.02 -48.50 -5.63 2.11 -517.22 0.63 -12.00 
OWNES 15.27 6.31 -2.27 8.68 11.12 12.65 15.37 
P.DINES -1. 02 3.08 -3.43 1. 73 -11.54 -7.10 -69.35 
S.KMS 15.37 -7.85 -263.30 0.00 79.74 66.14 60.59 
SHORT 4.09 3.44 5.60 4.79 4.90 5.67 5.60 
SSB 15.75 9.20 4.72 7.09 10.59 9.99 13.94 
STRAT -203.16 4.63 10.26 3.18 8.01 8.12 6.54 
U-BIX 45.28 58.73 38.05 21.76 33.28 31.82 30.41 
VARIABLE: ROA 
COMPANY 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
A BARNETT 11. 36 2.34 1. 26 1. 37 -0.50 6.27 7.66 
BIL 8.84 10.59 12.50 ll.25 8.52 7.82 6.39 
BROTHER 17.62 8.65 9.05 12.88 10.68 9.65 9.21 
CHH 11. 57 9.38 11.00 ll.38 5.95 5.14 6.12 
COL. MOTOR 18.66 8.10 9.60 6.46 4.71 7.50 9.87 
DONAGHY'S 14.59 14.54 8.26 9.81 9.41 10.38 11.87 
E. ADAMS 23.98 18.77 21. 38 19.20 13.40 14.22 14.21 
EBOS 8.35 ll.77 9.75 -1.65 7.84 8.80 13.14 
F&P 18.58 14.49 16.71 15.88 9.21 9.68 11. 21 
FCL 8.36 10.77 11.13 9.41 6.14 2.17 5.36 
FERNZ 11.19 12.35 13.81 16.27 10.93 14.07 13.76 
FIRESTONE 17.15 7.12 1.04 1. 21 0.17 4.23 12.47 
liB 17.38 13.53 9.39 ll.36 17.48 23.71 30.95 
INL ll.31 15.91 12.17 12.52 B.03 10.35 11.18 
KINGSGATE 1. 35 2.74 3.66 6.59 5.03 3.95 -14.57 
MAGNUM 12.26 8.31 12.78 8.91 6.12 6.16 0.27 
MAIR 10.ll 11. 71 9.66 10.64 9.89 14.13 -1. 61 
MILBURN 16.68 12.78 12.94 12.07 ll.76 13.27 18.15 
NZ REFIN 1.20 0.80 0.83 3.30 4.74 4.95 6.15 
PDL ll.76 8.47 9.54 7.31 9.34 14.11 14.31 
R. OTAGO 21. 57 12.58 19.29 19.33 20.22 21.82 28.02 
REID 15.98 16.63 16.04 14.91 14.53 14.48 12.05 
S&T 8.34 6.50 4.93 6.56 7.43 11.01 12.29 
SANFORD 21.07 20.11 29.84 25.74 12.80 21. 22 18.34 
TAYLOR'S 14.73 15.13 8.33 6.27 6.09 0.52 4.06 
WHORTON 28.23 26.25 19.42 24.47 17 .06 17.28 17 .01 
W NEILL 30.36 20.06 12.41 11 .84 7.72 3.95 -9.11 
W. MNGT 16.37 12.81 16.65 18.04 16.85 15.12 12.99 
elL 14 .18 9.46 10.63 11. 31 8.20 -19.32 10.29 
GROeORP 0.97 -0.08 -8.47 -14.91 6.57 9.99 -3.36 
NZ S/\LMON -lO.12 -9.91 2.S5 -S.2G -19.30 10.88 10.66 
PAHAl'1 Ni!: -lll.(J~ -til.'/6 6.3<) 11 .3U 6.35 9.55 16.53 
H. PACIne 46.5" 45.2L IIJ.54 ] 'J .IJ b 12.45 26.84 35.27 
RJI 3.16 5.44 5.22 5.48 1. 99 -5.33 -30.61 
'fRANSMARK 16.81 16.32 19.75 23.40 19.39 13.81 -0.72 
TRIUHPH 24.40 -27.22 -3.96 5.88 10.82 -6.04 0.35 
AMURI 5.25 4.20 4.10 7.29 7.49 5.21 10.59 
APPLE 15.30 8.68 6.73 7.58 8.B7 7.78 8.54 
BAY CORP 31.50 37.91 12.64 -78.97 0.94 22.66 24.11 
CARR 15.94 10.42 14.22 1. 34 -44.69 -17.90 2.24 
CAVALIER 21. 42 5.77 9.02. 14.87 14.02 13.87 15.75 
D.SLOANE 6.90 -24.08 5.53 7.57 9.63 1.06 -10.25 
DAMBA 47.87 34.16 16.94 21. 59 11.99 3.61 11. 53 
E.EQ 10.67 -1. 56 13.13 8.22 12.03 15.74 4.36 
GULF 6.B7 5.15 5.6B 6.26 7.16 7.54 8.24 
HELl 7.92 3.43 10.3B 12.62 17.50 17.08 13.75 
LECTRICA 13.5B 4.56 0.91 2.98 -41.96 -33.08 -65.61 
MASTER B.20 8.64 0.08 7.00 -1.37 2.21 4.58 
MCCONNEL 3.14 -2.64 6.40 0.66 -26.04 10.31 -0.58 
OWNES 8.52 10.53 7.75 10.09 9.37 8.55 9.91 
P.DINES 1. B6 3.74 -1.75 1. 71 -7.63 -4.98 -48.09 
S.KMS B.73 9.80 -6.10 0.05 9.68 12.60 12.50 
SHORT 4.54 3.91 5.82 5.03 5.51 7.82 5.96 
SSB 19.03 13.43 8.61 10.36 9.32 12.50 15.93 
STRAT -14.37 10.73 7.87 2.B1 7.65 7.94 6.47 
U-BIX 32.06 21.02 20.07 18.7B 11. 41 16.97 15.05 
VARIABLE: LEVERAGE 
CONPANY 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
A BARNETT 0.28 0.59 0.61 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.53 
BIL 0.84 0.81 0.73 0.75 0.53 0.41 0.38 
BROTHER 0.72 0.68 0.71 0.69 0.56 0.61 0.62 
CBB 0.71 0.44 0.58 0.50 0.70 0.60 0.47 
COL. HOTOR 0.49 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.23 0.23 0.28 
DONAGHY'S 0.39 0.37 0.50 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.43 
E. ADAMS 0.24 0.28 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.17 0.12 
EBOS 0.67 0.61 0.55 0.69 0.63 0.53 0.48 
F&P 0.31 0.43 0.53 0.38 0.39 0.33 0.30 
FCL 0.67 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.60 0.70 0.64 
FERNZ 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.57 0.58 0.53 
FIRESTONE 0.23 0.19 0.28 0.33 0.22 0.33 0.30 
HB 0.39 0.57 0.47 0.49 0.31 0.21 0.18 
INL 0.36 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.59 0.56 0.50 
KINGSGATE 0.21 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.59 0.51 
MAGNUH 0.29 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.46 0.56 0.40 
MAIR 0.59 0.65 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.55 0.62 
MILBURN 0.39 0.45 0.52 0.51 0.43 0.38 0.26 
NZ REFIN 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.91 0.82 0.88 
PDL 0.65 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.70 0.60 0.48 
R. OTAGO 0.35 0.66 0.51 0.74 0.59 0.58 0.53 
REID 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.52 0.51 0.60 
S&'l' 0.56 0.53 0.37 0.48 0.4-' 0.34 0.38 
SANFOHD (). !J S 0.55 0.38 ().IJ~ o.:n 0.25 0.28 
'l'AYLOH'S 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.65 0.60 
WHORTON 0.31 0.21 0.51 0.47 0.29 0.23 0.26 
W NEILL 0.54 0.63 0.70 0.63 0.72 0.79 0.87 
W. HNGT 0.41 0.43 0.35 0.48 0.32 0.35 0.42 
CIL 0.56 0.77 0.73 0.63 0.47 0.66 0.41 
GROCORP 0.30 0.40 0.07 0.35 0.43 0.35 0.42 
HZ SALMON 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.08 0.03 0.02 
PARAPINE 0.64 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.76 0.55 0.55 
R. PACIFIC 0.35 0.33 0.42 0.48 0.13 0.18 0.15 
RJI 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.44 0.54 0.56 0.79 
THANSMAHK 0.47 0.77 (). -10 0.65 0.6'1 0.56 0.53 
THIUMPII o.n 0.34 (). 12 0.16 () • 1 'J 0.16 0.18 
AMURI 0.24 0.15 0.29 O. J-' 0.46 0.56 0.51 
APPLE 1. 47 0.45 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.39 0.40 
BAY CORP 0.62 0.58 0.52 1. 02 1.12 0.96 0.70 
CARR 0.68 0.55 0.64 0.81 0.32 0.42 0.38 
CAVALIER 1. 96 0.72 0.58 0.44 0.38 0.45 0.38 
D.SLOANE 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 
DAMBA 0.25 0.21 0.24 0.37 0.27 0.36 0.40 
E.EQ 0.26 0.66 1.10 0.41 0.47 0.44 0.20 
GULF 1.01 0.27 0.50 0.44 0.54 0.63 0.66 
HELl 0.11 0.45 0.42 0.56 0.47 0.41 0.52 
LECTRICA 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.60 0.73 
MASTER 0.38 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.57 0.42 0.25 
MCCONNEL 0.78 0.83 0.80 0.07 0.91 0.70 0.82 
OWNES 0.77 0.67 0.73 0.71 0.65 0.59 0.59 
P.DINES 0.27 0.24 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.30 
S.KHS 0.63 0.76 0.93 1. 01 0.91 0.86 0.86 
SliORT 0.98 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.29 0.27 0.22 
SSB 0.46 0.44 0.38 0.39 0.34 0.34 0.34 
S'l'RAT 0.B1 0.32 0.24 0.09 0.04 U.U2 0.01 
U-BIX 0.61 0.61 0.55 0.43 0.70 U.70 0.74 
V ARIABLE: SIZE 
COMPANY 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
A BARNETT 10.18 10.75 10.70 10.70 10.45 10.48 10.56 
BIL 16.28 16.23 15.97 16.04 16.30 16.24 16.12 
BROTHER 8.89 10.55 10.66 10.74 10.63 10.95 11.02 
CHn 14.37 14.56 14 .81 14.92 15.75 15.66 15.64 
COL. MOTOR 11. 52 11. 40 11.44 11. 46 11.33 11.38 11. 49 
DONAGHY'S 11. 07 11.12 11.51 11.57 11.71 11.73 11. 79 
E. ADAMS 9.35 9.62 9.65 9.78 10.15 10.14 10.17 
EBOS 9.54 9.43 9.33 9.49 9.35 9.15 9.19 
F&P 12.59 12.88 12.96 12.86 12.94 12.85 12.87 
FCL 15.90 16.26 16.46 16.68 16.74 16.87 16.62 
FERNZ 12.25 12.47 12.58 12.71 12.76 12.88 12.87 
1" I RES'l'ONE 10.95 10.88 10.99 10.96 10.78 10.99 11. 03 
HB 11. 22 11.11 10.89 10.93 10.82 10.78 10.91 
Ii'lL 12.23 12.37 12.58 12.69 13.39 13.37 13.38 
KINGSGATE 12.62 12.92 12.97 12.70 12.66 12.46 12.25 
MAGNUM 13.51 13.94 13.66 13.80 14 .01 13.77 13.64 
MAIR 12.09 12.35 12.42 12.30 12.16 12.08 11. 92 
MILBURN 11.74 11.88 12.07 12.11 12.08 12.05 12.06 
NZ REFIN 14.50 14.44 14.39 14.36 14.27 14.29 14.14 
PDL 11.52 12.06 12.13 12.09 11.94 11. 75 11.87 
R. OTAGO 8.08 9.21 8.61 8.57 8.72 8.84 8.96 
REID 10.44 10.47 10.57 10.73 10.81 10.91 10.97 
S&T 12.90 12.78 12.18 12.32 12.20 11.90 12.06 
SANFORD 11.12 11.16 11 . 14 11. 27 12.31 12.26 12.40 
TAYLOR'S 9.71 10.02 10.02 9.95 9.80 9.59 9.30 
W BOR'!'ON 11. 95 12.11 12.34 12.44 12.63 12.70 12.80 
W NEILL 12.14 12.55 13.20 13.04 12.87 12.81 12.33 
W. MNGT 9.60 9.78 9.84 10.28 10.41 10.61 10.87 
elL 12.25 12.98 1 J . 0'/ 13.16 13.23 13 .05 12.44 
GHOCOHP 9.49 9.!.d I().O~ 9.90 10.10 10.23 10.30 
NZ SALI10N 1O.n IlL OJ 10.1"1 10.06 9.23 <). J7 9.48 
PARAPINE 6.61 5.76 9.03 8.97 9.24 9.34 9.42 
R. PACIFIC 7.80 7.95 8.24 7.94 7.89 8.30 8.32 
RJI 13.32 13.68 14.19 14.38 14.06 13.91 13.51 
TRANSMARK 10.15 11.02 10.82 10.73 10.86 11. 01 10.79 
TIUUMPH 8.45 7.61 7.39 7.51 7.69 7.58 7.60 
AHUfU 10.80 10.1:l9 11.10 11. 07 11.18 10.83 10.83 
APPLE 8.94 10.41 10.89 11. 29 11. 37 11.46 11. 39 
BAY CORP 10.22 10.51 10.76 10.13 9.92 9.79 9.61 
CARR 6.62 6.96 7.19 7.71 6.43 6.10 9.96 
CAVALIER 10.10 11.65 11. 77 11. 58 11. 53 11.72 11. 66 
D.SLOANE 9.61 9.48 9.65 9.85 9.85 9.82 9.65 
DAMBA 8.57 8.63 8.64 8.91 8.78 8.95 8.95 
E.EQ 9.34 10.18 10.02 10.15 10.09 10.28 10.92 
GULF 11.51 11.88 12.11 12.89 12.91 12.92 12.79 
IlELI 9.92 10.41 10.43 10.86 10.84 11.04 11. 38 
LECTRICA 9.86 9.81 9.71 9.52 8.97 8.52 7.62 
MASTER 11.08 11.43 11. 46 11.43 11.43 11. 07 11. 21 
MCCONNEL 13.27 12.92 12.74 15.08 12.23 11.40 11.68 
OWNES 12.26 11. 97 11.72 11. 70 11. 58 11.53 11. 49 
P.DINES 11. 26 11.06 11. 03 11. 01 10.96 11.04 10.77 
S.KMS 11.28 11. 25 11.18 11. 08 11. 36 11. 27 11. 51 
SHORT 11. 57 11.86 11.71 11.78 11.82 11.74 11.98 
SSB 11.14 11.17 11. 03 11.06 11. 03 11.12 11. 24 
STRAT 10.92 9.69 9.64 9.48 9.52 9.59 9.65 
U-BIX 9.51 9.95 10.10 10.12 10.99 11.17 11. 44 
V AI~IA LE: COMI) ANY IN'rEJ{LOCI(S 
1987 1990 f 1993 
A BARNETT 5 4 2 
BIL 19 8 8 
BROTHER 6 7 7 
CUH 8 4 8 
COL. MOTOR 0 0 0 
DONAGHY'S 7 4 3 
E. ADAMS 4 0 0 
EBOS 4 2 0 
F&P 12 5 6 
FCL 13 9 8 
FERNZ 13 3 3 
FIRESTONE 2 1 0 
HB 2 0 0 
Ii'lL 7 3 5 
KINGSGATE 6 3 0 
MAGNUM 10 4 2 
MAIR 9 2 4 
MILBURN 1 0 1 
NZ REFIN 6 7 9 
PDL 1 1 1 
R. OTAGO 5 4 2 
REID 5 3 2 
S&T 4 3 1 
SANFORD 2 1 1 
TAYLOR'S 6 4 3 
W UOR'l'ON 4 2 3 
W NEILL 16 4 2 
W. MNGT 0 0 0 
elL 14 6 
GHOCORP 6 0 
NZ SALI-ION 6 U 'I 
l'ARAP I NI~ 6 2 () 
R. PACll-'lC 2 2 1 
RJI 0 0 I 
'l'HANSI1AHK 8 1 () 
